



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THE UNITED STATES  
AND  
THE PHILIPPINES



# THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES

BY  
D. R. WILLIAMS



GARDEN CITY                      NEW YORK  
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY  
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## INTRODUCTION

ON APRIL 24, 1898, John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, sent the following laconic message to Commodore George Dewey, Hong Kong:

War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands and capture or destroy the Spanish Fleet.

On the morning of May 1, 1898, Dewey's squadron steamed into Manila Bay, and the Spanish fleet, lying off Cavite, was attacked and destroyed.

On August 13, 1898, American land forces captured the City of Manila, and the flag of Spain, which had flown in sovereignty over this Far Eastern outpost for three hundred and thirty years, gave way to the stars and stripes of the Western Republic.

In the years between, much of history has been written. A battle-scarred Europe has been remapped and is still struggling in the throes of readjustment; provincial America, flung by events into the turmoil of world affairs, has hesitatingly realized that it cannot live to itself alone; the somnolent East, land of myth and legend, has thrilled with awakened life, and its unbounded resources and uncounted millions have become a vital force in world trade and world politics. Everywhere old habits, old traditions, old manners of life and thought and conduct are changing, and on their ruins is shaping a new order, with

a confusion of problems and interests as novel as they are complicated and dangerous.

What place do the Philippines hold in this jigsaw puzzle whose shifting combinations have disrupted the old accustomed ways? What of the islands themselves and their possibilities, political and commercial? What of the Philippine people and their capacity and limitations? What has the possession of such islands meant thus far to the United States and to the Filipinos, and what good or evil would flow from their retention or abandonment?

Interesting and important as these questions are to every American, comparatively few have ever given them serious thought. To most this whole matter of the Philippines and our relations thereto has seemed of small moment when compared with local problems. Every effort to arouse general interest in the subject, or to convince that our possession and ultimate disposition of this island empire are fraught with momentous and far-reaching consequences, has met a blank wall of ignorance or unconcern. It is an unfortunate if not dangerous situation, furnishing as it does a fruitful field for the propagandist and the politician, who concern themselves little with facts or consequences. Without a knowledge and appreciation of actual conditions by Americans generally, there is ever a chance that snap judgment will be taken, with possibly disastrous results to both the United States and the Philippines.

Unfortunately, the whole question has become so befogged with sentiment and partisanship as utterly to confuse the seeker for truth, however honest and impartial. By treaty with Spain, ratified by a non-party vote, the Philippine Archipelago was ceded to and became territory of the United States. Through deliberate act we as-

sumed responsibility to the Filipino people and to the world for the orderly administration of justice in the islands. The Republican Party, which then chanced to be in power, took the only course possible under the circumstances, that is, established upon the ruins of Spanish sovereignty a government wherein the rights of all were safeguarded, and anarchy, chaos, and foreign intervention averted. Despite this logical and necessary step, taken without any pronouncement as to the future, the partisan cry of "Imperialism" was raised by Mr. Bryan in 1900, and the Philippines made the paramount issue of his campaign. Since then, the Democratic Party has continued to sponsor the immediate or early independence of the islands, while the Republicans have, in the main, opposed it. This absurd thing has happened notwithstanding that our people, as individuals, fully realize and frankly admit that party exigencies furnish no possible line of cleavage in the matter, and that to make the Philippines a pawn in the game of politics belittles our intelligence and invites disaster.

In the domain of personal testimony equal inconsistency prevails. Itinerant Congressmen, interested in bolstering party shibboleths, have reached and preached diametrically opposite conclusions from identical facts. Filipino politicians, through hand-picked "missions" and skilfully prepared press material, have indulged and are indulging a widespread but misleading propaganda for immediate independence. Doctrinaires and "little Americans," in utter disregard of obligations assumed, have raved and torn their hair over our venture in colonial government, reading into it all sorts of evil purposes and dire calamities. Others, with first-hand knowledge of conditions, have not been unanimous, some favouring and

others decrying our continued retention of the islands. Small wonder that a bewildered public, ten thousand miles away, is left guessing as to the proper answer.

It is time, however, to get the thing straight if we can. A crisis in our relations to the Philippines is fast approaching, with every indication that their future status will be definitely fixed in the early future, and it should be no hit-or-miss affair. Upon a right decision hinge not only the progress and well-being of ten millions of Filipinos and their descendants, but also the prestige of the United States and the part it is destined to play in the titanic struggle now shaping for trade supremacy in the awakening Orient.

✓ The purpose of the present work is to try to set out in orderly fashion the different factors of the problem as they affect the interests of the United States and of the Philippines. Twenty-five years of American control in the Archipelago should now furnish a fairly safe perspective against which to estimate the character and capacity of the Filipino people, and their reaction to modern ideas of government and personal relations. As to the islands themselves, the steadily swinging pendulum of international interest to the Far East has invested their possession with a significance, political and commercial, altogether undreamed when they passed into our keeping in 1898.

Given the controversial nature of the subject, criticism is inevitable whatever the conclusions reached. To the propagandist and the theorist, interested solely in stressing conditions favourable to their cause, whatever tends to oppose or weaken their argument is naturally unwelcome. To others, trained to register party slogans automatically or to run with the herd, anything which discredits their

inherited views must necessarily be wrong. Simply as a matter of record, the writer here disclaims holding any brief against Philippine independence except as he believes its realization would spell tragedy to the Filipino people; nor is he concerned with political pronouncements except as their translation into fact would, in his opinion, be a repudiation of obligations deliberately assumed by the American people. If the conditions hereinafter recited seem to emphasize the present unpreparedness of the Filipinos to stand alone, and the difficulties which would confront them if turned adrift by the United States, it is only that all the elements of the case may be known and receive consideration. Abundant literature has been and is being circulated to persuade our people and Congress that independence should be granted forthwith and American sovereignty withdrawn. Certainly no harm will result from taking into account the possible perils of such a step, while much may be lost through the obvious tendency to ignore them. To sound a warning when it is felt that danger threatens, is the act of a friend and not of an enemy.

Having lived in the Philippines for over twenty years, with opportunity to study the situation from within and without, there is at least a presumption that the writer is qualified to treat the subject intelligently. If he fails to do so it will be through lack of natural capacity rather than through lack of information or of a desire to portray the facts as he sincerely believes them to be. At all events, there will have been an attempt to stimulate further inquiry into the matter, and to impress the importance of the issue upon those charged with responsibility in the premises. How such responsibility is met, and how the situation develops in consequence, will not be lacking in interest.





THE UNITED STATES  
AND  
THE PHILIPPINES



# THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES

## CHAPTER I

### THE PHILIPPINES AND THE FAR EAST

**G**EOGRAPHICALLY, the Philippine Archipelago fronts for a thousand miles and more on the coast of Asia, being part of that great chain of islands sweeping from Kamchatka to the Equator, of which the Japanese Empire forms roughly the northern half. Within a radius of thirty-five hundred miles of Manila, lives half the population of the globe. Sparsely inhabited themselves, and with their tremendous potential resources in food and other products scarcely touched, the Philippines lie within the shadow of great, over-populated countries ever seeking an outlet for their land-hungry, starving, congested millions. The fate of the Filipino people is inextricably mingled with that of the Far East as a whole, and any disposition made of them by the United States must take into account this wider problem. A preliminary survey of events and policies in eastern Asia may help, therefore, in fixing the nature and extent of our responsibility.

It is natural, perhaps, to exaggerate the importance of one's particular theme. We believe, however, that when

the record is analyzed, it will be found that the terse message which sent Dewey's fleet to Manila Bay in 1898 carried in its wake a train of inevitable happenings which largely changed the destiny of the United States and the Far East, if not of the world. At that time our people knew little and cared less about conditions in China, or what was happening in all that vast territory beyond the Pacific. Engrossed in domestic affairs, uneducated as to the needs and value of foreign trade, and with no apparent material rewards at stake, the attitude of both our government and people toward Oriental affairs was largely one of indifference or of merely academic interest. It was Mr. Dooley who aptly expressed the bewilderment of our people at news of Dewey's victory, by saying that most Americans did not know whether the Philippines were islands or a breakfast food.

In 1898 the transpacific carrying trade of the United States was represented by six small steamers of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, with but a handful of Americans doing business in Asiatic ports. Not only was the very considerable commerce of the Orient practically monopolized by Europeans, but the ancient Empire of China, with all its potential possibilities, was rapidly being dismembered. One after another its strategic harbours and richest provinces were passing into the possession or becoming the closed preserve of foreign Powers, with nothing in sight to hinder what seemed an inevitable "break up" and division of the spoils. By 1900 this scramble to secure specific territory or special privileges in China had reached the following pass:

Great Britain possessed the Island of Victoria (Hong Kong), with its magnificent harbour and naval base. She held Kowloon Peninsula (opposite Hong Kong), as also the

port of Weihaiwei and adjacent territory, under ninety-nine-year leaseholds, while China had agreed not to alienate any territory adjoining the Yangtze River "to any other Power."

France, already intrenched in Annam and Tonking (Indo-China), held the Bay of Kwangchow in Kwantung Province under a ninety-nine-year lease, and had exacted a promise that China would not alienate the Island of Hainan or the provinces of Kwantung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan, bordering on Tonking, to any other Power.

Germany had secured a ninety-nine-year lease of the Bay of Kiaochow, with a neutral zone fifty kilometres wide around its shores; also the right to construct two railways in the Province of Shantung, to develop mining properties adjacent thereto, and to have preferential trade rights for her nationals throughout the whole of Shantung.

Russia had demanded and secured a twenty-five-year lease of Dalny, Port Arthur, and the lower part of the Liaotung Peninsula, while she asserted and was conceded special rights in the territory beyond the Great Wall.

Japan, through her war with China in 1894, secured Formosa and the Pescadores Islands, while Korea, theretofore claimed as a vassal state by China, became independent. Subsequently Japan exacted a promise from China not to alienate any part of Fukien Province, opposite Formosa, to any other Power.

Portugal held in perpetuity the Peninsula of Macao, the oldest of the European colonies in eastern Asia.

China was impotent to resist this steady invasion of her sovereignty, while the nations involved, being in accord as to their respective interests, were naturally concerned in hastening rather than in halting the process of dissolution.

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It was at this critical stage that the United States acquired the Philippine Islands, and was compelled by such fact to think and act in terms of an Asiatic Power. Fortunately, Mr. John Hay, then Secretary of State, was endowed with the ability and the vision to realize the importance of this new development in our Far Eastern relations and the obligations it imposed. Foremost among these obligations was to safeguard our interests in China through forestalling a further invasion of her sovereignty or the carving of her territory into exclusive trade areas. He acted promptly, our respective Ambassadors and Ministers to Great Britain, Germany, Russia, France, Japan, and Italy being instructed in September and November, 1899, to request of such governments "formal assurance"—

That any claims made by them to spheres of influence in China would not interfere with any vested interest within such so-called spheres.

That the Chinese tariff then in force would apply to all merchandise, to whatever nationality belonging, landed in or shipped to all ports within such spheres, and that the duties levied thereon should be collected by the Chinese Government; and

That no discrimination whatever be made in the matter of harbour dues or railroad charges within such spheres as to vessels or merchandise belonging to the citizens or subjects of any other nationality.

Italy, the only country notified which had acquired no special privileges in China, promptly assented. The others, while unable to question the right or justice of Mr. Hay's position, conditioned their assent upon a "like acquiescence" by the other Powers. The answers in this regard being uniform, they were treated as acceptances and the Powers were so notified by Mr. Hay in March, 1900.

The laying down of this equality of opportunity or "Open Door" policy—first fruits of our political entry

into Asiatic territory—not only halted the impending partition of China, but in its eventual workings has assured to the United States a place of commanding influence and importance in the whole Pacific area.

The action taken by Mr. Hay was timely. Within less than three months thereafter events took place which, had the Powers not been pledged otherwise, would have furnished ample excuse for their intervention in the government of China. In June, 1900, the world was startled by news that the foreign legations at Peking had been shut off from outside communication—and were being besieged and threatened with extermination by an organization colloquially known as “Boxers.” Taken by surprise, the principal Powers exerted themselves to assemble a relief force at Tientsin. The United States, through the presence of American troops in the Philippines, was enabled immediately to rush two regiments to the scene, and thus take an active part and voice in the relief operations. Realizing the attitude of the belligerents, the American Government on July 3d, before marching on Peking, stated its policy as follows:

To seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.

This principle was accepted by the Powers, and the “territorial integrity of China” became linked thereafter with the Open Door policy. While the promiscuous looting of non-combatants following the capture of Peking, and the exorbitant indemnities imposed by certain of the Powers, were outrageous and indefensible, the outstanding fact is that China, largely through the stand taken by

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the United States, weathered the crisis without dismemberment.

The struggle, however, was but beginning. In January 1902, an alliance was entered into between Great Britain and Japan, whereby they mutually agreed to assist each other should any third Power intervene in hostilities undertaken by either of them in defence of their "special interests" in China and Korea. Backed and protected by this alliance, Japan declared war on Russia in February, 1904, to test the growing power of the latter in Manchuria and Korea. With her reserves of men and supplies thousands of miles away, Russia in the Far East met defeat. As fruits of her victory Japan acquired the southern half of Saghalien Island, Russia's unexpired leasehold of Dalny, Port Arthur, and adjacent territory, as also the South Manchurian branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway—being a line from Changchun to Dalny and Port Arthur. As a heritage of the war, Japan also asserted certain preferred rights in Manchuria, this notwithstanding that her peace treaty with Russia expressly stated:

The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they have not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.

It is interesting to note here that the subtle force of propaganda—with which our country has been so deluged in recent years—was first exploited on a large scale in this Russo-Japanese War. Through a skilful press campaign, and at no small expense, the sympathies of most Americans were enlisted with Japan in the war, and her aims and victory applauded. It illustrates the power of the printed word which, despite every disillusion, is still accepted as gospel by the majority of people.



The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 specifically recited in its preamble that both parties were "specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations." Japan had recognized the independence of Korea in her treaty with China following the Sino-Japanese War, and had, after declaring war on Russia, entered into formal treaty with Korea guaranteeing the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire. In August, 1905, Russia having been defeated, the original Anglo-Japanese alliance, though not expiring until 1907, was replaced by a new instrument which omitted all reference to "maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of Korea," and expressly recognized "the paramount political, military, and economic interests" of Japan in that country. In November, 1905, Japan established a protectorate over Korea, and in August, 1910, followed this step by formal annexation. This latter was staged through a "treaty" whereby the Emperor of Korea ceded his rights of sovereignty to the Emperor of Japan. Thus ended the Open Door in the Hermit Kingdom.

By ultimatum delivered to China in 1909, Japan secured the right to construct and operate a railway from the Yalu River—dividing line between Korea and Manchuria—to Mukden. This established a through connection with the port of Fusan, south Korea, and gave her, in conjunction with the South Manchurian line, Dalny to Changchun, a strangle-hold on transportation in South Manchuria. That this monopoly should be used to favour her own traders in the matter of rates, shipping facilities, and commercial privileges was inevitable. Not only this, but ob-

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jection was entered to every project by other interests tending to lessen Japanese influence or control in the Manchurian area.

Growing out of this situation, and the blocking by Japan (backed by Great Britain, France, and Russia) of various concessions granted to British and American capital for railway construction in Manchuria, the United States, through Secretary Knox, submitted a proposal in 1909 to Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan, Germany, and China for the "neutralization" of the Manchurian railways. This plan involved a loan to China for the repurchase of such lines, the participating powers to supervise operations during the loan period. The purpose, as stated by Mr. Knox, was:

to secure an economic, scientific, and *impartial administration* of such lines, and to furnish the most effective way of preserving the undisturbed enjoyment by China of all political rights in Manchuria and of promoting the development of those provinces under a practical application of the Open Door and equality of opportunity policy.

Inasmuch as China already had the right to repurchase these lines in 1937, Mr. Knox's plan simply anticipated such an event under conditions which would eliminate further friction, insure just treatment for China, and impartially protect the interests of all concerned. China, who saw her sovereign rights in Manchuria being gradually undermined, heartily endorsed the arrangement. For the same reason it was rejected by Japan and Russia; in which stand they were supported by their allies, Great Britain and France. The net result was to preclude China from deciding the form of railway construction, and other development, in her own territory, and to shut tighter the door of equal opportunity in one of her greatest prov-

inces. This happened notwithstanding the Russo-Japanese peace treaty provided that:

Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.

In 1912 the Manchu dynasty in China was overthrown and a republic established. The result, given the immensity of Chinese territory, lack of means of communication, and the utter inexperience of her people in matters political, was and is a transition period bordering on chaos. Semi-independent governments dominated by local military leaders were erected in many provinces; while the whole of South China subsequently broke away and established a separate republic under Sun Yat Sen. The central government at Peking, largely shorn of power and revenues, fell into the hands of officials concerned more in enhancing their private fortunes than in protecting the rights of their people. The waters were indeed sorely troubled and the fishing good.

On the heels of this portentous development in China came the World War, centring the attention and energies of European Powers upon problems far more vital than the vicissitudes or fate of this infant republic of the Far East. To them it became, at most, simply a pawn to play in their then deadly struggle for existence.

Japan, flushed with her victories over China and Russia, and completely subservient to an ambitious military caste, steadily pursued a policy having for its aim the dominance, if not the absorption, of the trade and political destiny of eastern Asia. Possession had already been acquired of Formosa, Korea, the Liaotung Peninsula, and the southern half of Saghalien Island, with special rights

acknowledged in South Manchuria by Powers other than the United States. The European cataclysm furnished an unexpected opportunity to expedite and consolidate her ambitions, which she utilized to the utmost.

On August 15, 1914, two weeks after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, Japan delivered an ultimatum to Germany, expiring August 23d, commanding her, among other things—

To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochou, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.

This ultimatum remaining unanswered, operations were undertaken against Tsingtao and its small German garrison, the city being captured early in November with but few casualties. Some twenty-thousand Japanese soldiers were engaged, assisted by a detachment of twelve hundred British and Sikh troops. China, though directly concerned, was not consulted, while her status as a neutral was violated through the invasion of Japanese troops across purely Chinese territory, the forcible requisition of labour and supplies, and other totally unwarranted usurpations of authority.

With the elimination of the isolated German garrison at Tsingtao, every "war purpose" involved was accomplished and further aggression uncalled for. Japan, however, proceeded immediately to take possession of, garrison, and operate the German-built railway extending 256 miles westward to Tsinanfu, to exploit in her own interests the mining and other concessions held by Germany, to seize the archives and other property of the Chinese customs at Tsingtao, and to control in large

measure the government and economic resources of Shantung Province with its 40,000,000 inhabitants.

In the meantime both the Japanese Government and people reaped tremendous profits through the sale of munitions and supplies, through a virtual monopoly of shipping on the Pacific, and through an almost exclusive sale of Japanese products in markets theretofore shared by her allies. The bulk of these increased revenues was used in the progressive enlargement of her navy and the upbuilding of a powerful military establishment.

All doubts as to Japan's imperial designs upon Asia were dispelled in 1915. At a time when world attention was focussed upon Europe, and any concerted opposition unlikely, Japan boldly unmasked and through her "Twenty-one Demands" upon a helpless China, sought to entrench herself as overlord of that great country. In the letter of instructions by Baron Kato, Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, transmitting such demands to the Japanese Minister to China, this purpose is bluntly stated as follows:

Believing it absolutely essential for strengthening Japan's position in Eastern Asia as well as for the preservation of the general interest, to secure Chinese adherence to the foregoing proposals [demands], the Imperial Government are determined to attain this end by all means within their power.

As originally presented, the demands were divided into Five Groups. By the first four China became obligated: To abide by any agreement thereafter reached between Japan and Germany relative to German possessions in Shantung Province; not to cede or lease to a third Power any territory or island within such province or along its shores, with right in Japan to construct a railway from Chefoo or Lungkau to join the Kiaochou-Tsinanfu Rail-

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way; to extend the lease of Dalny and Port Arthur (expiring in 1923) to a period of ninety-nine years, with like extension of the South Manchurian and Antung-Mukden Railway leases; to grant Japanese subjects right to lease and own lands and to engage in business, manufacture, and mining in South Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia; not to grant permission to subjects of a third Power to construct a railway in such territory, or to pledge local taxes therein to a third Power as security for a loan without previous consent of the Japanese Government; not to employ political, military, or financial advisers in South Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia without first consulting Japan; to hand over to Japan the control and management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway for a term of ninety-nine years; to operate jointly with Japan the Hanyehping Coal & Iron Company, adjacent to Hankow, and not to dispose of any of its rights or property, or operate adjacent mines, or undertake any work affecting the interests of such company, without the previous consent of Japan, and not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China.

By Group V of the demands, China obligated herself: To employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs; to grant Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools in the interior of China the right of owning lands; to have the police departments in important places in China administered jointly by Japanese and Chinese, or to have such police departments employ numerous Japanese; to purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (50 per cent. or more of the amount needed), or to agree that there be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal, and that Japanese technical experts be employed and Japanese material

purchased; to grant to Japan the right to construct a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hangchow, and another between Nanchang and Chaochou; to consult Japan first if foreign capital be needed to work mines, build railways, or construct harbour works in the Province of Fukien, and to grant Japanese subjects the right of missionary propaganda in China.

These demands, if accepted as presented, would have brought China under the virtual suzerainty of Japan, as was doubtless intended. They were altogether unprovoked and without legal or moral sanction. No war existed between the two countries, nor had China trespassed on any rights of Japan. It was simply a case of stand and deliver, where China gave everything and received nothing. Pressure was brought to have China accept such demands *en bloc* and without publicity. When information seeped through that certain demands had been made, Japan sought at first to conceal their true purport. When further evasion became impossible, the original proposals were variously modified to meet the storm of criticism evoked. Finally, on May 7, 1915, Japan issued an ultimatum to China that unless the "revised" demands were accepted before 6 p. m. of May 9th, "the Imperial Government will take such steps as they may deem necessary." Faced with this ultimatum China was perforce compelled to accept, which she did.

Under the demands as finally imposed, China agreed: To give full assent to any agreement thereafter reached between Japan and Germany as to disposition of the rights, interests and concessions of Germany in Shantung Province; not to lease or concede to any foreign Power any territory within or island along the coast of such

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Province, and to approach Japanese capitalists for a loan to finance the Chefoo-Weihsien Railway; to extend the term of the Dalny and Port Arthur lease and the terms of the South Manchuria and Antung-Mukden railways for ninety-nine years; that Japanese subjects should be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and to lease land necessary for trade, manufacture, and agricultural purposes; to cancel China's right under the original South Manchurian Railway agreement to redeem such line thirty-six years after completion; to grant Japanese subjects the right to select and work mines in nine mining districts in South Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia (naming them); to call first upon Japanese capitalists to provide funds for railway construction in South Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia, as also when making any future loans on the security of taxes in such provinces; to give preference to Japanese should foreign advisers be employed on political, financial, or police matters in South Manchuria; to notify and come to an understanding with the Japanese Consul before enforcement of any police laws, ordinances or taxes applicable to Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia; to give its consent to any agreement reached by the Hanyehping Company and Japanese capitalists, and not to confiscate such company or convert it into a state enterprise without consent of the Japanese capitalists, or cause it to borrow or use foreign capital other than Japanese.

The far-reaching demands contained in Group V were postponed "for later negotiations," except that as to Fukien Province, China declared it had not given permission to foreign nations to construct on the coast of such province, dock yards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases, or other military establishments; nor did it



entertain an intention of borrowing foreign capital for such purposes.

As to the German leasehold in Shantung, Japan agreed that, when such territory was left to her free disposal after the war, she would restore same to China on the following conditions: The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a commercial port; a concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government; an international settlement to be opened should the Powers so desire; and that disposal of the buildings and property of Germany should be arranged by mutual agreement between the Japanese and Chinese governments before restoration. As will be noted, these conditions did not include a return of the economic privileges held by Germany, while the reserved right in Japan to designate a concession "under her exclusive jurisdiction" would enable her to take the desirable portions of Tsingtao, rendering anything which remained completely innocuous from a commercial standpoint. Moreover, it gave her rights in perpetuity which Germany held simply under a non-assignable leasehold.

Of all the Powers, the United States alone placed itself on record as in opposition to Japan's purposes. On May 16, 1915, the following note was delivered to the Japanese and Chinese authorities:

In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place or which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan, and the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honour to notify the Government of Japan [China] that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into, or which may be entered into between the governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the

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political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy commonly known as the Open Door policy.

In November, 1908, by what is known as the Root-Takahira agreement, Japan had covenanted with the United States to support "the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce of all nations in that Empire," and that if any event occurred threatening the *status quo* as thus described, "the two Governments would communicate with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures should be taken." It is somewhat difficult to reconcile the Twenty-one Demands, and the methods employed by Japan in presenting and enforcing them, with this agreement.

Having dragooned China into acceptance of any agreement thereafter reached between Japan and Germany as to the rights of the latter in Shantung, pressure was brought by Japan upon her allies to support her claims at the Peace Conference to Shantung and to the German-owned islands north of the Equator. This demand was conceded by Great Britain, France, and Italy in February and March, 1917, that is, at the very time America's entrance into the war was being urged by these Powers. No advice of such agreement with Japan was furnished the United States, however, despite its having joined forces with the Allies, and having also been largely instrumental in having China declare war on Germany. It was not until the Peace Conference assembled in 1919 that either the United States or China learned of this secret pledge affecting Shantung and other German possessions.

It is to be noted also that China's entry into the war was consistently opposed by Japan until she had thus safeguarded her possession of Shantung. Without this

prevision, China's participation in the Peace Conference might have blocked or seriously embarrassed her plans.

China participated in the Peace Conference but, despite her protests, and that of the American delegates and their advisers, the prearranged programme was finally put across. The treaty as executed awarded Japan, "free and clear of all charges and encumbrances," and without obligation whatsoever to China, every property right, privilege, and concession which Germany held or might claim in Shantung Province. The Chinese delegates refused to sign the treaty, and the Senate of the United States, to its credit, also refused to acquiesce in such a questionable proceeding.

As to the German islands north of the Equator, Japan's claim of title was, under the procedure finally adopted, limited to that of mandate. The interpretation sought to be given such mandate by Japan will be noted later.

In November, 1917, a somewhat sorry page was written in the annals of our State Department. Realizing that the attitude of the United States was the one serious obstacle to her plans in China, Japan brought every influence and every ingenuity to bear to have her "special interests" in that country recognized by our authorities. Availing herself of the anomalous and fevered conditions created by our war problem, she finally succeeded in persuading Secretary Lansing (or President Wilson) to conform to what is known as the Ishii-Lansing Note. This instrument, while reaffirming the obligation to respect the territorial integrity of China and the Open Door policy, further stated:

The governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan

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has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

Inasmuch as both the United States and Japan were already pledged by the Root-Takahira agreement of 1908 to maintain the territorial integrity of China and the Open Door, the storm centre of this new agreement naturally revolved about this ambiguous "special interest" paragraph.

The note was given out by Japan in Tokio and Peking before our representatives at either point were advised of its contents, thus placing them at a tactical disadvantage. Both in the translation of the note into Chinese and in the publicity given it, Japan sought to have it believed that her paramount political interests in China had finally been recognized by the United States. While this construction was negatived by the American Legation at Peking, and its own translation circulated, the actual effect was seriously to embarrass the United States in China and to complicate an already difficult situation. Some two years later Secretary Lansing, testifying before a Senate committee as to what actually happened when such provision was discussed, stated:

I suggested to Viscount Ishii that it would be well for the two governments to reaffirm the Open Door policy, on the ground that reports were being spread as to the purpose of Japan to take advantage of the situation created by the war to extend her influence over China—political influence. Ishii replied that he would like to consider the matter, but that, of course, he felt that Japan had a special interest in China, and that that should be mentioned in any agreement that we had; and I replied that we, of course, recognized that Japan, on account of her geographical position, had a peculiar interest in China, but that it was not political in nature, and that the danger of a statement of special interest was that it might be so construed, and therefore I objected to making such a statement.

At another interview we discussed the phrase special "interests,"

which the Japanese Government had been very insistent upon, and which, with the explanation I have made, I was not very strongly opposed to, thinking that the reaffirmation of the Open Door policy was the most essential thing that we could have at that time; and we discussed the phrase which appeared in the draft note, "special interest," and I told him that if it meant "paramount interest," I could not discuss it further; but if he meant "special interest" based upon geographical position, I would consider the insertion of it in the note. Then it was, during that same interview, that we mentioned "paramount interest" and he made a reference to the Monroe Doctrine, and rather a suggestion that there should be a Monroe Doctrine for the Far East.

And I told him that there seemed to be a misconception as to the underlying principles of the Monroe Doctrine; that it was not an assertion of primacy or paramount interest by the United States in its relation to other American republics; that its purpose was to prevent foreign Powers from interfering with the separate rights of any nation in this hemisphere, and that the whole aim was to preserve to each Republic the power of self development. I said further that so far as aiding in this development the United States claimed no special privilege over other countries. I told Viscount Ishii that I felt the same principle should be applied to China, and that no special privileges, and certainly no paramount interest, in that country should be claimed by any foreign Power. Viscount Ishii maintained silence.

Despite his fears that the term "special interest" might be construed to mean a paramount or political interest, and his objection to it for that reason, Secretary Lansing nevertheless permitted its use and saw his fears abundantly realized.

During the whole of this period the Government and press of Japan had industriously sought to magnify the California land and school questions and the attitude of the United States regarding Japanese immigration into a grave injustice against Japan. The principal object was doubtless to have Americans believe that Japanese in the United States were being harshly treated, and thus dispose our authorities to acquiesce, as an offset, to her policies in

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## CHAPTER II

### THE PHILIPPINES AND THE FAR EAST (*Continued*)

FOLLOWING the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05, Russia and Japan had agreed, by secret treaty, mutually to support their respective claims of interest in North and South Manchuria. This was supplemented in July, 1916, by another secret agreement having for its expressed object "the safeguarding of China from the political domination of any third Power whatsoever having hostile designs against Russia or Japan." It was provided therein that should war be declared by any third Power, as indicated, against one of the contracting parties, "the other party, at the first demand of its ally, must come to its aid." By process of elimination it is fairly certain the "third Power" contemplated by this agreement was the United States.

With the collapse of Russia in 1917, and the consequent welter of conflicting interests in her Asiatic possessions, opportunity was offered Japan to extend her influence and possible control into North Manchuria and Siberia. Excuse for such action, from a war standpoint, was supplied by the presence in Siberia of large numbers of German and Austrian prisoners and immense supplies of military stores belonging to Russia. Suggestion was accordingly made by Japan that she be authorized to intervene in Siberia to protect the Allied interests. Great Britain and France were agreeable, but the United States refused its consent to such exclusive intervention, and Japan was compelled



to forego her proposition. Had the United States acquiesced, and Japan been granted authority to act alone and without interference, the map of Asiatic Russia would likely have suffered considerable changes.

In the summer of 1918, largely through the initiative of the United States, a joint intervention in Siberia was undertaken by Great Britain, France, Japan, Italy, and the United States. Its sole purpose was to assist the Czecho-Slovakian troops in their heroic struggle to cross Siberia from European Russia, to steady any efforts at self-government in which the Russians themselves might be willing to accept assistance, and to guard the military stores at Vladivostok. In taking this military action the various powers, upon request of the United States, united in assuring the people of Russia that—

None of the governments uniting in action either in Siberia or in northern Russia contemplated any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or thereafter, but that each of the Associated Powers had the single object of affording such aid as should be acceptable, and only such aid as should be acceptable, to the Russian people in their endeavour to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny.

It was agreed that the maximum of troops to be supplied by either of such Powers should be eight thousand, which number was furnished by the United States. Japan, however, for purposes of her own, and entirely outside the needs of the situation, sent to Manchuria and Siberia a force of approximately seventy-five thousand officers and men. The inevitable result of this action, both as concerned the civil population and the troops of the various Powers, was continuous friction and differences, with constant attempts on the part of Japan to utilize the dis-

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turbed conditions to her advantage. Space forbids a detail of the intrigue, the plots and counter plots, the factional struggles, and the bribery, corruption and bloodshed with which this occupational period in Siberia was filled.

In April, 1920, the United States withdrew the last of its troops from Siberia, those of Great Britain, France, and Italy having already left. Within forty-eight hours thereafter Japan took possession of Vladivostok, which had theretofore remained in Russian hands, and proceeded to consolidate her position in other important Siberian centres. In the spring of 1920 she possessed herself of the Russian-owned half of Saghalien Island, which step was taken to insure payment by Russia for the wiping out of a Japanese garrison, and other Japanese residents, at Nicolaievsk (adjacent to the Amur) by a nondescript band of Russians.

As this policy of aggression in Siberia was in direct violation of the intervention agreement, representations were made to Japan by the United States looking to a fulfilment by her of this original pledge. The position of our State Department was expressed in a note to Japan, May 31, 1921, as follows:

The Government of the United States would be untrue to the spirit of coöperation which led it, in the summer of 1918, upon an understanding with the Government of Japan, to dispatch troops to Siberia, if it neglected to point out that, in its view, continued occupation of the strategic centres in eastern Siberia—involving indefinite possession of the port of Vladivostok, the stationing of troops at Habarovsk, Nicolaievsk, De Castries, Mago, Sophiesk, and other important points, the seizure of the Russian portion of Saghalien, and the establishment of a civil administration, which inevitably lends itself to misconception and antagonism—tends rather to increase than to allay the unrest and disorder in that region. The military occupation of Saghalien in reprisal of the Nicolaievsk affair is not fundamentally a question of the validity

of procedure under the recognized rules of international law. The issue presented is that of the scrupulous fulfillment of the assurances given to the Russian people, which were a matter of frank exchanges and of apparently complete understanding between the Government of the United States and of Japan. These assurances were intended by the Government of the United States to convey to the people of Russia a promise on the part of the two Governments not to use the joint expedition or any incidents which might arise out of it, as an occasion to occupy territory, even temporarily, or to assume any military or administrative control over the people of Siberia.

In view of its conviction that the course followed by the Government of Japan brings into question the very definite understanding concluded at the time the troops were sent to Siberia, the Government of the United States must in candour explain its position and say to the Japanese Government that the Government of the United States can neither now nor hereafter recognize as valid any claims or titles arising out of the present occupation and control, and that it cannot acquiesce in any action taken by the Government of Japan which might impair existing treaty rights or the political or territorial integrity of Russia.

Japan excused her action on various pretexts but made no move toward evacuation.

Another element of discord in the situation was the Chinese Eastern Railway. This line, built by Russia under agreement with China, traverses northern Manchuria for a thousand miles or more, connecting the Trans-Siberian Railway with Vladivostok. When the Russian Government collapsed, the line naturally became a bone of contention, with Japan striving to capture the prize. The difficulty was solved for a time through its operation by an Inter-Allied railway board, headed by Mr. John F. Stevens, formerly engineer of the Panama Canal. The matter of ultimate control and operation, however, is still pending.

In July, 1898, the United States annexed the Hawaiian Islands, and in August, 1898, acquired the Philippine Islands and Guam. A cable to Honolulu was laid by

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American interests in 1902, to Guam and Manila in 1903, Manila to Shanghai in 1906, and Guam to Japan in 1908. A German cable connected Guam with the Island of Yap (500 miles south), from which junction branches extended to the Dutch Indies and to Shanghai. As Yap was one of the German-owned islands north of the Equator, it was included among the possessions pledged to Japan by Great Britain, France, and Italy under the secret agreement of 1917. The Peace Treaty, however, provided—

Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions.

The United States, being one of the Principal Associated Powers, thus became vested with a joint interest in these possessions. As to certain of them, such as Shantung, a direct allocation was made in the Treaty, the remainder being left for distribution by the League of Nations. In cases where the inhabitants "were not able to stand by themselves," provision was made for a government by mandate "on behalf of the League."

Given the vital importance of Yap as a cable centre, with opportunity in the mandatory to utilize its facilities to the detriment of trade competitors, President Wilson had suggested during the discussions at Paris that the question of Yap be reserved with a view to making it an international cable station. When the League acted, however, Japan was awarded a mandate for all the German islands north of the Equator, including Yap. The United States, not having ratified the Treaty, and not being a member of the League, was not consulted in such distribution despite Mr. Wilson's reservation and the joint interest vested in the United States as to all such possessions. While a mandate conferred neither owner-

ship nor sovereignty, the Powers concerned took possession of their respective "holdings" and proceeded to occupy and administer them on the evident assumption that special, if not exclusive, rights were conferred.

Issue was thereupon raised by our State Department as to the power of the Supreme Council or of the League to bind the United States or to act on its behalf, or to debar it from a discussion of or participation in any of the rights and privileges secured under mandates, even though not a member of the League. In other words, while the United States had neither asked nor received anything in the way of reparations, it did object to having a "No trespass" sign posted on these German possessions which it had helped to secure at no small cost of life and treasure. The specific point was also raised with Japan that Yap should not be included in her mandate of German islands because of Mr. Wilson's express reservation. Japan declined to accept this view, holding that the action of the Supreme Council was final and conclusive, and that the cable landing at Yap must be exclusively under Japanese direction. In concluding her refusal to concede the rights claimed by the United States, Japan stated:

They [the Japanese Government] cannot consider themselves bound in any way to recognize the freedom of other nations in the manner insisted upon by the American Government in regard to the landing and operation of cables even in places (under mandate) where the principle of the Open Door is to be guaranteed.

As to this attitude by Japan, Secretary Hughes, after various exchanges, stated as follows:

This government must point out that as the United States has never vested either the Supreme Council or the League of Nations with any authority to bind the United States or to act on its behalf, there has been no opportunity for any decision which could be deemed to affect

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the rights of the United States. It may also be observed that the right accruing to the United States through the victory in which it has participated could not be regarded as in any way ceded or surrendered to Japan, or to other nations, except by treaty, and that no such treaty has been made. This government must insist that it has not lost its right or interest as it existed prior to any action of the Supreme Council or of the League of Nations, and cannot recognize the allocation of the island [Yap] or the validity of the mandate to Japan.

Inasmuch as Yap has no economic value, having area of but seventy square miles and less than five thousand population, Japan's attitude argued a purpose to profit by her alleged exclusive rights in other ways.

The foregoing summary of Far Eastern conditions subsequent to 1900 brings us to the fateful spring of 1921. While many of the elements entering into and shaping the situation have necessarily been omitted, the primary purpose has been to bring into orderly relief the part played therein by the United States since acquiring the Philippine Islands and announcing its Open Door policy. We have seen that in every crisis threatening either such policy or the territorial integrity of China, our State Department has entered protest, and in many instances has stood alone in demanding fulfilment of the undertaking. We have further found that, despite the consistent refusal of our government to sanction any encroachments upon the doctrine involved, the Japanese Empire, with the backing or at least tacit consent of the European Powers, had gradually extended her claims and political influence. She was intrenched in Shantung, in Siberia, in Manchuria, and in Korea, and was asserting rights under the Twenty-one Demands and her league mandate directly opposed to American interests. Moreover, she was committed to a policy of naval expansion (her famous "eight-eight" programme) requiring an expenditure of over one

third of her entire annual revenues, and necessitating, in our own protection, a counter-programme calling for appropriations running into billions of dollars. Undeterred by the fate of German militarism and the development of an overwhelming world sentiment against German methods of territorial aggrandizement, the military element in Japan still dominated, and continued to shape its plans for a Pan-Asian empire to be acquired by conquest.

A situation had developed which, unless arrested and modified, offered the alternative of a supine acquiescence by the United States in a flouting of its Open Door policy and a surrender by it of further responsible participation in Asiatic affairs, or the eventual maintenance of such policy and rights by force of arms.

A factor which had greatly stimulated and furthered Japanese ambitions, and which now cast a sinister shadow over the whole Far Eastern problem, was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, heretofore described. Without the moral and material backing supplied and guaranteed by this Alliance, Japan would hardly have attacked Russia in 1904, nor would she have pursued thereafter such an aggressive policy in Korea, Manchuria, Shantung, and Siberia. The Alliance was due to expire in July, 1921, and the question of its renewal or abrogation was charged with tremendous import to the United States and China. If renewed, such a fact would be treated and considered as a ratification by Great Britain of Japan's attitude and claims in China and Siberia, and would fortify the Japanese military party in driving ahead regardless of America's protests. Its abrogation, on the other hand, by compelling Japan to stand alone, would inevitably force her to cultivate friendly relations with China and Russia as a condition precedent to any worth-while or lasting

commercial penetration. It would also incline the Japanese military party to a policy calculated to win the confidence and goodwill of the Powers, rather than perpetuate the distrust and suspicion which its former course had unfortunately inspired.

While Great Britain was willing and possibly anxious to terminate the Alliance, and while this step was urged by Canada and other of her Dominions, the desire to avoid accusation of having used such Alliance when to her interest, and of casting it overboard when no longer needed, made its renewal practically certain.

Given this condition of affairs, combined with the feverish race for naval supremacy and the constantly increasing grounds of friction over Far Eastern questions, it was apparent to all, and freely predicted, that another war, more disastrous than the last, was in the making, with the Pacific area as the scene of conflict.

Into this darkening prospect, surcharged with every portent of disaster, came the Washington Conference, one of those master strokes of human genius which change the course of history and the destiny of mankind. On July 8, 1921, an invitation was extended, by direction of the President of the United States, to the principal Allied and Associated Powers, *i. e.*, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, to take part in a conference on the subject of limitation of armament, to be held in Washington on the eleventh day of November, 1921. Such invitation also suggested that inasmuch as the question of limitation of armament had a close relation to Pacific and Far Eastern problems, that:

the Powers especially interested in these problems should undertake, in connection with the Conference, the consideration of all matters bearing upon their solution, with a view to reaching a common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the Far East.



This suggestion having been favourably received, invitations were extended to Belgium, China, the Netherlands, and Portugal to participate in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions in connection with the Conference.

The momentous accomplishments of the Conference are familiar history. Not only was the naval limitation pact proposed by Secretary Hughes adopted, and the Far Eastern situation clarified and charted, but a giant stride was taken toward "the end of war," something for which earnest men and women everywhere are hoping and striving. The obligation solemnly assumed by the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan to take a "naval holiday" for fifteen years, means not only a saving of billions of dollars to their peoples, and a lessened likelihood of the waste and horror of war, but it carries an almost definite assurance that at the end of such period there will be no step backward. With the success of this Conference as a precedent, any civilized country hereafter which deliberately appeals to the law of the jungle to establish its claims or further its ambitions will likely find itself an outlaw among the nations.

That the success of the naval treaties at the Conference hinged upon a satisfactory solution of Pacific and Far Eastern problems is now generally recognized. With these latter eliminated as a source of possible misunderstandings and conflict, a halt in the competitive naval programmes of the Powers became possible. The Conference, in fact, devoted the bulk of its time to Far Eastern questions, the results achieved being positive and far-reaching.

By the so-called "Four Power Treaty," the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan agreed, between

themselves, to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and dominions in the Pacific Ocean; and

If there should develop between any of the High Contracting Parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights, which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them, they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment.

Another provision, the most vital in its consequence, and which really gave birth to such Treaty, was that, upon its ratification, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of July, 1911, should terminate.

By the "Nine Power Treaty," executed by the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, China, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal, such Powers, other than China, agreed:

To respect the sovereignty of China, and to provide her the fullest opportunity to develop and maintain an effective and stable government; to refrain from taking advantage of conditions therein to seek special rights or privileges, and not to enter into any treaty or arrangement whatsoever which would infringe or impair these principles.

With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the Open Door, or equality of opportunity in China, such Powers agreed not to seek, or to support their respective nationals in seeking: (a) any superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China; (b) any monopoly or preference which would deprive the nationals of any other Power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese Government, or any local authority, in any category of

public enterprise; and, further, not to support any agreements, made with each other by their respective nationals, destined to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of China.

China undertook to be guided by the foregoing principles in dealing with applications for economic rights and privileges by foreign governments and their nationals, whether parties to the treaty or not, and also not to alienate or lease any portion of her territory or littoral to any foreign country.

Provision was made for a full and frank communication between the Powers whenever a situation arose involving application of the stipulations agreed upon; also the establishment in China of a Board of Reference to which all questions affecting execution of the Treaty could be referred for investigation and report.

The Powers also adopted a treaty providing ways and means for a revision of the Chinese customs tariff, which will insure additional and much-needed revenues to the Chinese Government.

Discussion was had and resolutions were adopted with respect to extra-Territoriality, Foreign Postal Agencies, Armed Forces and Radio Stations in China; also to the reduction of Chinese Military Forces, the Chinese Eastern Railway, and existing commitments of China, or with respect to China.

The question of Shantung received wide publicity during the Conference and was the subject of prolonged discussion between the Japanese and Chinese delegates. Through the good offices of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour a treaty was finally executed whereby Japan agreed to restore to China the former German-leased territory of Kiaochow,

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together with the public properties belonging to Germany, the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway, etc. This agreement was a consummation directly attributable to the Conference, and eliminated one of the most serious criticisms of Japan's policy, and the source of a constantly increasing antagonism toward Japan by the Chinese people.

China's demand that the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915 (Twenty-one Demands) be reconsidered and cancelled, was refused by Japan. Declaration was made by Japan, however, that she was ready to throw open to the International Financial Consortium the exclusive option granted by such treaty to Japanese capitalists in the matter of loans for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia, and loans to be secured on taxes in that region; that she had no intention of insisting on her preferential right to the engagement of Japanese advisers or instructors on political, financial, military, or police matters in South Manchuria, and that she was ready to withdraw the reservation that Group V of the original proposals "would be postponed for future negotiations."

In the matter of Japan's failure to withdraw her troops from Siberia in conformity with agreement, the position of the United States was reaffirmed and declaration was made by Japan that it was her fixed policy to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, that the military occupation of the Russian province of Sakhalin was only temporary, and that plans were being formulated for the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province.

The controversy concerning the Island of Yap was adjusted during the Conference period by a treaty between the United States and Japan whereby the United States is granted:

free access to the Island of Yap on a footing of entire equality with Japan or any other nation, in all that relates to the landing and operation of the existing Yap-Guam cable or of any cable which may hereafter be laid by the United States or its nationals.

Rights of residence and freedom from discrimination of any sort or kind are also included.

At the close of the Conference, Baron Shidehara, of the Japanese Delegation, after referring to the fact that Japan must look primarily to the Asiatic mainland for raw materials and a market for her manufactured products, and for that reason was naturally more interested in China than are countries remotely situated, said:

To say that Japan has special interests in China is simply to state a plain and actual fact. It intimates no claim or pretension of any kind prejudicial to China or to any other foreign nation. Nor are we actuated by any intention of securing preferential or exclusive economic rights in China. We do not seek any territory in China, but we do seek a field of economic activity beneficial as much to China as to Japan, based always on the doctrine of the Open Door and equal opportunity.

This statement of Baron Shidehara represents the opinion of a constantly increasing element in Japan which frankly concedes that the Twenty-one Demands and the policy pursued by the militarists in Shantung and Siberia were political blunders, to be remedied only by an entire change of policy. Given the power and influence still exercised by her military group, it may be that performance by Japan will lag behind profession. There is every reason to believe, however, that the Japanese people, whatever temporary digressions may occur, will increasingly centre their efforts upon economic rather than territorial expansion in Asia. However else the late war may have failed to redeem its promises, it did establish the fact that no nation, pretending to be civilized, can hereafter deliber-

ately ignore treaty stipulations and escape the censure of mankind and eventual retribution. The obligation now imposed by written covenant to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, and to observe the Open Door principle in all its phases, has back of it a weight of moral sanction more powerful than material force. There will be trade rivalry and competition of the keenest, and it may be that intervention of some sort will become necessary in China before she finds herself, but no single party to the Nine Power Treaty can further afford to make either trade exigencies or national ambitions an excuse for claiming exclusive rights or political privileges in China.

Since the Conference closed, Japan has restored Shantung to China as agreed, and has withdrawn her troops from the Maritime Province of Siberia. While she still retains possession of northern Sakhalin, its eventual restoration to Russia is probable. The Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917, whereby the United States recognized Japan's "special interest" in China, and which Japan sought to interpret as creating a "paramount interest," has been formally cancelled by the two governments.

With the outstanding causes for friction removed, therefore, and all the responsible Powers jointly committed as to their future policy in Far Eastern affairs, there is every reason to believe that peace in the Pacific has been definitely assured. The doctrine of the Open Door and the territorial integrity of China, declared by the United States in 1899 and 1900, and supplemented thereafter by consistent opposition to every effort at its infringement, found a definite and final sanction in the treaties and commitments of the Washington Conference. While no millennium has been achieved, the results, and the method of their accomplishment, offer greater hope and greater promise for

sanity in the adjustment of world differences than anything yet recorded. The victory, for such it has been, was not an easy one, requiring as it did the overcoming of old-line methods and precedents, and the uprooting of entrenched privileges grounded in decades of persistent and painstaking effort. Even in our own Senate, when every difficulty had apparently been surmounted, a small coterie of malcontents came within an ace of wrecking all that had been so laboriously accomplished. Pretending to be frightened by the bogie of foreign entanglements, they would have deliberately perpetuated a situation which imposed a ruinous race in naval armaments and directly invited every "entanglement" which the failure to reach an accord on Pacific and Far Eastern questions would have eventually precipitated.

Americans are proud and tenacious of the Monroe Doctrine. In effect the various world powers, acting in concert, established through the Washington Conference a like doctrine for China, insuring her against the old policy of spoliation theretofore applied. In accomplishing this end Great Britain definitely aligned herself with the United States, as was the case in that other day when Monroe announced his famous doctrine for the Americas. What the backing of Great Britain then signified (and signifies to-day in our Far Eastern policy) was expressed by Thomas Jefferson in a letter to Monroe as follows:

The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of independence. That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. . . . One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the bands, bring her

mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the same cause. . . . With Great Britain withdrawn from their scale (Continental Powers) and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe combined would not undertake such a war.

The recent flare-up in Japan over the immigration question is unfortunate but hardly affords ground for serious misunderstanding. Upon sober second thought her somewhat over-sensitive people—too inclined as yet to look for slights where none are intended—will realize that the proposition involved is economic and not racial. It is not a matter of inferiority or superiority, but simply a recognition of inherent and ineradicable differences which make an amalgamation of the two peoples, or mass competition between them, impossible. Unless checked, an element of discord would be injected into our industrial life fraught with inevitable clashes and permanent trouble. Japan herself acts upon the same principle in excluding Chinese and Korean coolies because of their lower standards of living and wage scale, while foreigners are prohibited from owning land in Japan in the interest of Japanese nationals.

Japanese officials, merchants, students and tourists are, freely admitted to the United States, exclusion being applicable to the labouring classes only. The Immigration Act does not apply specifically to Japan, but includes China, Korea, India, Ceylon, Burmah, Java, Siam, and all Asiatic peoples ineligible to American citizenship under our laws. Japan does not question the absolute right of the United States to regulate immigration, nor was anything more done by Congress than Japan had already



recognized as expedient and proper under the so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement," operative for years. While the desired end could, and doubtless should, have been accomplished in other ways, to quibble and become excited over the "method," when the result—so far as actual exclusion is concerned—had theretofore received full acquiescence, seems a bit childish. In their consequences the "Gentlemen's Agreement" and the Immigration Act are identical, and it is not apparent why Japanese feelings should be lacerated, and Japanese pride offended in the one case and not in the other. Given Japan's policy as to domestic immigration, her attitude as respects the United States is neither logical nor consistent, and any continued agitation of the subject can but result in serious prejudice to both countries. Over 41 per cent. of Japanese exports in 1923 went to the United States, while some 32 per cent. of her imports came from the United States. What this signifies to a nation such as Japan, whose whole economic structure rests upon her manufacturing interests, is altogether plain.

There is little question but that this immigration imbroglio has been utilized in Japan to inflame the passions of the people, and thus bolster the waning prestige of the militarists against a rising tide of democracy. There is also doubtless involved the old purpose of "putting across" in America the idea that Japan should be given a free hand in Asia in compensation for the "injustice" worked her in the United States. Given the losses suffered through the earthquake, the growing discontent and unrest of the Japanese masses over industrial conditions, and the financial stress under which the Government is labouring, for Japan to embark again upon an orgy of military expenditures, with a reversion to her old-time course of in-

trigue and ruthless aggrandizement, would simply react to the injury of her own interests and prestige and prove a losing venture. It can be said also that all talk of war with the United States because of existing differences is absurd. Statesmen of the eminence and ability of those who control the destinies of the Japanese Empire do not deliberately invite national bankruptcy and the ruin of their people—inevitable consequences to Japan of such a struggle, whatever the outcome.

The vital influence exercised over our Far Eastern relations through ownership of the Philippine Islands has been but dimly appreciated by the American people. Realization is now dawning, however, that without this stake at the doors of Asia, and without the interest in Oriental trade and politics which the possession of such islands stimulated and made possible, the Open Door policy in China would never have been declared by Mr. Hay, or, if declared, would have been allowed to lapse through repeated attacks thereon by other Powers and the lack of public interest in its enforcement.

Referring to the effect produced upon European thought and progress by the discovery of America, a writer said—"Men's minds grew larger to take in a larger world." Equally is it true that the extension of United States sovereignty to the Philippines, and the leaven planted in a thousand communities by returning officers, employees, tourists, and business men—to whom the Orient had become a living thing—largely helped to break down the insularity and self-sufficiency of the American people, and prepared them to take a greater interest and a larger part in problems beyond their immediate horizon. Is it far-fetched, therefore, to argue that the Washington Conference, with all that it achieved, and with all it promises

in shaping world affairs, was a logical sequence of Dewey's victory in Manila Bay and of the developments to which that victory paved the way?

What this intervention has meant and may mean to the United States in giving it a rightful participation in the rapidly developing trade and commerce of those vast populations to which the Philippines are neighbour, will be considered in a later chapter. Suffice to say here that of the total foreign trade of the United States at this time, 21 per cent. is now with Asia, excluding Asia Minor, as against  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. in 1900, with even greater hope and promise for the future. The total foreign trade of the United States with the Far East and Oceania in 1923 amounted to \$1,726,824,000.

To the Philippine Islands and their people, the advent of the United States and the protection of its sovereignty have meant security and peace and orderly progress amid all the welter of warring and conflicting interests which raged about them. "A dwarf protected by a giant has a giant's strength," and the puny Philippines, secure in the might of the United States, pursued its course unmolested and unafraid through all those devastating years which brought ruin and death to so many of earth's peoples.

As an insular possession of the United States, the "Four Power Treaty" of the Washington Conference insures the Philippines from outside aggression, and from having its scant and easy-going population submerged by a tidal wave of virile and industrious Chinese and Japanese, eager to avail of the rich and undeveloped resources of the islands. Ceasing to be such a possession, it would lose this protection and this security, with obligation to fight its own battles, and to sink or swim, politically and economically, through its own feeble and unaided efforts.

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To those having knowledge of the various peoples of the Orient and their characteristics, and of the dire struggle for existence which grips the great bulk of their unnumbered millions, it is altogether clear that the Filipinos could not survive the "free-for-all" which American withdrawal would invite. It is this fact, and others to be developed later, which must be taken into account in determining the future disposition of the islands.

## CHAPTER III

### THE PHILIPPINES AND THEIR PEOPLE

TO MEASURE the unknown in terms of the known is a human failing, with the result that many well-meaning persons find no difficulty in "solving" our Philippine problem by formulæ derived from Plymouth Rock, Bunker Hill, and the Continental Congress. They forget or placidly ignore that the question has to do with a Malay people on the coasts of Asia who, whatever their capacity or limitations, certainly bear little resemblance to our Puritan or Revolutionary forbears. Approached as an abstract proposition, these same well-meaning persons will admit that unless you fashion your structure according to location and materials, it will probably prove a failure. Holding to this truth, it would seem logical that any future disposition of the Philippines by the United States, or any judgment as to past performance, must be based upon the character of material, both in territory and people, inherited from Spain in 1898. Examining the situation in this light, what are the facts?

By formal treaty with Spain, the United States became vested with title to and responsibility for the Philippine Archipelago and Guam. As to Guam, which furnishes a sort of stepping stone between the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines, no issue is presented, there being every assurance it will remain definitely American territory. There remains, therefore, the mooted question of the Philippines.


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The Philippine Archipelago is entirely within the tropics, extending from 22° North Latitude to within less than 5° of the Equator, its length, north to south, being approximately one thousand miles. It comprises 3,141 islands, of which more than one thousand are of a size suitable for habitation and cultivation. Fronting directly on the mainland of Asia, the islands lie midway between the Japanese Empire to the north and Netherlands India to the south, with the British ports of Hong Kong and Singapore and French Indo-China just across the way. In their length, they stretch athwart the gateway leading from Europe and India to the Far East, and are on the direct trade route between Oceania, and the Dutch possessions to the south, and China, Japan, and Siberia to the north.

While adjacent to the most thickly populated countries of the world, the Philippines are themselves but sparsely inhabited. The following comparisons may prove interesting and significant.

With area of 115,026 square miles, the great bulk of which is cultivable, the Philippines have a population of less than 11,000,000. The Japanese Empire (excluding Korea and Formosa), with an area of but 140,778 square miles, less than 17 per cent. of which is cultivable, has approximately 57,000,000 inhabitants. Java, with area of 48,503 square miles, has a population of over 35,000,000. Six of the coastal provinces of China, being those most nearly adjacent to the Philippines, *i. e.*, Kwantung, Fukien, Kiangsu, Anwei, Chekiang, and Shantung, with area of 363,220 square miles, have an estimated population of 165,000,000. As against less than 95 persons to the square mile in the Philippines, Japan has 392, Java 720, and the coastal provinces of China 454.

The great islands of Mindanao, Palawan, and Mindoro,



Map showing strategic trade location of the Philippines

possibly the richest of the Philippine group in soil and natural resources, still remain to all intents unpopulated. With aggregate area of 44,170 square miles, or approximately that of Java, they have less than 750,000 inhabitants.

In agricultural, mineral, and forest wealth, as also in strategic trade location, the Philippines have been pronounced by experts to be the richest and most favoured group of tropical islands in the world. With every natural advantage, however, their potentialities in food and other products, the need and struggle for which are becoming increasingly desperate among the nations, are as yet scarcely touched. While the Dutch were developing their East Indian possessions, making of them a veritable treasure house for the inhabitants and the mother country, the Philippines lay dormant, dreaming away the centuries under the somnolent and archaic rule of Spain. Even at this time, despite the stimulus of twenty-five years of American rule; millions of dollars' worth of food products are imported annually. In 1923, importations of rice, the staple food of the people, amounted to \$3,706,430, while in the same year importations of meat and dairy products, eggs, fish, and fish products, bread-stuffs and vegetables, most of which could be produced in the islands, totalled \$9,228,637.

Needless to say the exposed insular position of the archipelago, its extended coast line, sparse population, and undeveloped wealth, make it a coveted field for economic invasion by its more populous and industrious neighbours. The same conditions would, in case of war, subject it to attack from every quarter, and render any possibility of national defence, based upon local man power or revenues, altogether hopeless.



As to the Filipino people, they belong, racially, to the Malay family, being kindred to the inhabitants of the Federated Malay States, Straits Settlements, Java, Borneo, the Celebes, and that litter of islands lying off the southeast coast of Asia. Just when the first Malay settlements were established in the Philippines is unknown. The wide difference in present types, however, indicates that this coming was in successive waves at widely varying intervals, the latest invasion being that of the Mohammedan Moros, now inhabiting the great island of Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, and adjacent seas.

The Malay, however, was himself a usurper, the aboriginal inhabitants of the Philippines being what are now known as Negritos. They are a small black people of doubtful ethnology, the average stature of the men being less than four feet six inches and that of the women under four feet. Of a timid disposition, and altogether primitive in intelligence, this pygmy race is gradually disappearing, the estimated survivors being less than thirty thousand. This remnant, which has resisted every attempt at civilization, is scattered throughout the mountains and unexplored forest areas of various islands, where they exist in a state of nature but little removed from our simian ancestors.


As lodgment was found in the islands by successive invaders, the earlier comers were forced backward into the remoter corners of the archipelago, where they preserved more or less intact their particular dialects, customs, and traditions. While the parent stock was Malay, there was no homogeneity of language among the different groups, nor any attempt to create a government or state which would include the whole population. The various communities remained altogether distinct, each constantly

preying and warring upon the other. Dr. David P. Barrows states the situation thus in his History of the Philippines:

The weakest side of the culture of the early Filipinos was their political and social organization, and they were weak here in precisely the same way that the now uncivilized peoples of Northern Luzon are still weak. Their state did not embrace the whole tribe or nation; it included simply the community. Outside the settlers in one immediate vicinity, all others were enemies or, at most, foreigners. There were, in the Philippines, no large states, nor even great rajas and sultans such as were found in the Malay Archipelago, but instead on every island were a multiple of small communities, each independent of the other and frequently waging war. The unit of their political order was a small cluster of from thirty to one hundred families, called a "barangay," which still exists in the Philippines as a "barrio." At the head of each barangay was a chief known as the "dato," a word no longer used in the northern Philippines though it persists among the Moros of Mindanao.

Despite over three centuries of Spanish sovereignty and influence, these tribal distinctions still largely persist, the population being split into numerous local divisions, speaking different dialects and regarding each other with mutual distrust and suspicion. H. Otley Beyer, Professor of Anthropology at the University of the Philippines, fixes the number of existing ethnographic groups in the Philippines at eighty-seven, basing his classification upon the following definition of "ethnographic group," *i. e.*, "Any group of people, living in a more or less continuous geographic area, who have a sufficiently unique economic and social life, language, or physical type to mark them off clearly and distinctly from any other similar group in the Philippine Islands."

It has been said, and doubtless truly, that in no like area in the world will there be found such a diversity of types and blends of people—each speaking its own



Official language map of the Philippines

language and having its own peculiar customs and interests—as exists to-day in the Philippine Archipelago. Within the island group will be found every gradation of humanity, from the pygmy Negritos, at the very bottom of the human scale, to the cultured and up-to-date product of our modern schools and colleges.

Inasmuch as any government established in the Philippines must be builded by or for this variegated Malay population, we are concerned in knowing what the racial characteristics of Malay peoples are and to what extent Spain, during her long rule, refined or otherwise changed these characteristics before turning the product over to us for further treatment.

A. R. Colquhoun, author of "The Mastery of the Pacific," and an acknowledged authority on Oriental peoples, discussing Malay capacity for self-government, says:

No Malay nation has ever emerged from the hordes of that race which have spread over the Islands of the Pacific. Wherever they are found they have certain marked characteristics, and of these the most remarkable is their lack of that spirit which goes to form a homogeneous people, to weld them together. The Malay is always a provincial; more, he rarely rises outside the interests of his town or village. He is never honest as we account that virtue, never truthful, and never industrious or persevering. This is his dark side, but it is with that we are concerned. The two points which are most inimical to progress are, as already mentioned, the lack of unity and the lack of persistence. The Malay, in short, is a creature of limitations.

Sir Frank Swettenham, for thirty years a colonial administrator in British Malaysia, and pronounced "the foremost living authority on Malay history," stated, from the sum of his experience, that "the germ of self-government does not exist in the Malay race."

Bishop James Thoburn, of the Methodist Episcopal

Church, who spent forty-five years in the Orient and fifteen years among the Malays of the Straits Settlements, testifying as to Malay characteristics before a committee of the United States Senate, said:

They have no cohesion whatever among themselves. Wherever I meet the Malays I find they live to themselves; they go off into tribes and clans, and the biggest man is called a sultan and his jurisdiction is limited.

The above conclusions, which could be multiplied indefinitely, are historically accurate, and certainly reflect conditions as they existed in the Philippines when Spain took possession. It remains to be seen how far this general verdict must be modified as to the Filipino-Malay because of Spanish influence and tutelage.

Ferdinand Magellan, sailing under commission of Charles V of Spain, discovered the Philippines in 1521. His were the first vessels to round South America, the first to reach the Orient from Europe by sailing westward, and the first to circumnavigate the globe. A writer has well termed it, "The greatest voyage of discovery that has ever been accomplished, and greater than can ever be performed again." Magellan, however, did not live to reap his triumph, meeting death in one of the tribal feuds of the Philippines. While at Cebu he volunteered to assist the dato of that place in a war being waged with the islanders of Mactan, and was killed in battle.

A permanent settlement was effected at Cebu by Miguel Lopez de Legazpi in 1565, and at Manila in 1571. Thereafter, and with but little resistance, Spanish sovereignty was extended to include most of the archipelago, where, with but slight interference, it continued until superseded by that of the United States in 1898.

When taken over by Spain the Philippines had an es-

timated population of five hundred thousand. No Filipino nation was destroyed or supplanted, for none existed. The inhabitants, as already noted, were simply a collection of scattered tribes occupying limited areas of the archipelago. Even at that time Mohammedan Moros from Mindanao and Sulu had established settlements in Manila, as also along the coasts of Luzon and on the adjacent islands of Mindoro and Lubang. Being of a more virile and aggressive stock than the earlier comers, there is little question but that this Mohammedan element, if undisturbed, would have shortly impressed its religion and tribal customs upon the other native groups. Given the trend of events, however, the islands could not long have continued unoccupied by some European Power. It was an era of discovery and expansion, wherein the English, Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish were mapping between them the new worlds to which Columbus had opened a way. Within brief intervals following her occupation of the Philippines, Spain's hold thereon was contested in turn by each of these rival powers, none of which could the Filipinos have successfully resisted.

Owing to their remoteness and the difficulties of communication, Spain made but little effort to colonize the Philippines or to develop their resources. Except as government servants, civil and military, or members of various religious orders, comparatively few Spaniards found their way to the Far East. In fact, for more than two hundred years there was little or no direct transport between the Philippines and Spain, all communication being had with and through Mexico, to which the islands were subordinate. Even this service was limited to an annual galleon ("great ships of six hundred and eight hundred tons apiece") sailing between Manila and Aca-

pulco on the Mexican coast. After the secession of Mexico in 1820, and until completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, communication with Spain was had by sailing vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, each voyage requiring from four to six months. The carrying trade of the Philippines remained a Spanish monopoly until 1835, which date marks the beginning of any real commercial development of the islands. At no time, however, did this commerce reach other than modest proportions. While more or less traffic was had with China, Japan, and other nearby countries, its reflection upon the life and manners of the people was largely limited to Manila, the trade centre of the islands, where most of the foreigners resided.

Given the above conditions, and the further fact that intercourse between the widely separated islands of the archipelago was naturally limited, the impress of Spanish civilization upon the native population was far less than in her American colonies. It was upon her possessions in the Americas that Spain centred her great commercial and missionary efforts, and into which, for more than two centuries, she poured a constant tide of soldiers, ecclesiastics, adventurers, and colonists. The widely different results registered in the two cases find illustration in the fact that while Spanish is to-day the common tongue of practically all the inhabitants of every country south of the Rio Grande save Brazil, and the seal of Spanish customs and manners has been set irrevocably upon their people, in the Philippines less than eight per cent. of the natives ever learned to read or speak the Spanish language, and a very considerable number of them never at any time came within Spanish influence.

It was not until 1863, or thereabouts, that any attempt

was made by Spain to establish a system of public schools in the islands. Even then instruction remained largely in the hands of the parish priests (Friars), and was devoted principally to the catechism and Church literature. The facilities offered were utterly inadequate and reached only a small fraction of the population, mostly children of well-to-do families. The masses of the people, both in their daily intercourse and in the meagre instruction afforded them in the parish schools, were restricted to the dialect of their particular locality. These dialects had and have little or no literature, certainly none of consequence, nor do they furnish a common medium of communication between different sections of the country.

With exception, therefore, of the comparatively limited number of persons privileged (or permitted) to attend the Manila schools, or who had direct dealings with the Spanish governing class, the great body of Filipinos had no knowledge of a world outside the confines of their own little pueblos. As to higher education, the Colleges of San José and Santo Tomás, established in Manila by the Jesuit and Dominican Orders, were intended primarily to serve the needs of the Spanish rather than of the Filipino community. The Filipinos who latterly attended such institutions, and who comprised the better educated element at the time of American occupation, were mostly of the Mestizo class, that is, having an admixture of foreign blood.

Whether because the religious orders found their "spiritual control" was better served by preserving native ignorance and superstition, or because the civil authorities found greater safety in confining the people to their local dialects and thus minimizing the possibility of effective resistance, the fact is that comparatively little effort was



made by either Church or State to broaden the mental horizon of the Filipinos. Such changes in native character as actually occurred resulted more from the inevitable influence of three centuries of contact with Spanish manners and institutions, and a considerable racial intermixture of the two peoples, than from any deliberate planning by the Government.

Of the land area of the archipelago, forty per cent., comprising Mindanao and Sulu, Palawan, Mindoro, and the mountain provinces of Luzon, came only remotely within the sphere of Spanish administration. With exception of isolated stations exercising a precarious and limited jurisdiction, Spanish authority was practically nonexistent throughout the whole of such territory. The various tribes, Moro and Pagan, inhabiting these regions continued to be governed as formerly by their local *datos* or headmen, American occupation finding them little if at all changed in customs, beliefs, and manner of life from the days of Magellan and Legaspi. The Igorots, Ifugaos, Kalingas, and other pagan peoples of Luzon, were still merrily decorating their huts with human heads, while Mindanao was a happy-hunting-ground where rival *datos* and their followings carved each other at pleasure with kris and campilan, unrestrained by the trammels of civilization.

These wild peoples, now numbering something over a million, were classed under Spanish laws as *infieles* (Non-Christians), and as such were systematically exploited by their Christian neighbours whenever feasible. The Mohammedan Moros, however, were and still are fighters, and have ever proved a difficult problem. Not only did Spain fail to subdue them, but up until almost the closing days of Spanish rule they regularly raided Filipino coastal

towns as far north as Luzon, robbing, killing, and carrying large numbers of people into captivity and slavery.

In the Philipinés, as in her other colonies, Spain was zealous in her missionary efforts, being more concerned in preparing the natives for bliss hereafter than in fitting them for an earthly life. Having no strong religious bent of their own, the great majority of Filipinos readily professed Christianity and lent themselves to the forms and ceremonials of the Catholic faith. While in actual practice they hardly measure up to Orthodox specifications, there is little question but that the humanizing influence of the new belief represents the greatest contribution made by Spain to the islands. Through its teachings Filipino women were largely emancipated from their former chattel state, and now occupy a far better position than do their sisters in other Oriental countries. They are to-day equal partners in the household, and in most cases are better executives and more closely in touch with practical realities than are the men. Archbishop Nozaleda of Manila, who served twenty-six years in the Philippines, testifying before the Taft Commission, said:

The women are better than the men here in every way. In intelligence, in virtue, and in labor; and a great deal more economical. They are very much given to trade and trafficking. If any rights or privileges are to be granted to the natives, do not give them to the men but to the women. Why, even in the fields, it is the women who do the work. The men go to the cockfights and gamble.

Practically all of the Friar Orders, Dominicans, Augustinians, Franciscans, Recolletos, etc., were represented in the islands, the field having been early parcelled between them to avoid overlapping interests. Unfortunately, these Orders, as time passed, lost much of their early religious zeal and used their powers to reap a material rather

than a spiritual harvest. Great landed estates were acquired by them, which they too often administered in utter disregard of tenant rights. The civil authorities, being subject to frequent changes, were largely controlled by such Orders and became simply instruments for their aggrandizement. In the provinces the Friar was supreme, enforcing obedience both by temporal sanctions and by threats of eternal damnation. Their rule was despotic, their authority absolute, and their moral influence anything but uplifting. Friction and antagonism naturally resulted, much of the unrest during the latter years of Spanish rule being due to resentment against friar abuses. There was a growing demand for their expulsion and the confiscation of their estates, which demand, at the time of American occupation, had flamed into open revolt in many places. The story of the harsh conditions under which the people then suffered has been graphically told by Dr. José Rizal, an outstanding figure in Philippine history, in his novel "Noli Me Tangere." Later, and growing out of the same causes, over a million native communicants, headed by Gregorio Aglipay, broke away from the regular Catholic organization and established an Independent Filipino Church.

While the great bulk of the Filipino people is Malay, and shares the characteristics of that race, it is not the element of the population which occupies the foreground. This latter is composed largely of persons of mixed foreign descent, usually Spanish or Chinese.

The Chinaman is the trader of the Orient, industrious, persevering, and saving. From the earliest times they have been found in the Philippines, intermarrying with the natives and taking a leading part in the internal commerce of the islands. While always persecuted and dis-

criminated against under Spanish rule, and slaughtered frequently, their presence was indispensable as a business asset and they were never altogether eliminated. Their children, however, born to native women and known as Chinese Mestizos, have always been treated and considered as Filipinos, and as such constitute a distinct type in the community. Many of the wealthy families in Manila, and the majority of those in adjoining provinces, have Chinese blood in their veins, the blend having improved the native stock in persistence and business stability. Most of the inventions and improvements introduced into the country, crude though they were, are traceable to the same source.

Naturally there was a considerable infusion of Spanish blood, in which process the Army, Church, and State participated. Here again the children born to Spanish fathers, known as Spanish Mestizos, were and are classed as "Filipinos," and they so represent themselves, however small the Malay strain or however much the paternal traits predominate. In social status, however, and in those things which go to evidence actual equality, there is usually a wide gulf between the Mestizo *ilustrado* and the predominant undiluted Malay product. Prof. H. Otley Beyer, heretofore cited, fixes at 500,000 the number of native-born inhabitants having considerable Chinese blood; while the number of those having considerable Spanish or other European blood is approximately 200,000, making a total for both of 7.36 per cent. of the population.

In every country of Asia from the Suez to Japan, save only the Philippines and Netherlands India, the cross between Europeans and natives is known as an "Eurasian." They are people without a country, having the status of neither European nor Asians. In Netherlands

India children of Dutch fathers and native mothers take the nationality of the father, having all the rights and privileges of a Hollander. Had either of these systems been followed in the Philippines, a considerable number of persons who now style themselves "Filipinos" would be classed as either Eurasians or Spanish. The distinction becomes important only when this Mestizo element, comprising at most less than 8 per cent. of the population, holds itself out as "representative" or "typical" of the whole, and pretends to voice the needs and desires of the Filipino people.

A fact too often overlooked, particularly by the casual visitor, is that Manila, with its foreign flavouring and its evidences of modern civilization, is *not* the Philippines, and that the cultured and well-to-do Filipinos there encountered, or with whom dealings are usually had elsewhere, are *not* the people whose rights and interests are primarily involved. The real Filipino, the Malay, who comprises over ninety per cent. of the population, will be found living unobtrusively in the innumerable little nipa shacks which hedge the streets and highways, or in the mountains of Luzon, the wilds of Mindanao, and other sequestered places of the archipelago. The voice of this silent multitude—poor, ignorant, helpless, credulous, exploited and enslaved throughout all their history, subservient to those in authority or whom they regard as superiors, and whose welfare and security were an unconsidered item until American occupation—finds no expression in the native press or the political forum. They have been, and in large measure still are, simply instruments in the hands of the educated and wealthy few.

Needless to say, the government instituted by Spain in the Philippines did little to train the native stock in self-

governing capacity. It was essentially paternal and autocratic, the only lesson taught being that wealth and official position conferred special privileges and immunities. The Filipino took no responsible part in public affairs, and was early trained to look upon the governing hierarchy, whether Church or State, as omnipotent. Spanish officials may possibly have been responsible to those above them, but never to those beneath them. Over those occupying a lower status their power was practically unlimited, and the most absolute homage and service were demanded and received. The greater preyed upon the less and all united in oppressing the masses, there being nowhere any conception of a government wherein the governing class derives its power and authority at the will and subject to the commands of the governed. That ingrained respect for the will of a majority, and that long discipline in self-government acquired by Anglo-Saxon peoples through centuries of participation in town meetings and elective assemblies, find no counterpart in Filipino heredity and training. As a race, the Filipinos not only have very much to learn, but very much to unlearn.

The decadence of Spain during the 19th Century, and her failure to keep pace with the march of modern progress, were glaringly evidenced in the few colonies remaining out of her once vast overseas empire. In the Philippines, no less than in Cuba and Porto Rico, the stamp of mediævalism was impressed upon both government and people, there being little or no reaction to the tremendous changes working about them. While this lassitude, this failure of Spanish authorities to give application to the discoveries and inventions which were transforming life in Europe and America, permeated every department of govern-

ment in the Philippines, a reference to their attitude in the matter of health and sanitation will furnish an index to the whole.

As compared with China and Japan, the scant increase in Filipino population during the centuries of Spanish rule finds partial explanation in the wider prevalence of disease germs in the tropics, and in the greater virility and stamina of the Chinese and Japanese peoples. Given the fact, however, that tropical Java steadily and rapidly increased in numbers under Dutch administration, the real answer as to the Philippines is found in the utter lack, in both knowledge and practice, of sanitary living and of appliances and facilities for the prevention and treatment of disease.

The situation prevailing throughout the islands upon American occupation was something appalling. In the City of Manila the death rate among children under one year of age was 95 per cent. Surface wells and a contaminated city supply system furnished water for drinking purposes, the use of distilled or artesian water being almost unknown. There was no proper sewerage or other adequate provision for disposal of human waste. The old moat surrounding the Walled City, and the numerous canals threading the business and residential districts, were full of refuse and an offence to sight and smell. Smallpox, beri-beri, bubonic plague, tuberculosis, malaria, and other pestilential diseases, were endemic, while the ravages of cholera were frequent and deadly. Lepers existed in large numbers, and in most localities mingled freely with the general public. The treatment of the insane and feeble-minded was a disgrace to civilization. In the whole of the islands there was not a single hospital or operating room with modern conveniences and appli-

ances. Trained nurses were practically unknown, and in many provinces medical assistance of any kind was unobtainable. There was little or no preventive inoculation, and the people lived (and died) without knowledge of germs and of their transmission through food and personal contact. Both Spaniards and natives considered night air as noxious, and windows and doors were tightly closed at nightfall. Epidemics and other calamities were accepted by the masses as a visitation of Divine Providence, to be exorcised by the burning of candles and religious processions rather than through segregation of the afflicted or other sanitary measures. Given these conditions, and applying them to a people undernourished, lacking in vitality, and utterly ignorant of personal hygiene, the fact of a high mortality and "scant population" ceases to be surprising.

In the latter years of Spanish occupation the import and export business of the islands centred almost entirely in British, German, French, and Swiss houses, with a few Spanish concerns. Of the three considerable banking institutions, two were British, *i.e.*, the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China; and the other Spanish, *i. e.*, El Banco Español Filipino. The internal merchandising business of the islands was conducted almost entirely by Chinese, as is the case to-day. The Filipinos took little or no part in external commerce, and played a minor rôle in local enterprises of consequence. They lacked and still lack the initiative and cohesion necessary to large-scale or pioneer operations, particularly where risks are attached; while their want of persistence and industry works a serious handicap along almost every line of commercial and industrial development. With every facility themselves



to exploit the phenomenal resources of the islands, nothing of real importance has been accomplished. There are no worth-while manufacturing plants, and few large agricultural undertakings, those that exist being mainly in the hands of or controlled by foreigners.

Upon American occupation there were but one hundred and twenty miles of railway in the archipelago, this line being British built and owned. Inter-island transportation was slow and hazardous, the waters being poorly charted and lighted. During six months of the year the public highways everywhere were little better than a quagmire, the larger rivers being either forded or crossed by antiquated ferries, making the marketing of products, except by water, difficult and expensive. With rare exceptions agricultural implements and methods harked back to the time of the Pharaohs, generation following generation with scarcely any appreciable innovations. The Philippines lay on a backwater, largely unknown and unknowing, their shores scarcely touched by the currents of progress sweeping the world outside their borders.

While Spaniards contributed many of their social graces to the Filipinos, and impressed various superficial phases of European life and thought upon the people at large, they did not or could not confer upon them the creative and artistic ability which is the heritage of Spanish peoples. A. R. Colquhoun, heretofore quoted, who travelled extensively in the Philippines following American occupation, refers to this fact as follows:

It is a curious fact that the chief glory of Spain, her preëminence in painting and sculpture, has found no echo in these islands; but the fact emphasizes what has been said as to the predominance of the Malay element. The Malays have not produced artists in any of the countries to which they have spread, and though at times they produce

pretty decorative work, it has little individuality and is usually copied from Chinese, Hindus, or whatever race has come in contact with them. Despite the wonderful carvings of the Hindu temples in Java, where the Malays reached their highest point in indigenous civilization, there is no such thing as native carving to be seen in that island. They have not even the desire to emulate what their Hindu conquerors had done.

This want of originality is so marked a feature of Filipino character that it is as though we ran our heads against a dead wall in Malay characteristics. The Malay has no creative ability. Ages ago he evolved his idea of a house, and that house can be seen now in any of the islands to which he has penetrated, always the same. The sameness of his musical instruments, his ornaments, his weapons, is remarkable, especially when we consider the wide range of Malay invasion and the lack of communication between the different islands over which that invasion spread.

The modifications induced in the race by a variety of climate and conditions have not affected the elemental characteristics of the Malay at all, and of these the most striking is his lack of initiative, the absence of that quality which marks certain men out and makes them heroes and leaders. To this universal mediocrity is no doubt due the very slight degree of civilization ever attained by the Malays without outside influence, and also their political inefficiency.

The Filipino is a product of the tropics, indolent, easy-going, and emotional. The rank and file lend themselves readily to the lightest impulse or influence, rendering it easy for a character of more than average force to exploit them in his own interest, or to secure a following for any idea or scheme however absurd or chimerical. They talk much but accomplish little, losing sight of practical things in chasing ideals and shadows. Their enthusiasm is easily aroused, but, lacking persistence, their interest has a tendency to die as quickly. They are imitative rather than constructive, and rarely excel as executives. There is no "mass" feeling, that is, concern as a community for the interests or sufferings of those outside the ken of their own immediate family or connections. Their

wants are few and simple, and when these are supplied there is a disposition to lie back until necessity spurs to further effort. They are provincial in character, and, with rare exceptions, are loath to leave their particular neighbourhood, however congested, and migrate to other parts. Gambling among them is a passion and its eradication difficult if not impossible. Along nearly every line of achievement or development, the Filipino illustrates the handicap of climate, heredity, and environment, and it is but now, under American sovereignty and protection, that his feet have been set upon the long road that leads to responsible citizenship.

It is possible, of course, to argue from particular instances that the foregoing analysis of Filipino character is altogether too sweeping in its limitations. What has been sought, however, is to summarize the various elements, racial, climatic, and otherwise, which have put their stamp upon the people as a whole, and which to-day affect the overwhelming majority in their industrial and political capacities. There have been and are many Filipinos who do not come within this general description, but they comprise a negligible percentage of the population, and will usually be found, upon investigation, to have a strain of foreign blood. It is to be said, on the other hand, that in their personal relations the Filipinos have many admirable and likable traits. They are extremely hospitable, and a stranger among them is seldom refused food and lodging. Children are treated affectionately and filial obedience is ingrained. Parents, in turn, are ambitious for their children, and there are few sacrifices they will not make on their behalf. The old and indigent are cared for by their relatives, while the status of women, as heretofore noted, is altogether commendable.

When dealing with concrete cases, Filipinos themselves realize and frankly admit the characteristics and limitations above recited. In 1917 and 1918 there was a large influx of Japanese to the province of Davao, Island of Mindanao, where conditions are peculiarly favourable for the growing of Manila hemp, then commanding war prices. A number of Americans also started plantations there, and considerable capital was invested. Few Filipinos took advantage of the situation, and these simply as day labourers. Referring to this situation, *El Ideal*, organ of the dominant political party in the Islands, commented as follows in its issue of October 8, 1918:

It is the Japanese and Americans who are able to see and take advantage of the opportunities offered by this intensely fertile region, and it is natural they should preponderate in such district. It would seem that we [Filipinos] prefer to assist passively at this partition of our islands, giving vent simply to protests, and throwing out occasionally the word patriotism. We imagine that in this manner we have complied with our patriotic duty, and have conjured the danger of the Japanization of Davao and other regions of Mindanao.

The saddest thing in connection with this Davao matter, however, *is that it is typical*. With but very rare exceptions we do not oppose other than resounding words and pompous phrases to the methodical efficiency of foreign elements, and then remain perfectly content, believing, ingenuously, that in this way we can insure our economic development.

The same paper, under date of March 7, 1918, after referring to the fact that more Japanese than Filipinos were migrating to Davao, stated:

In other terms, while we fill our mouths with words, patriotically declaiming against the Japanization of this great Island, we do absolutely nothing to overcome it. We need not be surprised, therefore, if, before we realize it, we will see the greater part of Mindanao entirely controlled by Japanese. Then all our protests, and all our patriotic fulminations, will be completely sterile.

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Another Filipino paper, *The Philippine National Weekly*, dealing with Filipino pretensions, stated in its issue of December 1, 1917:

It seems that as to initiatives we are the happiest people. The moment has come, however, to be outspoken. We have plans, but we lack the vim to carry them out; words abound but deeds are scarce; flamboyant oratory is in vogue and overflows, but little, if anything, is accomplished. There is a wealth of illusions, not a grain of reality. The dreamers form a legion, yet but few or no plans are carried through.

It is to be noted that the strictures referred to above are not directed at the ignorant masses, who seldom enter into the equation when discussing Philippine affairs, but apply to the educated and "talking element" at the top, which pretends to leadership. The discouraging feature, however, is that the characteristics so graphically portrayed by these Filipino writers are racial ones, which neither declamation nor exhortation can overcome. They are inbred, and only the slow processes of time and evolution can change them.

## CHAPTER IV

### AMERICA IN THE PHILIPPINES

IN ANY discussion of America's entrance into the Philippines, it is well to emphasize certain facts which some of our countrymen are inclined to forget. The first of these is that our being in the Philippines is not the act of any class or party, but represents the will of the American people. Our war with Spain was not a partisan affair, but resulted from the pressure of an almost unanimous public sentiment. The Battle of Manila Bay, which was a logical outcome of that war, aroused our people to the highest enthusiasm. The sending of American troops to the islands, both to prosecute the war against Spain and to preserve public order thereafter, met scarcely a dissenting voice. The outbreak of the Philippine insurrection—being a protest of certain elements of the people against our occupation—occurred February 4, 1899, *before* our Senate, by a non-party vote, approved the Treaty of Paris, thus confirming our title to the islands and ratifying the action theretofore taken by President McKinley under his war power. The record shows that Mr. Bryan, who later became an apostle of "Anti-Imperialism," was quite active in achieving this result.

There are many also who confuse our rights and obligations in the Philippines with those respecting Cuba. The treaty with Spain, however, discloses an entirely different relation and responsibility. As to Cuba it provides:

Art. I. Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

The Philippine provision reads:

Art. III. Spain cedes to the United States the Archipelago known as the Philippine Islands.

As heretofore shown, the sovereignty of Spain had existed in the Philippines for over three centuries, and her title was clearer than is that of most modern countries to their possessions.

By formal treaty, therefore, the Philippine Archipelago became "domestic territory" of the United States, and its status differs in no respect from the territory ceded us by Mexico in 1848, or the subsequently acquired territories of Alaska, Hawaii, and the Canal Zone. In what is known as the *Diamond Rings Case*, 183 U. S. 176, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Chief Justice Fuller, expresses the fact as follows:

By the 3rd Article of the treaty Spain ceded to the United States "the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands," and the United States agreed to pay Spain the sum of \$20,000,000 within three months. The treaty was ratified; Congress appropriated the money; the ratification was proclaimed. The treaty-making power, the executive power, the legislative power, concurred in the completion of the transaction.

The Philippines thereby ceased, in the language of the treaty, "to be Spanish." Ceasing to be Spanish, they ceased to be foreign country. They came under the complete and absolute sovereignty and dominion of the United States, and so became territory of the United States over which civil government could be established. The result was the same although there was no stipulation that the native inhabitants should be incorporated into the body politic, and none securing to them the right to choose their nationality. Their allegiance became due to the United States, and they became entitled to its protection.

Something not generally known is that the \$20,000,000 paid Spain under the treaty was not a gratuity or in

compensation for specific property or territory. The minutes of the Conference show that the islands had a public debt at that time of 40,000,000 pesos—equivalent to \$20,000,000 gold—on account of certain bonds issued by the Spanish Government secured by a special guarantee of the Philippine customs. The Spanish Commissioners insisted that payment of these bonds be expressly assumed or guaranteed by the United States upon taking over the islands. This was refused by the American Commissioners, the matter being finally arranged through agreement to pay the amount to Spain and the assumption of the indebtedness by her.

The situation in the Philippines at the time of and immediately preceding American occupation was this:

In 1896 an uprising against Spanish authority occurred in certain Tagalog provinces adjacent to Manila, the movement coming finally under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo. The purposes of the insurrection as stated by Isabelo Artacho, one of the Filipino leaders, was:

The expulsion of the Religious Corporations from the islands; the reformation of the Spanish laws in force in the Philippines, adapting them to the aspirations of the people; granting the people ample and solid instruction in all branches of education; with personal security and liberty based on a rational political system.

As will be noted, Señor Artacho does not include political independence as one of the objects for which they were striving—a fact amply confirmed by other documents. The demands of the insurgents, so far as then formulated, were simply for administrative reforms, and the expulsion of the Friars or curtailment of their powers.

When the revolt began there were but 300 Spanish soldiers in Manila and some 1,500 in the entire Archipelago, which number was later increased to 26,000, assisted by



several loyal Filipino regiments. With the army thus recruited, the insurgent forces, after a short campaign, were defeated and scattered.

Early in 1897 the insurrection started afresh and spread to other Luzon provinces, its trail being marked by acts of wanton cruelty and barbarous reprisals by Spaniards and natives alike. By the end of November, 1897, the government forces had succeeded in overcoming and dispersing the Insurgents throughout most of the affected territory, the only position of importance remaining uncaptured being at Biacnabáto, a mountain stronghold north of Manila. In the meantime negotiations had proceeded, looking to the securing of peace through a cash payment to the insurgent leaders and their departure from the islands. Primo de Rivera, then Governor-General, in recommending this plan to his government, stated the advantages as being: "The saving of money, the saving of lives, *and that it would destroy the prestige of the chiefs who sold out and emigrated.*" The Spanish Ministry, fully occupied as it was with Cuba, authorized the proposed arrangement. In treating with the Insurgents, however, Primo de Rivera absolutely refused to commit himself to specific reforms, declaring that Spain "could never admit anything which might affect her honour or sovereignty, or involve compromises for the future," and that he "could only employ his good offices to indicate such reforms as he thought were needed." With this understanding, and on this basis, Aguinaldo and his subordinate chiefs undertook, in consideration of 800,000 pesos—to be paid in three installments—to surrender their arms, dismiss the insurgent forces, and themselves leave the Philippines. This agreement, known as the Treaty of Biacnabáto, was executed on December 15, 1897, having

been ratified by the Insurgent "Assembly" and approved by their "Supreme Council." On December 27th, Aguinaldo and twenty-seven companions were taken to Hong Kong on a Spanish steamer, the first instalment of 400,000 pesos being deposited to the credit of Aguinaldo & Company in a Hong Kong Bank on January 2, 1898. This fund was controlled and disbursed by Aguinaldo for the maintenance of himself and fellow exiles.

Contention immediately developed as to the "proceeds of sale." Two days following Aguinaldo's departure, a gathering of insurgent chiefs, styling themselves "Principals of the Insurrection," headed by Isabelo Artacho, protested to Primo de Rivera against sending the rest of the money to Aguinaldo, saying, among other things, that: "Discontent has been produced in the minds of many who, though having more rights to the benefits of pacification, have nevertheless been left in complete abandonment in these islands, while, on the contrary, others, of better fortune, though with less merit or fitness, have embarked for foreign ports whither they have been taken to be maintained with the so-called treasury of the insurrection." The second instalment of 200,000 pesos was accordingly paid to the chiefs who made the protest. Apparently the third instalment was not paid, the reason assigned being that there was little chance of its equitable division among those entitled to it under the agreement.

On February 24, 1898, Aguinaldo and his associates in Hong Kong declared the Biacnabáto agreement with the Spanish authorities "null and void" because of failure to pay the full thirty pieces of silver, and organized a "Revolutionary Committee" to engage in propaganda outside the Philippines and to assist in carrying on insurrection in the islands. While treating their contract with Primo de

Rivera as violated, and themselves absolved therefrom, there was no proffer to return the 600,000 pesos already received as consideration "for abandoning further attacks on Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines."

New trouble came on apace. On April 5, 1898, Isabelo Artacho, who had received 5,000 pesos as his share of the second instalment, arrived in Hong Kong. He immediately demanded 200,000 pesos of the funds there deposited, this under an agreement to establish a company in Hong Kong for the benefit of the former leaders generally, and not merely those who had accompanied Aguinaldo. This agreement was repudiated by Aguinaldo and his followers and payment refused; whereupon Artacho entered suit in his name and that of other exiles, demanding that Aguinaldo be required to account for the trust funds deposited in his hands, and that he be enjoined, together with his committee, from handling or disposing of such money. As exhibits Artacho filed copies of the Biacnabáto treaty and of an agreement entered into by the "leaders" on December 19, 1897. A summons was issued for Aguinaldo's appearance before the Supreme Court of Hong Kong on April 13, 1898, but by that time he was outside the jurisdiction of the Court, having sailed from Hong Kong on April 8th. Major J. M. R. Taylor, who translated and compiled the Insurgent records now on file with the War Department, Washington, describes this event as follows:

He [Aguinaldo] drew out the 50,000 pesos from the Chartered Bank, which had become due according to the terms of the deposit, and perhaps such other sums as could be drawn upon by check, engaged passage for Europe by way of Singapore for G. H. del Pilar, N. M. Leyba, and himself under assumed names, appointed V. Belarmino to succeed to his functions, and gave him checks in blank to draw the interest of the sums on deposit to provide for the support of the exiles.

He gave as his reason for departure that he was going to remain under cover until Artacho could be bought off, but he intended to go far afield for this purpose, as he gave his destination as Europe and the United States.

Aguinaldo and his companions arrived in Singapore, via Saigon, on April 21, 1898. War having then been declared by the United States against Spain, Aguinaldo was persuaded by an Englishman named Bray (who had lived some years in the Philippines) to have an interview with the American Consul-General in Singapore, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt. The latter, believing that Aguinaldo might possibly prove useful should operations be undertaken against Manila, cabled Commodore Dewey to that effect, and was told in reply to have Aguinaldo come to Hong Kong. By the time Aguinaldo arrived, however, Dewey's squadron was already at the gates of Manila and the Spanish fleet had been destroyed. On May 19th, or some three weeks after the battle of Manila Bay, Aguinaldo and about eighteen other "Biacnabáto exiles" returned to the Philippines from Hong Kong.

While the American fleet could at any time after May 1st have forced the surrender of Manila, and thus ended Spain's tenure of the islands, the step was not taken pending arrival of American troops to occupy the city. In the interim of their coming, Aguinaldo, operating partly with arms secured from the captured Spanish arsenal at Cavite, and partly with importations permitted by Dewey, attacked the Spanish garrisons outside Manila and drove them within the protection of the old Walled City and its outlying forts. Here he was blocked, these fortifications being impregnable to any force or guns the insurgents could muster. Admiral Dewey, testifying later before a Senate Committee, stated: "They [Fili-

pinos] had no artillery and I knew very well could not take that Walled City, and I wanted the situation to remain as it was until our troops came to occupy it."

By the end of July, 1898, some 10,500 American soldiers had arrived at Manila Bay. To avoid the loss of life and property inevitable to a bombardment, it was arranged to press the attack upon Manila by land, notwithstanding it was the height of the rainy season and the landing of troops and supplies extremely difficult. On August 13th the attack was delivered and the Spanish soldiers occupying outlying positions were early routed and driven within the city walls. Before the final assault, however, the Spaniards capitulated, and on the afternoon of the 13th, Manila was entered and possession taken by the American forces.

During this time there was no coöperation between the American and Filipino forces as allies or otherwise; in fact, there was considerable friction, due to the desire of the Filipinos to forestall the Americans, if possible, in the capture and occupation of Manila, and thus secure for themselves the resulting spoils and prestige. On August 12th, the day preceding the surrender, General Merritt, commanding the American troops, notified Aguinaldo to forbid his forces to enter Manila. Having no control over the Insurgents, who lacked both discipline and self-restraint, the American officers entertained well-grounded fears that if such troops were admitted on equal terms, and permitted to overrun the city, promiscuous looting and other excesses would occur, with the necessity of suppressing them by force. Under the circumstances a joint occupation of the city, with its divided authority and responsibility, was impossible.

What would inevitably have happened had Manila been

captured by or delivered to the heterogeneous Insurgent forces, is well illustrated by Aguinaldo's subsequent demand for a share in the "war booty" because of Filipino coöperation in the siege and taking of the city. To this demand General Otis (who had succeeded General Merritt) replied:

Your forces, you say in substance, should have a share in the booty resulting from the conquest of the City, on account of hardships endured and assistance rendered. Under the rules of war which are binding on my Government the existence of spoils of war, denominated "booty," has never been recognized. No enemy's property of any kind, public or private, can be seized, claimed by, or awarded to, any of its officers or men, and should they attempt to appropriate any of it for their individual benefit, they would be very severely punished through military tribunals, on which have been conferred by law very sweeping jurisdiction. My troops cannot acquire booty nor any individual benefit by reason of the capture of an enemy's territory. I make this comment, believing that you hold erroneous opinions in respect to individual advantages which occupation bestows.

The Articles of Capitulation gave the American forces full occupancy of Manila and its defences, and specifically placed: "The city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions, under the special safeguard of the faith and honour of the American Army." The obligation thus assumed was early rendered difficult through the presence in the city of various units of Insurgent troops who, despite the request upon Aguinaldo, had pushed in along with and after the American soldiers, and had since been rapidly increasing in numbers. Conditions affecting the enforcement of law and order finally became such that on September 8, 1898, General Otis, in a communication to Aguinaldo reviewing the entire situation, stated in part as follows:

It only remains for me to respectfully notify you that I am compelled by my instructions to direct that your armed forces evacuate the entire city of Manila, including its suburbs and defences and that I shall be obliged to take action with that end in view within a very short space of time should you decline to comply with my Government's demands; and I hereby serve notice on you that unless your troops are withdrawn beyond the line of the city's defences before Thursday, the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible action, and that my Government will hold you responsible for any unfortunate consequences which may occur.

The firm stand taken by General Otis was effective, the armed insurgent organizations withdrawing from the city and its suburbs on the evening of September 15th and taking a position just beyond the American outposts.

The situation existing between the taking of Manila on August 13, 1898, and the ratification of the Treaty of Paris on February 6, 1899, was somewhat anomalous, and has resulted in considerable loose argument as to what should have been done. The conditions were these:

Following the destruction of the Spanish fleet on May 1, 1898, the decision was made to send an American army of occupation to the Philippines. President McKinley, in communicating this decision to the Secretary of War on May 19th, informed him that such troops were being sent, "for the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of Spanish power in that quarter and of giving order and security to the islands while in possession of the United States"; and, "that the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political conditions of the inhabitants."

It is to be borne in mind that when this action was taken, Spanish sovereignty still subsisted in the islands, and, further, that the final overthrow of such sovereignty on August 13, 1898, was accomplished not by Aguinaldo and

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his troops but by American naval and land forces. The remains of the Spanish fleet, Cavite and its arsenal, and the city and bay of Manila and their defences, were surrendered and delivered to the United States, which pledged itself to safeguard life and property within such limits. The peace protocol with Spain—negotiated coincident with the taking of Manila but without knowledge of that fact—specifically provided:

The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbour of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace *which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.*

To have dealt with Aguinaldo during this interval in his alleged civil capacity would have been a recognition of his government as an existing entity, something impossible without a palpable violation of the Peace Protocol. Until a final treaty was concluded, the Insurgents of the Philippines were and continued to be simply “rebellious subjects of Spain.” Unless the islands were eventually ceded to the United States by treaty, or were otherwise compromised therein, they remained the property of Spain, subject to her control and liable to such disposition as she saw fit. Pending the Peace Conference and its results the United States had no title whatsoever to the Philippines, and was not authorized to “deliver” them to the Filipinos or to others, or to make agreements as to their future status.

It has been claimed by Aguinaldo and others that Consul General Pratt at Singapore, and later Admiral Dewey, “verbally promised” that Philippine independence would be recognized by the United States. Aside from the fact that any such promises, if made, were beyond the authority of these officers, both of them have explicitly



denied the claim. On May 26, 1898, being within a few days of Aguinaldo's return to the Philippines, Secretary Long of the Navy cabled Dewey:

It is desirable, as far as possible, and consistent with your success and safety, not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future.

To this Dewey replied on June 3d:

Have acted according to the spirit of the Department's instructions from the beginning, and have entered into no alliance with the insurgents or with any faction. This squadron can reduce the defences of Manila at any time, but it is considered useless until arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain possession.

Testifying before a Senate Committee as to whether he had recognized the Government proclaimed by Aguinaldo, he replied:

Never. I did not think I had any authority to do it, and it never occurred to me to do it. There was a sort of reign of terror; there was no government. These people had gotten power for the first time in their lives and they were riding roughshod over the community. The acts of cruelty which were brought to my notice were hardly credible. I sent word to Aguinaldo that he must treat his prisoners kindly, and he said he would.

On June 17, 1898, Secretary of State Day cabled Consul-General Pratt to "Avoid unauthorized negotiations with insurgents." On June 16th a dispatch was mailed this Consul by the State Department reading:

To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to gratify. This Government has known the Philippine insurgents only as discontented and rebellious subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted with their purposes. While their contest with that Power has been a matter of

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public notoriety, they have not asked or received from this Government any recognition. The United States, in entering upon the occupation of the islands, as the result of its military operations in that quarter, will exercise the rights which the state of war confers, and will expect from the inhabitants, without regard to their former attitude toward the Spanish Government, that obedience which will be lawfully due from them. If, in the course of your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you acted upon the assumption that this Government would coöperate with him in the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting his coöperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might put forward, your action was unauthorized and cannot be approved.

On July 28, 1898, Pratt replied:

I declined to discuss with General Aguinaldo the question of the future policy of the United States with regard to the Philippines. I held out no hopes to him of any kind, committed the Government in no way whatever, and, in the course of our conferences, never acted upon the assumption that the Government would coöperate with him, General Aguinaldo, for the furtherance of any plans of his own, nor that, in accepting his said coöperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might put forward.

Aguinaldo and his chiefs, however, both to encourage their following and possibly to enhance their own prestige, industriously gave out that they had an "alliance" with the Americans, and that independence had been promised them. As will be seen, their claim had no official sanction and was altogether gratuitous.

The Peace Conference, held at Paris, lasted some months, the matter of the Philippines offering the principal obstacle to an agreement. President McKinley in his original instructions to the American Commission stated that the United States "could not accept less than the Island of Luzon in full sovereignty." It was soon realized, however, that to take Luzon and leave the rest of the archipelago to Spain, or more likely to Germany, was to

invite all manner of complications. The President thereupon informed the Commission that "the cession must be of the whole archipelago or none, and as the latter is wholly inadmissible, the former must therefore be required." He further indicated that he had come to this conclusion, "mainly because of the interests of the Filipino people, for whose welfare we cannot escape responsibility." In a later dispatch he stated: "The sentiment in the United States is almost universal that the people of the Philippines, whatever else is done, must be liberated from Spanish domination. In this sentiment the President fully concurs."

The proposed cession of the Philippines was vigorously opposed by the Spanish Commissioners. They contended that the occupation of Manila should be governed by the terms of the peace protocol rather than the articles of capitulation; that the protocol did not contemplate the cession of the islands, and that Spanish sovereignty over the Archipelago was unimpaired. With exception of Great Britain, practically all the European Powers supported and openly sympathized with Spain in her position, regarding the United States as a brutal aggressor seeking self-profit through picking a quarrel over Cuba. True

Earlier in the Conference the United States had demanded that Spain assume Cuba's public debt, notwithstanding that such debts usually attach to a territory upon change in sovereignty. It was now urged by the Spanish Commissioners that their ministry could not possibly accept this Cuban debt and remain in power unless some concessions were made in the Philippine demands. The American delegates were not in full accord. Mr. Day was agreeable to paying Spain \$15,000,000, and allowing her to keep Mindanao and Sulu; Mr. Frye wanted the whole

archipelago, but, fearing failure of the treaty, was willing to pay Spain \$5,000,000, and leave her the Visayas and Mindanao; Mr. Reid, while arguing that the United States had full claim to the whole archipelago as indemnity for war expenses, would, to save the treaty, pay Spain \$15,000,000 therefor, or agree instead to her keeping Mindanao and Sulu. Mr. Gray was opposed, on principle, to taking the Philippines, but was willing to acquiesce in such a step, making "reasonable concessions." Mr. Davis was in favour of flatly demanding the archipelago and making no money payment. As certain concessions seemed imperative to avoid a break in negotiations, President McKinley, while directing the Commission to demand a cession of the entire archipelago, authorized them to assume the Philippine debt of \$20,000,000, or rather pay that sum to Spain, with the promise to admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippines for ten years upon the same terms as American ships and merchandise. This offer—virtually an ultimatum—was, after some sparring, accepted by Spain, and the treaty signed on December 10, 1898. Among other concessions by the United States were: to return to Spain all arms, guns of all calibre, ammunition, live stock, and materials and supplies of all kinds belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, and also to defray the cost of sending back to Spain all Spanish prisoners of war taken upon the capture of Manila.

Given the limitations of the peace protocol, also the terms upon which Manila was surrendered, it is obvious that the scope of possible demands concerning the Philippines at the Peace Conference was circumscribed. The only alternative offered was to insist upon a cession of the islands, in whole or in part, to the United States, or to

permit their retention, in whole or in part, by Spain. The status of the parties at the time furnished absolutely no warrant for requiring that Spain make a gratuitous delivery of her sovereignty to the Philippine Insurgents, nor could any such proposition, if made, have prospered. In finally demanding a cession of the entire group, and the making of substantial concessions to that end, the principal motive of the United States was the welfare of the Filipino people, who otherwise would have reverted to Spanish domination, or to that of such country or countries as might have purchased the islands from Spain or have intervened in the protection of their respective nationals. *Belmont*

Inasmuch as many Americans, professing to have at heart "the happiness and well being" of the Filipino people, have persistently argued that some sort of crime was committed by the United States in taking sovereignty over the Philippines, a brief survey of the other possible course, *i.e.*, leaving them to the control and disposition of Spain, may prove interesting.

The Spaniards had in Manila, at the time of its capture, some 13,000 soldiers, 22,000 small arms, 10,000,000 rounds of ammunition, 70 pieces of modern artillery of different calibre, and several hundred ancient bronze pieces. The terms of surrender provided that these arms, delivered to our authorities, "should be returned to the Spanish forces if the islands reverted to Spain, or the American troops abandoned Manila." It was also agreed that until conclusion of a peace treaty, these prisoners and war materials were to remain in Manila subject to United States control.

Relieved of the war in Cuba, the Spanish soldiers there engaged, numbering approximately 120,000, would have been available to send against the Philippine Insurgents. As the latter had no artillery or munitions of consequence,

and were without resources or facilities to acquire them, there was little prospect of their taking Manila, certainly not before the local garrison were reënforced by the Cuban contingents, when any possibility of such capture would have been hopeless.

It will be recalled also that the Spanish fleet under Admiral Camara was still intact, and that its departure for the Far East in June, 1898, caused no little worry to our army and navy officials. Until arrival of the monitors *Monterey* and *Monadnock*, then en route from San Francisco, Dewey's squadron was outclassed by that of Camara. Fearing the latter might arrive at Manila before the monitors, Dewey planned "to take his fleet to the North of Luzon, cruise eastward until he met the *Monterey* and *Monadnock*, and then return to give battle." In the meantime, General Anderson, commanding the American troops already on the scene, proposed "to take thirty days' rations, march into the hills about twenty miles east of Cavite, intrench, and await the return of the fleet." Just as these plans were about to be given effect, word was received that Camara's fleet, after reaching the Red Sea, had turned back. The episode demonstrates, however, that the Filipino Insurgents, having no navy whatsoever, could not have held Manila even if captured, or any other coast town in the archipelago, upon arrival of Camara's fleet in Philippine waters.

Whatever the eventual outcome of the struggle between Spain and the Insurgents, had the United States withdrawn, it requires little imagination to picture the wave of red carnage which would have swept the islands when Spain, freed from the handicap of her Cuban operations, could have devoted her energies and resources to the Philippine situation. Neither does it require great

acumen to realize that, if successful in suppressing the insurrection, the temper of the Government would hardly have been such as to inspire reform measures, or the granting of participation in public affairs to the natives.

Filipinos of intelligence fully realized this imminent possibility of disaster. On August 21, 1898, Dr. Galicano Apacible, who headed the Hong Kong junta upon Aguinaldo's departure, wrote Apolinario Mabini, who was denominated "the brains of the insurrection," as follows:

The last telegrams from Europe are alarming for our future. The demand of America is annexation of Porto Rico and the Ladrone Islands, independence of Cuba under an American protectorate, and an American coaling station in the Philippines. That is, they will again deliver us into the hands of Spain. If events will be what these telegrams indicate, we have a dark and bloody future before us. To be again in the hands of Spain will mean a long and bloody war, and it is doubtful if the end will be favourable to us. The treaty of peace sanctioned by the other Powers will assure the dominion of Spain. Spain free from Cuba and her other colonies will employ all her energy to crush us and will send here the 150,000 men she has in Cuba. I do not think the Filipinos will again submit to their tyrannies and there will be a long and bloody war. And on account of the treaty, the other Powers will aid Spain to dominate us completely and place all possible obstacles in our way to prevent shipment of arms and all kinds of revolutionary labours.

It was Doctor Apacible's opinion, therefore, that the Filipinos should establish negotiations with the United States looking to independence under an American protectorate. As heretofore shown, the circumstances did not justify the United States in making such a demand upon Spain even had the Insurgent leaders concurred in suggesting it.

A like view of the perils in store was taken by prominent Filipinos abroad who were qualified by experience and outlook to appreciate the real situation. On July 28,

1898, Señor Antonio Regidor, a Filipino of wealth and education residing in London, cabled Sr. Felipe Agoncillo, Secretary of the Hong Kong junta, as follows:

In the name of the Filipinos, you should immediately send a telegraphic message to McKinley requesting him not to abandon the islands after we have fought as brothers for a common cause. Pledge him our unconditional adhesion, especially of the well-to-do people. To return to Spain, in whatever form, would mean annihilation, perpetual anarchy. Filipinos en masse should visit the consuls at Hong Kong and Singapore. London commerce supports it. Influence Aguinaldo to accept American flag, flying it everywhere, thus obliging them to remain.

Aside from the imminent reestablishment of Spanish rule had the United States abandoned the islands, subsequent events disclosed another likely development hardly less disastrous in its consequences to the Philippine people.

Germany, in her carefully laid plans to dominate world commerce, had entered late in the race for colonies and strategic trade bases, and was industriously seeking to overcome the handicap. In 1884 she had succeeded in getting considerable slices of territory in Africa, and somewhat later acquired portions of New Guinea and certain South Pacific Islands. In March, 1898, she secured from China a leasehold of the Bay of Kiaochow, and various economic rights in the province of Shantung. Evidence has accumulated that shortly before or during the Spanish War period, Germany was negotiating with Spain for purchase of the Philippines and other Spanish possessions in the Pacific. It was a sale which Spain, harassed by the situation in Cuba and the constantly recurring insurgent outbreaks in the Philippines, might well have considered. Certainly Germany did not take kindly to America's entrance on the scene. The story of Admiral von Died-



richs's attitude during Dewey's blockade of Manila Bay, and the resulting friction between the two commanders, is familiar history. Notwithstanding that Germany's commercial interests in the Philippines were less than those of Great Britain, France, or Switzerland, she brought to the scene six out of the seven war vessels constituting her Asiatic squadron—a fleet superior in strength at one time to that commanded by Dewey. The German officials fraternized with the Spaniards ashore, and were banqueted and fêted by them. Provisions were supplied the besieged city by German vessels, and Spanish refugees were received aboard whenever a bombardment of Manila was rumoured. The first news received at Washington of the capture of Manila was that given out at Hong Kong on August 15th by a German war vessel, which had taken aboard ex-Governor-General Augustin of the Philippines and started for the China coast when surrender of the city was assured.

Spanish possessions in the Pacific at this time included not only the Philippine archipelago, but also the Caroline, Ladrone, and Pelew archipelagos, lying some 1,200 to 1,500 miles east of the Philippines, mere dots in a waste of waters, far from the beaten trade routes. Guam, one of the Ladrone group, with an area of 225 square miles, was ceded to the United States because of its possible use as a cable station. Spain's possession of the remaining islands, however, was not disturbed. On February 12, 1899, or within a week of the ratification by the United States of the Paris Treaty, Spain concluded a sale of these islands to Germany. The area of the Caroline group (including the now famous Island of Yap) is 390 square miles; of the Ladrone group (excluding Guam) 214 square miles, and of the Pelew group 170 square miles—a total

for the lot of but 774 square miles. For this comparatively insignificant area Germany paid Spain 25,000,000 pesetas, equivalent to \$4,875,000. What Spain might have secured on this basis for the Philippines, with their 116,000 square miles of territory, far more advantageously situated, can be readily figured. Certainly their potential value was such that Spain would not have meekly surrendered them to the Filipinos, particularly when she could have sold them to Germany had the need arisen. It is to be remembered that all this occurred at a time when European powers were carving China to pieces, and systematically grabbing commercial and military bases wherever situate.

What a German occupation of the Philippines in 1899 or thereabouts might have meant to the world affords rather interesting speculation. To the Filipinos, it would most certainly have meant stern repression and enforced acquiescence, then and thereafter, to the will of a despotic government. There is little question also but that, with the natural facilities offered, Manila Bay and its approaches would have been thoroughly fortified by Germany, and rendered well-nigh impregnable. It is for army and navy experts to figure the consequences to Allied shipping, and to Allied war plans, had it been necessary in 1914 to cope with a strong German squadron operating from this protected base. On the other hand, had Germany in the Philippines been overcome, and the same procedure followed as was applied by the League of Nations to other German islands North of the Equator, then the Philippine Archipelago would to-day be under a "Japanese mandate," administered in the interests of that country.

| Whatever the alternative—Spain, Germany, or Japan—

and there is little question it would have been one of them, it would seem clear that the Filipino people have every reason to thank Providence that the American flag *did* remain in the Philippines, and that under its protection they were given and still have every opportunity and encouragement to develop whatever talent God has given them.

As late as February 9, 1923, a Senator of the United States, speaking upon a bill relating to the Philippines, stated in part as follows:

We assumed jurisdiction over the Philippine Islands and their inhabitants without the consent of the latter. Our flag was not welcomed by them; they had won their independence from the Spanish crown and set up a republican form of government under a constitution which contained many liberal and progressive features. They exhibited remarkable patriotism and great ability, and there were manifold evidences that they were competent to govern themselves and to establish domestic tranquillity and discharge such international obligations as are required of an enlightened nation.

We have quoted this speech because it furnishes a fair sample of the sort of "argument" which is being regularly fed the American public by politicians and propagandists, who pretend to speak with knowledge of the facts.

If this and other like accusations are true, then the American people have been guilty of gross injustice and should be condemned therefor. To be charged with deliberately robbing the Philippine people of their independence, already won from Spain, and destroying in the process an enlightened and progressive government, is somewhat damning, particularly when sponsored by an exalted Senator who it is hardly supposed, would lightly malign his countrymen. Let us briefly review the facts, however, and see whether the charge is true or simply political buncombe.

In December, 1897, Aguinaldo and his subordinate chiefs sold out to the Spanish Government and left the islands, thereafter engaging in a squabble with other "leaders" over the spoils.

At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, Aguinaldo was en route to Europe, while various of his fellow ex-patriots were in Hong Kong and other foreign parts.

On May 1, 1898, the sovereignty of Spain in the Philippines went down with Montojo's fleet at Cavite, there not being a time thereafter when Dewey could not have forced a surrender of the Spanish forces through a bombardment of Manila.

On May 19, 1898, Aguinaldo, together with eighteen other voluntary exiles, returned to the Philippines on an American boat, a return determined upon and made possible by Dewey's victory.

On May 31, 1898, and then largely with arms secured from the captured Spanish Arsenal at Cavite and importations permitted by Admiral Dewey, active operations against the Spanish forces outside Manila were begun by Aguinaldo's forces.

Insurgent successes thereafter, particularly adjacent to Manila, were due to the security afforded through destruction of the Spanish fleet, and to the fact that Spanish reënforcements and supplies were cut off by Dewey's blockade of Manila Bay.

On June 12, 1898, a "Proclamation of Independence" was issued by Aguinaldo and other military chiefs at Kawit, Province of Cavite. It was local in its circulation, and such as any military group might issue at any time.

On August 1, 1898, another "Proclamation of Independence" was issued, wherein various towns in the neighbourhood of Manila participated or were represented,

the affair being engineered and controlled by the military leaders.

On August 13, 1898, Manila and its outlying forts, which could have resisted Filipino attacks indefinitely, were taken over and occupied by American troops.

On September 29, 1898, a "Philippine Republic" was proclaimed at Malolos, made possible by the fact that the American forces were marking time pending disposition of the islands by treaty, and because the Spanish forces, land and naval, were held in leash by the United States awaiting the same event.

The "Philippine Constitution" was not proclaimed until January 23, 1899, one of its "liberal and progressive features" being a confiscation by the Government of the buildings, properties, and other belongings of the religious orders in the islands.

At least ninety per cent. of the inhabitants did not and could not voice their needs or desires in any manner, did not know what it was all about, and were not even remotely represented in any deliberations of the Malolos Government.

The more conservative and intelligent element of the population realized that the Philippine people had neither the resources nor political experience to stand alone, and favoured the establishment of American authority.

The course pursued by the Tagalog oligarchy, largely military, which dominated throughout, gave no evidence of ability to establish domestic tranquillity, much less discharge international obligations. The only system of government familiar to them was that of Spain, which hardly qualified for a popular, self-governing democracy.

The Filipinos did not "win their independence from the Spanish Crown," Spanish sovereignty having been de-

stroyed and supplanted by the United States. Had the American flag been withdrawn, the City of Manila and its defences, together with all captured arms, guns, and other war material, would, under the terms of surrender, have reverted to the Spanish forces still on the ground.

American withdrawal would have left the road open for Camara's fleet and Spanish reënforcements from Cuba and Porto Rico; which would have precipitated another era of carnage and anarchy in the islands, with the possibility of Insurgent success altogether hopeless.

With Spain again in the saddle, or with the islands sold to Germany or in the hands of intervening powers, the star of promise heralded by America's entrance on the scene would have been eclipsed, and all the ancient ills of the Philippine people have been perpetuated.

Unfortunately, however, the facts above recited have not deterred, and will not likely deter in the future, irresponsible declarations by alleged Americans concerning the circumstances attending our occupation of the Philippines, and the consequent protection afforded the Filipinos from the almost certain enslavement which awaited them.

## CHAPTER V

### THE SUPERSEDING OF SPAIN

THE interval between the occupation of Manila on August 13, 1898, and the ratification of the Peace Treaty on February 6, 1899, was, as we have seen, a peculiarly trying one. With the ultimate disposition of the islands uncertain, it was impossible to formulate and carry out any definite programme for the future. In the meantime the American forces remained in Manila and administered its affairs, while Dewey's fleet rode at anchor in the Bay.

There is no question that the considerable delay in negotiating and ratifying the Treaty was unfortunate. Had the United States been able to proceed on August 13th, or thereabouts, with some concrete plan of island administration, the subsequent collision with the Insurgents might possibly have been avoided. During these long months, however, the more belligerent of the native leaders, flushed by their successes over dispirited Spanish recruits, and having an absolutely free hand outside Manila, gradually worked themselves into the belief not only that the United States had no rights in the islands, but that they could readily defeat the American troops. Possibly this illusion was fostered by the pacific attitude of our soldiers (mostly Western volunteers), who were acting under strict instructions to avoid bringing on any engagement. The failure of these lanky Americans to take seriously or resent with force the various insults hurled at

them by their diminutive antagonists, much of which they did not understand, misled the excitable natives into believing they were afraid of them. As time passed, the Insurgent leaders and their following became steadily more truculent and aggressive, straining the forbearance of American officers and men to the breaking point.

On September 29, 1898, a Philippine Republic was proclaimed at Malolos, with Aguinaldo as President. Of the 193 persons listed as members of their Congress, some 42 were classified as "elected" and 151 as "appointed." The 68 delegates assigned to the Visayan Islands, with their nearly three million population, were all appointed. Of the 42 "elected" delegates—largely hand-picked by the military leaders—18 were from Tagalog provinces adjacent to Manila. Of the 85 delegates actually present at the opening of the Congress, 59 were Tagalogs. It was to all intents a Tagalog oligarchy, engineered and dominated by a few persons. The "Philippine people," as such, had no representation, nor did the vast bulk of them have any knowledge of what was transpiring.

On December 21, 1898, President McKinley, anticipating ratification of the peace treaty, transmitted to the Secretary of War the terms of a proclamation to be issued by General Otis to the Filipinos. This read, in part, as follows:

The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbour of Manila by the United States naval squadron commanded by Rear Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein.

With the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain on the 10th inst., and as the result of the victories of American arms, the future control, disposition and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States. In fulfilment of the



rights of sovereignty thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbour, and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory.

It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner, that we come not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. The operations of civil and municipal government are to be performed by such officers as may accept the supremacy of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance, or by officers chosen as far as may be practicable from the inhabitants of the islands.

Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberty which is the heritage of free people, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States.

This statement of purposes by the President, with its promise of a stable government in which the inhabitants should participate, and where justice and right would replace arbitrary rule, did not avail to prevent a conflict. The radical element was now in full control and, drunk with power and authority, refused to listen to prudence or reason. Wiser counsels there were aplenty, there being many Filipinos of prominence who opposed resistance to American authority, finally severing their relations with the Malolos government and returning to Manila. Among these were Cayetano Arellano, Dr. Pardo de Tavera,

Benito Legarda, Florentino Torres, Gregorio Araneta, Felipe Calderón, and men of like standing who, in education, intelligence, and judgment stood head and shoulders above those who finally led their credulous following into a hopeless struggle. These men clearly recognized what Aguinaldo and his advisers could not or would not see, *i. e.*, that without American support the Filipinos as a people had neither the experience nor the solidarity to organize and conduct a government which would insure internal order or be recognized or tolerated by foreign Powers.

The national hero of the Philippines is Dr. José Rizal, author and poet, executed by the Spaniards on December 30, 1896, because of alleged "rebellion and sedition" against Spanish authority. Rizal, however, whom the Filipinos now venerate, consistently opposed taking up arms against Spain, realizing that it spelled disaster to his people and could bring nothing but misfortune upon them. In a manifesto to his countrymen, written on December 15, 1896, after reciting that he had offered Spain his services to assist in stifling the Insurgent outbreak, he continued:

Countrymen: I have given proof, as much as has any, of desiring liberties for my country, and I continue to desire them. But I set down as the premise the education of the people, so that, through instruction and labour, it might come to possess its own personality, and might be worthy of those liberties. In my writings I have recommended study, and the civic virtues, without which there is no redemption. I have also written (and my words have been repeated) that reforms, to be fruitful, must come from above, and that those coming from below were only to be obtained in a manner such as would make them irregular and uncertain. Nourished upon these ideas, I cannot less than condemn, and I do condemn, that absurd and savage outbreak, plotted behind my back, which dishonours us Filipinos and discredits those who may speak on our behalf. I abominate its criminal proceedings, and I

disown any sort of participation in it, deploring with all the sorrow of my heart the ignorant victims of deception. Return then to your houses, and may God pardon those who have acted in bad faith.

It was Rizal's desire (1896) to preserve Spanish sovereignty, though with administrative reforms which would insure the progressive enlightenment of his people. With a wider experience, keener vision, and greater honesty of purpose than these Insurgent leaders, he realized that the redemption of his race, given their stage of development at that time, lay in evolution and not in revolution, and that to grasp at power when not prepared to exercise or maintain it, was not only futile but involved useless sacrifice and bloodshed. Had he lived, there is no question but that he would have sided with those who favoured American rule, and would have welcomed the protection and guidance of the United States as a means to the gradual emancipation of his people from racial limitations and from the mental and political bondage imposed by Spain.

President McKinley's proclamation having failed in its appeal, no immediate steps were taken to extend American authority beyond Manila and its environs. A force sent, in the meantime, to Iloilo under General Miller, was directed not to occupy the place if resistance were offered, it being feared such action might precipitate hostilities in Luzon, where it was still hoped trouble could be averted. Moreover, pending ratification of the peace treaty—necessary actually to confirm American sovereignty—it was felt that force should be employed only to repel actual attack.

The Insurgent records, later captured and compiled, show that during this period active preparations for war upon the American forces were under way, to be initiated

by an uprising and massacre of whites in Manila. Major J. R. M. Taylor, who edited these documents, summarizes this portion of the Insurgent plans as follows:

The attack which Aguinaldo was preparing to deliver upon and in Manila was not to be a mere raid such as the bandits of Cavite were in the habit of making upon the defenseless towns. The plan was a piece of calculated savagery in which murder and outrage were considered means to accomplish a purpose. The servants were to kill their employers; organized bands, dressed as civilians, living in the City of Manila under the government of the Americans, in many cases employed by the Americans, were to suddenly fall upon the barracks of the American soldiers and massacre the inmates; all Americans in the streets were to be killed, the city was to be fired, and its loot was to be the reward of loyalty to Aguinaldo. If this plan had been carried out no white man and no white woman would have escaped. The reinforcements from the United States would have arrived to find only the smoking ruins of Manila. Buencamino had warned General Augustin what the fate of Manila would be if taken by a horde of Indians drunk with victory. That fate was now deliberately planned for the city. Aguinaldo planned to occupy the capital, not as it had been occupied by the Americans. He planned to take it as Count Tilly took Magdeburg.

On January 21, 1899, General Otis wrote to Admiral Dewey:

The insurgents will not now permit us to cross their lines, and have been very insulting to our officers, calling to them that they will very shortly give us battle. My best information is that they have fully determined to attack both outside and within the city before our additional troops arrive, and the least spark may start a conflagration.

This spark was set a few days following (February 4, 1899), the occurrence being described by General Otis as follows:

On the night of February 2d they sent in a strong detachment to draw the fire of our outposts, which took up a position immediately in front and within a few yards of the same. The outpost was strength-

ened by a few of our men, who silently bore their taunts and abuse the entire night. On the evening of February 4th, another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts, which occupied a retired position at least one-hundred-and-fifty yards within the line which had been mutually agreed upon, an insurgent approaching the picket and refusing to halt or answer when challenged. The result was that the picket discharged his piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed.

The insurgents had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of a small outpost, which they had evidently laboured with all their ingenuity to accomplish, in order to justify in some way their premeditated attack. It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wished to open hostilities at this time, as they were not completely prepared to assume the initiative. They desired two or three days more to perfect arrangements, but the zeal of their army brought on the crisis which anticipated their premeditated action. They could not have delayed long, however, for it was their object to force an issue before American troops, then en route, could arrive in Manila.

The insurgent fusillade which followed the shot of the American sentry was taken up, and the engagement soon became general throughout the opposing lines. On the same evening Aguinaldo's "Declaration of War," setting out that the American forces of occupation would be "treated as enemies," appeared in Malolos and was given circulation in Manila early the next morning.

At this time the United States Senate was still discussing the Spanish peace treaty, a minority opposition having developed to ratification. Insurgent records indicate that hostilities were precipitated not only to anticipate the arrival of further American troops, but also in the belief that such action, evidencing opposition to American sovereignty, would help defeat the treaty. The actual effect of the outbreak, however, was to cause certain senators, who had theretofore wavered in their views, to vote for the treaty, which was ratified on February 6th, two days after fighting began.

Given the fact that American sovereignty over the Philippines was confirmed with full knowledge that an insurrection was then waging against our authority, was any course possible thereafter other than that pursued, that is, to suppress the uprising and establish law and order throughout the islands? We ask the question because there are those who vaguely assert that something else should have been done. Certainly President McKinley had no option in the matter. He was obligated to quell disorder in the Philippines exactly as he would had it occurred in any other territory of the United States. Would any one say our troops should have ceased fighting, acknowledged the Filipinos as victors, and left the islands? It is not conceivable. The only other possible authority—the American Congress—had already spoken through a two-thirds vote of the Senate, ratifying the treaty. Any further step must necessarily await the restoration of peace. Having assumed sovereignty, it became impossible to acquiesce in its overthrow or limitation by force.

The course of the insurrection need not be reviewed in detail. The Filipino forces, as an organized unit, were early defeated and scattered, offering at no time any effective resistance. With the capture of the insurgent capital at Malolos, and the going of Aguinaldo into hiding, the opposition degenerated into that most trying of all struggles, guerilla warfare. Small bands of natives, operating under local leaders and levying forced tribute upon their own people, were able to prolong disorder within restricted areas for some two years. When it is remembered that the climate is a tropical one, where heat, storm, and disease waited upon the path of our soldiers; that they were fighting upon unfamiliar ground, much of

it mountainous or rank with jungle growth; that they were ignorant of the native dialects, and compelled to rely for information upon the uncertain testimony of local guides and interpreters, some conception may be had of the difficulties encountered and the fortitude displayed in overcoming them. At one time the American forces were split into over five hundred detachments, in order to restore order in the different communities and to furnish security to the great body of the people who, while desiring peace, were terrorized by a small insurgent element. The following order, issued by "General in Chief" Maxilom of Cebu, March 24, 1900, will show *why* American protection was necessary:

1. The presidentes of all towns who subscribe to and recognize American sovereignty, shall be pursued by all the revolutionists without mercy, and when captured shall be sent to these headquarters for a most summary trial and execution as traitors to the country.

2. All Filipino citizens, including the wealthy, of the towns, are subject to the preceding regulation.

3. It shall be the duty of the revolutionary armies with regard to towns which shall recognize or intend to recognize such sovereignty, to destroy the town or towns, and without any consideration whatever to kill all males, even the poorest, and set fire to all the houses, without respecting any property excepting that of foreigners.

The above is but one of many such orders, and illustrates how "Insurgent support" was secured and maintained, particularly after organized resistance collapsed. It is to be remembered that these guerilla bands were armed, while the populace was not, thus placing the latter at their mercy. Moreover, the bulk of these very arms, now used to resist American authority and intimidate their own countrymen, had been secured from the Spanish Arsenal at Cavite, captured by our fleet, and from later importations landed with Dewey's permission while blockading Manila Bay.

The futility of the insurrection was perfectly apparent after the first month's fighting, and was so recognized by the more responsible Filipinos. Had the radical Tagalog leaders been less blinded by their own ambitions and lust for power, they would have remembered Rizal's counsels and saved their fellow countrymen, whom they pretended to represent, much needless misfortune. The masses of the people, characterized by Rizal as "ignorant victims of deception," had little choice, however, being forced to ally themselves with the insurgent cause, or to be killed, tortured, or otherwise punished should they refuse. During the course of the war, they suffered far more through the acts of their own self-styled chiefs than they did at the hands of the Americans. The barbarities practised by the insurgent forces during this period, both upon captive Spanish friars and soldiers and upon their own people, have been detailed by Hon. Dean C. Worcester in his book "Philippines Past and Present." It constitutes a record of callousness to human suffering and human rights not usually associated with capacity to administer an enlightened government.

In prolonging the war, with its attendant evils, the insurgent leaders did so with full knowledge of the altruistic purposes of the United States toward the Filipino people. On January 20, 1899, being prior to the outbreak of hostilities, President McKinley, in his efforts to secure a peaceful solution of differences, had appointed a commission to visit the islands and confer with their people. In his communication to the Secretary of State advising his action, he said:

In order to facilitate the most humane, pacific, and effective extension of authority throughout these islands, and to secure, with the



least possible delay, the benefits of a wise and generous protection of life and property to the inhabitants, I have named Jacob G. Schurman, Rear-Admiral George Dewey, Major General Elwell S. Otis, Charles Denby, and Dean C. Worcester to constitute a commission to aid in the accomplishment of these results.

It is my desire that in all their relations with the inhabitants of the islands the commissioners exercise due respect for all the ideals, customs, and institutions of the tribes which compose the population, emphasizing upon all occasions the just and beneficent intentions of the Government of the United States.

Doctor Schurman was President of Cornell University, Mr. Denby had served for fourteen years as Minister to China, and Mr. Worcester, through extended explorations in the islands previous to American occupation, knew Philippine conditions better than any other American.

Before Messrs. Schurman, Denby, and Worcester were able to join Gen. Otis and Admiral Dewey in Manila, the insurrection had begun. On April 4, 1899, however, the full Commission issued a proclamation to the people of the Philippine Islands setting forth the purposes of the American Government. This proclamation, which was translated into various of the native dialects and widely circulated, read in part as follows:

The aim and object of the American Government, apart from the fulfilment of the solemn obligations it has assumed toward the family of nations by the acceptance of sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, is the well being, the prosperity, and the happiness of the Philippine people and their elevation and advancement to a position among the most civilized peoples of the world.

Both in the establishment and maintenance of government in the Philippine Islands it will be the policy of the United States to consult the views and wishes, and to secure the advice, coöperation, and aid, of the Philippine people themselves.

In the meantime, the attention of the Philippine people is invited to certain regulative principles by which the United States will be guided in its relations with them. The following are deemed of cardinal importance:

1. The supremacy of the United States must and will be enforced throughout every part of the archipelago, and those who resist it can accomplish no end other than their own ruin.
2. The most ample liberty of self-government will be granted to the Philippine people which is consistent with the maintenance of a wise, just, stable, effective, and economical administration of public affairs, and compatible with the sovereign and international rights and obligations of the United States.
3. The civil rights of the Philippine people will be guaranteed and protected to the fullest extent; religious freedom assured, and all persons shall have an equal standing before the law.
4. Honour, justice, and friendship forbid the use of the Philippine people or islands as an object or means of exploitation. The purpose of the American Government is the welfare and advancement of the Philippine people.
5. There shall be guaranteed to the Philippine people an honest and effective civil service, in which, to the fullest extent practicable, natives shall be employed.

In addition to the foregoing, the Commission pledged our Government to an impartial collection and expenditure of public revenues, the speedy and effective administration of justice, the construction of roads and other necessary public works, the extension of scientific health protection, the encouragement of domestic and foreign trade and of island industries, the general spread of education, and the reform of every department of government, all to be undertaken in the interest and for the benefit of the Philippine people.

It may be interesting to note here that every promise made at this time was scrupulously fulfilled by the United States, and that the Filipino people are to-day in the full enjoyment of every privilege and advantage above enumerated, none of which theretofore existed.

The Commission spent several months in the islands. It studied conditions and events from every angle, and availed itself of every opportunity and source of informa-

tion possible to render an impartial report covering the situation. The members of the Commission were high-minded, intelligent men, actuated by no desire and impelled by no purpose other than to execute faithfully their trust in the interests of all concerned. Is it not more reasonable, therefore, to accept their findings of fact, and to place our faith in their judgment, than to follow the little gods of politics and propaganda, who are concerned only with effecting some proposition which may serve their particular ends? In a report to the President, which embodied the evidence upon which their conclusions were founded, this group of men said:

Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the commission believe that the government of the Philippines would speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, the intervention of other Powers and the eventual division of the islands among them. Only through American occupation, therefore, is the idea of a free, self-governing, and united Philippine commonwealth at all conceivable. And the indispensable need, from the Filipino point of view, of maintaining American sovereignty over the archipelago is recognized by all intelligent Filipinos and even by those insurgents who desire an American protectorate. The latter, it is true, would take the revenues and leave us the responsibilities. Nevertheless, they recognize the indubitable fact that the Filipino cannot stand alone. Thus the welfare of the Filipinos coincides with the dictates of national honour in forbidding our abandonment of the archipelago. We cannot, from any point of view, escape the responsibilities of government which our sovereignty entails; and the commission is strongly persuaded that the performance of our national duty will prove the greatest blessing to the peoples of the Philippine Islands.

Our control means to the inhabitants of the Philippines internal peace and order, a guarantee against foreign aggression and against the dismemberment of their country, commercial and industrial prosperity, and as large a share of the affairs of government as they shall prove fit to take.

Twenty-three years after he had subscribed the foregoing, Doctor Schurman, now Minister to China, again

visited the Philippine Islands, and in addressing a gathering of Filipinos stated:

For myself, visualizing the troubled conditions of the world since Spain ceded her sovereignty over the Philippine Islands to the United States; recalling the ambitions and lust of certain great nations for the acquisition of Pacific possessions; remembering the dominance of militarism in the world and the callous indifference of military powers to moral and international law and to the rights of smaller nations; recollecting and considering all this, I say, I do not hesitate to give it deliberately as my opinion, that an independent Philippine Republic would have been engulfed in the irresistible tides of rival imperialisms and competing economic interests, and submerged as completely and as hopelessly as other independent nations have been submerged in the tumultuous and devastating upheavals of the last twenty years.

It is a prevalent idea that the Philippine people were a unit in resisting American sovereignty and that their leaders were altogether patriotic and unselfish. Aside from the fact, already noted, that the more intelligent and conservative among them both opposed and deplored an armed struggle and quit the Malolos government when their counsels were rejected, the Filipino people as a whole had little voice in starting the insurrection and even less understanding of its consequences if successful. Precipitated and dominated, in the first instance by a Tagalog majority at Malolos, most of whom were in control of armed forces, the insurrection thereafter spread to outlying provinces largely through the instigation and leadership of Tagalog emissaries. There was no informed public sentiment, the masses knowing nothing of the United States or of its purposes on their behalf. They were told, and believed, that our soldiers were fiends incarnate, and that American "tyranny" would be worse than that of Spain. They were forbidden, under penalty, to read

the various proclamations issued for their enlightenment, while those posted in Manila and elsewhere were soon effaced by Insurgent agents. As for the Moros, Igorots, Ifugaos, and kindred peoples, occupying two-fifths of the land area of the islands and comprising some twelve per cent. of the population, their needs and desires and future status were not even remotely consulted.

The island of Negros, one of the most prosperous of the Visayan group, with an area of 4881 square miles and more than a half million inhabitants, did not join the Insurgent cause. Its people set up a government of their own early in 1899, applied to our authorities for assistance, and settled down peaceably under American rule. Efforts were made by Tagalog invaders to incite revolt, but with little success.

Even while the insurrection was on, and united action imperative, jealousy, intrigue, and the clash of rival ambitions were rife among the Insurgent leaders. While many instances might be given, the assassination of General Luna supplies a typical example and affords a clear indication of what would have happened under a Philippine Republic. Luna was admittedly one of the most capable of the Insurgent generals, his exploits and prestige early threatening to eclipse those of Aguinaldo. The latter, sensing Luna's growing popularity and fearing its consequences to himself, summoned Luna to his headquarters, where he was killed. The treatment of this historical fact by different "propaganda purveyors" is not without interest. One Charles Edward Russell, who visited the islands under the auspices and at the expense of the "Philippine Independence Commission," and wrote a book favouring independence, refers to the incident thus:

He [Luna] seems to have been singularly gifted for a military career, but five months after taking the field against the Americans he was mysteriously assassinated, a crime that has never been explained.

Francis Burton Harrison, who wrote a book in defence of his career as Governor-General of the islands, and who can scarcely be accused of painting things blacker than they are, has this to say:

They [the Insurgents] were divided in their own councils because of the jealousy of Aguinaldo, who finally put to death his best soldier, General Luna, through treachery.

The *Philippine Press Bulletin*, a propaganda publication issued in Washington, describing General Luna and his career in its number of June-July, 1923, says:

Of the generals of our Revolution, authorities agree in according to General Luna the place of first honour. A man of undaunted courage, commanding personality, and great organizing power, he quickly won the respect and admiration of Aguinaldo, who offered him the position of commanding general. Afterward he was made Director of War, and subsequently commander-in-chief. . . . The death of Luna, in June, 1899, at a time when his services were most needed, brought the Revolution practically to an end.

Mr. Harrison having supplied the detail of *how* General Luna met his death (a matter of common knowledge in the Philippines), the *Press Bulletin* enables us to fix responsibility for the consequent Insurgent collapse. We are not told, however, why, in this event, an unarmed and uninformed populace was coerced into supporting the futile resistance of guerilla leaders for another year and a half. In truth, the revolution would have ended as it did in any event, and Luna's assassination becomes important only as it illustrates why any purely Filipino government was foredoomed to failure. It might also be said that in

appointing Luna "Director of War," Aguinaldo retained in himself full control through making his cousin Baldomero "Secretary of War."

A happening somewhat similar to the Luna episode occurred during the 1896-97 insurrection against Spain. The uprising of 1896 was precipitated and led by Andres Bonifacio, president and animating spirit of a Filipino secret society known as the Katipunan. With the coming of Aguinaldo to the front, however, rivalry developed between them. At a meeting of the revolutionary leaders in March, 1897, Aguinaldo was elected president, a post to which Bonifacio aspired. Charles Edward Russell, heretofore cited, gives this somewhat naïve account of what followed:

As so often happens, the rank and file had wearied of the persistent recurrence of one man; there had been too much of Bonifacio. In the full cabinet that was chosen he was offered the place of Secretary of the Interior. He refused it in a rage, declared it to be beneath the dignity of a man that had created the movement and its success; and denouncing all the proceedings and the new government retired into the mountains with his two brothers. President Aguinaldo ordered his arrest. In trying to effect it, Bonifacio was mortally wounded.

This was rather rough on Bonifacio, particularly as "President Aguinaldo" sold out to the Spaniards a few months later and left the islands.

Apolinario Mabini, Aguinaldo's chief counsellor at Malolos, and without doubt the ablest, wrote as follows:

The death of Andres Bonifacio had plainly revealed the existence in Aguinaldo of an unrestrained ambition for power, and the personal enemies of Luna, by means of artful intrigues, exploited this weakness to ruin him [Luna].

There was also a characteristic aftermath to the quarrel which had arisen over division of the 600,000 pesos paid

by Spain for Insurgent allegiance. Le Roy, in his standard work "The Americans in the Philippines," refers to it as follows (vol. 1, p. 349):

The prescriptions of the Cavite revolt of 1896-97 were recalled also by the vindictiveness displayed at Bakoor [Aguinaldo's Headquarters] toward certain Pampangan and Pangasinan leaders of 1897 who had clashed with Aguinaldo over division of the Biaknabáto money, who had found it was not safe to go into their own provinces after his military organization had been set up there, and who for a time before the fall of Manila took refuge on one of Dewey's vessels in the bay.

All this would be amusing were it not that the ambitions, rivalries, and petty animosities of these "leaders" were given sway at the expense and through the suffering of an innocent and inoffensive people.

With the crumbling of the insurrection and gradual extension of American control, immediate steps were taken to provide for the orderly administration of justice in the occupied territory.

In Manila the process of "cleaning up," and of replacing a 16th-Century civilization with some of the decencies and opportunities of modern life, began almost with the day of occupation. On September 10, 1898, a city health board was organized, with Major Frank S. Bourns, an army surgeon, at its head. The results accomplished were so striking that a Spanish writer (Sastron), who had no particular love for Americans, said: "The Americans, practical as they are wont to be, speedily made the city cleaner than it had ever been before." With smallpox endemic, and everywhere prevalent, steps were taken at once to make vaccination general. By January 1, 1901, the city was completely free from such disease. Some two hundred lepers, who had been allowed to mingle with the population, were rounded up and confined, a



scientific disposal of city waste was provided, and sanitary regulations adopted and enforced.

On September 1, 1898, seven public schools were opened in Manila, in charge of Chaplain W. D. McKinnon. General Otis urged military officers to open as many schools as possible, and personally selected and ordered textbooks. Both in Manila and outlying districts, army officers acted as school superintendents and soldiers were detailed as teachers. Geo. P. Anderson, a volunteer officer and Yale graduate, was appointed Superintendent of Manila schools on June 1, 1899, and on March 30, 1900, Capt. Albert Todd was detailed as temporary Superintendent of Public Instruction for the islands, being succeeded on September 1, 1900, by Dr. Fred W. Atkinson of Massachusetts. On the same date Dr. David P. Barrows of California became Superintendent of Manila schools. Prior to September, 1900, some forty-one thousand dollars had been expended for stationery and textbooks by the military governor, while before the end of 1900 one hundred and twenty schools had been opened and equipped in northern Luzon alone.

Elections were held and local government set up in the various municipalities as rapidly as they were freed from Insurgent control and reprisals. While subject to American supervision, the officers elected under this arrangement were in every case Filipinos, being possibly the first instance of any real participation by them in choosing their own officials.

It is to be recalled that all this occurred while insurrection still waged in different parts, and while the islands were still under military rule.

In April, 1900, President McKinley appointed a Commission to go to the Philippines with authority to con-

tinue the work of civil organization and to effect a gradual transfer from military to civil rule. This Commission comprised Hon. Wm. H. Taft of Ohio, Prof. Dean C. Worcester of Michigan, Hon. Henry Clay Ide of Vermont, General Luke E. Wright of Tennessee, and Prof. Bernard Moses of California. It is doubtful if the President could have secured, in all our country, an abler or more conscientious body of men for this delicate and difficult task. Under the leadership of Judge Taft, they brought to their work not only commanding ability and unimpeachable integrity, but unflagging industry, infinite patience, an optimism that surmounted every obstacle and defeat, and an unfailing purpose to implant in the Philippines, as far as possible, those manifold blessings which have made our country an asylum for the oppressed of all nations. In the years that have gone, millions of the earth's down-trodden have forsaken their native lands, their homes, kindred, and friends to live beneath our flag and enjoy its privileges and protection, while to-day our portals are besieged by a clamouring horde seeking like benefits. All of these things which these others achieved and hope to achieve only through hardship and exile, we were now taking to the Philippine people as a gift, to be enjoyed by them in their own homes without privation or sacrifice. As messengers and bearers of this gift, commissioned to serve the needs and promote the welfare of an alien people, we were voluntarily sending the best and highest types of our American civilization.

President McKinley's instructions to the Commission furnish a masterly exposition of the plans and purposes of the United States on behalf of the islands and their people. The spirit of the whole will be gathered from the concluding paragraph, which reads:

A high and sacred obligation rests upon the Government of the United States to give protection for property and life, civil and religious freedom, and wise, firm, and unselfish guidance in the paths of peace and prosperity to all the people of the Philippine Islands. I charge this commission to labour for the full performance of this obligation which concerns the honour and conscience of their country, in the firm hope that through their labours all the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands may come to look back with gratitude to the day when God gave victory to American arms at Manila and set their land under the sovereignty and protection of the people of the United States.

The Commission arrived at Manila on June 3, 1900. Until September 1st its time was given to studying local problems, specific lines of inquiry being assigned the different commissioners. Conferences were held with heads of the various religious orders, with military officials, with all classes and conditions of natives, and with members of the foreign community, suggestions and recommendations being invited as to proposed legislation and contemplated reforms. The Filipinos were assured a full hearing in all matters affecting their interests, and that they could rely upon the justice, generosity, and clemency of the United States. On September 1st the Commission, under its instructions, became a legislative body with authority to appoint all officers provided for under its laws. Until the establishment of a central civil government, the military governor remained the chief executive.

The difficulties confronting the Commission can hardly be exaggerated. To win the confidence and coöperation of a people oppressed and deceived throughout all their history, most of them ignorant and many of them resentful, and to build a government from the ground up with scant and untried material, was a sufficient task of itself. In addition, the work of the Commission was complicated by the unfortunate material conditions of the country,

and hindered and embarrassed by the tirades of party politicians and parlour theorists at home. Insurgent leaders were proclaiming throughout the islands that if Bryan was elected in November, 1900, American troops would be withdrawn and the Philippines declared independent. This possibility caused many influential natives, favourable to American authority, to hesitate in publicly declaring their allegiance through a natural fear that they would be cut off from the spoils of an independent régime, and be singled out thereafter for persecution as "Americanistas."

With the defeat of Bryan and his "Paramount issue," however, conditions rapidly changed for the better, and Filipinos of prominence exerted themselves not only to further the work of the Commission, but to end the insurrection. In December, 1900, these Filipinos organized what is known as the Federal party, its platform being peace under American sovereignty with eventual statehood under our flag. Its president was Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, a man of brilliant attainments and of European training and culture, while its directors included men who ranked high in the insurgent councils at Malolos and who were recognized as leaders among their people. Through the organization of branches in the different provinces, and a consequent enlightenment of the people as to actual conditions, this party played an important part in the early restoration of peace.

In the meantime the Commission, through laws enacted by it, was bringing home to the masses, in concrete form, the fact that greater privileges were being voluntarily accorded them by the United States than they had ever demanded from Spain, and far greater than they could hope to enjoy under a government of their own.

Moreover, these laws were being enacted in public session, and every facility given the people to express freely their ideas concerning the various measures proposed. Advantage of this opportunity was taken by Filipinos in constantly increasing numbers, as they dearly love the limelight.

The first law passed by the Commission was an appropriation of \$1,000,000 for the construction and repair of highways and bridges. Its purpose was to furnish employment to persons rendered destitute by the war, and to make a start in a comprehensive system of road building for the islands. A Civil Service Act was shortly enacted, under which, other qualifications being equal, preference in appointments was to be given Filipinos. A provision was made for reorganization of the Bureaus of Forestry and Mining and Courts of Justice. One million dollars was appropriated for improving the port of Manila, a work begun by Spain but never finished. A comprehensive Municipal Code and Provincial Government Act were adopted, whereunder the largest possible measure of local autonomy was granted consistent with efficient and honest administration. More than sixty acts were passed during the period from September to January; all of them directed toward restoring government efficiency. Acts numbered 10 and 51 appropriated \$750 each, to be paid the widow and minor children, respectively, of the Vice-President of Santa Cruz, Laguna, and the Chief of Police, Leyte, both Filipinos who were murdered by Insurgents "because of their loyalty to the United States."

In the spring of 1901, the insurrection being about finished, the Commission made a tour of the islands, visiting practically every province in the archipelago.

Leading representatives of the different municipalities were called into session, and the provisions of the municipal and provincial acts explained to them in detail. Outside of the Moro country and other "Non-Christian" regions, civil government was organized in the various provinces and officers appointed to administer local affairs. Throughout its entire trip the Commission was enthusiastically and hospitably received, the people evidencing in every way their appreciation of the liberties and privileges accorded them. This coming of the authorities to visit them personally, and to discuss the situation face to face, was something new in their experience, and had much to do in transforming their sentiments toward our sovereignty. Also there is no question that the personality of Judge Taft worked wonders. The influence of his genial smile and hearty laugh, his patience, his sincerity, his tact, his evident interest in their welfare, and his gift of felicitous expression, counted more in winning the coöperation and goodwill of the people than all the proclamations which could have been issued. Both Americans and Filipinos can never be sufficiently thankful that he was appointed to represent the United States during this trying transition period.

The Commission was also fortunate in its Spanish Secretary and interpreter, Mr. A. W. Ferguson. Large of stature, and with a perfect command of Spanish, he had that quality of vivid facial and bodily expression peculiar to races of Latin origin or training, combined with a marvellous faculty of moulding the *thoughts* of a speaker into forms to please and enlighten. He would take the rudimentary ideas of some halting orator and dress them out in such happy guise that their own parent stood enchanted at the offspring of his brain. This meant much

in dealing with a people to whom the *manner* of expression oftentimes counts for more than what is actually said. He died later, at his post of duty, and a simple monument to his memory, erected by the many who loved him, now stands in an embowered Manila plaza named in his honour.

The pressure of work upon the Commission during this period was something tremendous. What with the preparation and public consideration of proposed laws, the granting of interviews, the discussion of plans and projects, and the hearing of petitions as varied and numerous as human tribulations, a pace was set which caused old residents to shake their heads and predict disaster. The writer, then Secretary of the Commission, can give personal testimony that for months "office hours" did not exist, nor were there *siestas*, easy chairs, or any of that *dolce far niente* existence usually associated with life in the tropics.

One of the Commission's many interviews deserves special mention, illustrating, as it does, the vague ideas held by the most prominent of Insurgent leaders as to the requirements of an independent government. Apolinario Mabini, frequently styled "the brains of the insurrection," requested and was granted an interview by the Commission. When asked his wishes, he entered into a long dissertation on the inherent rights of individuals and races to shape their own destinies, drawing a beautiful picture from the standpoint of a student philosopher dealing with abstract and purely theoretical problems. Finally Judge Taft said to him:

But suppose, Senor Mabini, the Americans should withdraw and this freedom of which you speak be granted you, what then? Your country is composed of many scattered islands, some of them inhabited by wild

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tribes and all of them by people speaking different dialects and without any cohesion of ideas or experience in government. You occupy an exposed and coveted position in the path of world commerce, and would doubtless be called upon, very soon, to defend your nationality. You have many foreigners living here, for whose lives and property you would be held accountable not only from outside interference, but from the ambitions and jealousies of your own people. To protect your country from these dangers, you would need an army of considerable strength and at least the nucleus of a navy. All these things, together with the necessary expenses of government, would cost a great deal of money. Your country and people are poor, and your industries paralyzed. Waiving, therefore, all question of your ability to govern yourselves, I would ask how you propose to raise the revenues necessary to administer and preserve such a government?

To this inquiry Mabini simply shrugged his shoulders and replied: "The question of revenue *is a mere detail*." With this the interview ended. Unfortunately, Mabini's attitude of mind is characteristic of his people. Both racially and as a consequence of Spanish influence, the Filipino is given to the "grand gesture," seldom stopping to think how his grandiose plans and projects would stand the test of practical application.

In March, 1901, Aguinaldo was captured by General Funston, and shortly thereafter took the oath of allegiance. Although he had been in hiding for over a year, and had ceased to be a factor in directing the insurrection, his capture and subsequent declaration for peace influenced the surrender of various "generals" who had theretofore eluded our troops. Others, who were never more than bandits posing as Insurgents, continued their depredations until gradually hunted down and destroyed.

On July 4, 1901, military rule was supplanted and a central civil government established. On that date Judge Taft was inaugurated Civil Governor of the islands, with the Commission, of which he was president, as a



legislative body. In addition, the members of the Commission became secretaries of various departments, to which were assigned specific government activities.

Much had been done while working on the heels of war. A greater work remained to be done now that peace had come and the Filipino people were prepared to coöperate with the United States in shaping their future destiny.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE BUILDING OF A GOVERNMENT—1901-13

IT IS not our purpose, however tempting the story, to describe in detail the crowded events following the inauguration of Judge Taft as Civil Governor in 1901. All that can be hoped here, is to list some of the outstanding results of those strenuous, splendid years, when American ideals rather than a party slogan measured the conception of our responsibility. This period extended to October, 1913, when, unfortunately, the mantle of authority theretofore worn by men of character and ability, interested in maintaining the prestige and dignity of our people as a whole, fell to the inadequate shoulders of a partisan politician and spoilsman, trained and disciplined in the devious ways of the political trader.

Only those on the ground in 1901, with opportunity to contrast then conditions with those existing in 1913, can appreciate the transformation worked during these years by Governor Taft and his associates and successors. With the energy and practical directness characteristic of their heritage, they swept clean the wreck of Spanish mediævalism and upon its ruins builded a modern commonwealth wherein the Philippine people, within their limitations, were given all the innovations and discoveries which have marked centuries of Anglo-Saxon enterprise and progress.

The task set could hardly have been more complicated. To new and untried problems, an impoverished country

and an untrained government personnel, was added the havoc wrought by war with its by-products of antagonism, of lawlessness, and the inertia incident to enforced idleness and the breaking up of accustomed pursuits. Moreover, during the early years of American occupation, an epidemic of rinderpest swept over the provinces, destroying the herds of carabao and cattle, leaving the people destitute of work animals. Agriculture, the true source of wealth of the islands, was largely paralyzed, and outside capital, which might have relieved the situation, was deterred from coming because of the persistent agitation of theorists and politicians looking to our early surrender of the islands.

The Philippines were ours by conquest and by formal cession from Spain; we were free to do with them as we pleased; and every historical precedent would have sanctioned their exploitation as a national asset. Instead, we voluntarily pledged the Philippine people that our administration would be for their benefit and protection and not for our aggrandizement. I state, unhesitatingly, that we have kept the faith, and that neither Filipinos nor Americans have just ground for complaint or criticism of the record which stands revealed.

Upon the material side of the problem, *i. e.* the shaping of conditions which make for progress, enlightenment, and well-being, the following incomplete summary of things done prior to 1913 will give an idea of how our trust was executed.

Courts with a simplified procedure, civil and criminal, were established, where rich and poor fared alike. For the first time the administration of justice ceased to be a matter of purchase and sale, to be enjoyed by the highest bidder.

Through the organization of a native constabulary, trained and officered by Americans—many of them regular army officers—brigandage and lawlessness were suppressed, and life and property protected and respected as never before in the history of the archipelago.

The chaotic condition of land titles and records, which made every purchase or other dealing with real property a hazard, was remedied through the organization of a Land Court, which enables every owner of lands to secure a registered and guaranteed title to his holdings.

The large agricultural estates of the friar orders, aggregating over four hundred thousand acres, which were a constant source of disturbance and discontent, were purchased by the Government at a cost of \$7,200,000, and arrangements made for their sale and lease to the occupants on easy terms.

The mongrel and fluctuating silver money in circulation upon our coming, which made all business operations a gamble, was replaced by a stable currency, based on gold and protected by ample reserves.

A Postal Savings Bank was established, encouraging habits of industry and thrift among a people noted for their improvidence.

A Public Land Act was passed which enables and encourages every Filipino to acquire a free homestead. Provision was also made for the sale and lease of public lands, of which millions of acres lie fallow and unproductive.

Forest regulations were adopted which protect this great source of island wealth from undue waste and destruction, and yet encourages capital in its exploitation.

Development of the rich mineral resources of the islands was made possible through laws and regulations

governing the location, protection, and patent of mining claims.

A Bureau of Agriculture was created, and the efforts of trained specialists were directed to improving the primitive methods of agriculture then in vogue, to providing and distributing selected agricultural stocks, and to educating the people in the necessity and advantage of producing better and more varied products. Numerous experimental farms were established, and practical demonstrations were furnished of scientific crop cultivation. A corps of trained veterinarians was employed which, through quarantine and other regulations, fought the destructive rinderpest epidemic to a standstill.

Bilibid, the great island prison, was transformed from a veritable death trap into an institution which would serve as a model in any country. Criminals are taught useful trades, and, as a reward for meritorious conduct, are transferred to the self-governing and self-supporting penal colony of Iwahig, where every opportunity is given them to become useful citizens.

The importation and smoking of opium were prohibited, and a vice which threatened to fasten itself upon the Philippine people was largely eliminated.

Church and State were divorced, and the people relieved of one of their greatest grievances under Spain. Freedom of worship, of speech, and of the press was guaranteed, privileges which many Filipinos, in their sudden release from old restraints, have flagrantly abused.

A Weather Bureau was organized in conjunction with the Philippine Observatory, previously established by the Jesuit Order. Under the efficient direction of Father José Algue, this bureau, through typhoon warnings and

other data, has prevented losses to shipping and other enterprises running into millions of dollars.

An educational system was established, designed to furnish every Filipino child a free public education. It was headed by trained educators from the States, while as early as 1901 a thousand American teachers were brought to the islands and distributed throughout the provinces. Here they became not only guides in mental progress, but through precept and example furnished a stimulus to higher standards of living. English was made the language of instruction. Spanish was spoken by less than five per cent. of the children, with nothing to be served by its use, and to have taught any of the local dialects would simply have perpetuated native provincialism. Moreover, English is the commercial medium of the Far East, and English literature is that of peoples who, in their governments, have best learned to submit to the will of a majority. In addition to primary instruction, high schools and normal institutes, housed in modern buildings, were brought within the reach of all, and a Philippine University, with full literary and professional courses, was organized. Manual-training schools, which taught useful trades and the dignity of labour, were installed in various centres. Hundreds of Filipino students were sent to the United States at public expense, where they received the best technical training of our colleges. Tennis, baseball, basketball, and track sports were everywhere implanted, improving native physique and offering a substitute for cockfighting, the national pastime. Every effort was directed toward supplying the unifying influence of a common language and of opening to Filipinos generally the pages of a bigger world than they had ever known or dreamed. It was realized that we

were possibly creating a single tongue to criticize and condemn our sovereignty, but it was a risk the United States was big enough to take and chance the consequences. Moreover, there was a belief, mistaken in the retrospect, that the Filipino, with a wider range of knowledge, would better appreciate his natural limitations and hesitate before demanding that he be cut adrift.

Health and quarantine services were organized, whose work in forestalling epidemics, in freeing the islands from smallpox, bubonic plague, and other endemic diseases, and in teaching and enforcing sanitation and sanitary living among all classes, would alone have justified our occupation. Between 1905 and 1910 more than 10,000,000 vaccinations were had, followed thereafter by revaccination, cutting the annual death rate from smallpox to 700 for 1912 as against 40,000 in 1901. A determined fight was made against tuberculosis, malaria, beriberi, and infant mortality, whose annual toll of victims ran into the hundreds of thousands.

Some three hundred local health boards carried the campaign into the provinces, gradually overcoming the passive resistance of the natives to any change in accustomed habits and surroundings. The lepers of the islands—over five thousand in number—were segregated, and settled on the Island of Culion, restricting a further spread of the disease and providing for the comfort and possible cure of the afflicted. Hundreds of artesian wells were constructed throughout the archipelago, replacing germ-laden surface cisterns and polluted streams as a source of water supply. Unwholesome and death-dealing plazas where food and drink were formerly sold gave way to modern steel and concrete markets, with cleanliness as a watchword. Modern hospitals were constructed in Ma-

nila, Cebu, Baguio, and Bontoc, that in Manila being as complete in its equipment and facilities as any like institution in the world. A school for trained nurses turned out hundreds of promising graduates, whose service and missionary work are helping to eradicate antiquated formulæ in caring for the sick. A Bureau of Government Laboratories, manned by experts, not only coöperated with the Health Department, but through its investigations into the cause and cure of tropical diseases, acquired a front rank among scientific institutions. The Pure Food and Drugs Act, applicable in the United States, was extended to the islands. Manila was given a new and complete sewerage system at a cost of more than two million dollars, as also crematories for disposal of city garbage. An extended water service was installed at a cost of a million and a half dollars, serving not only the needs and convenience of the city but insuring fire protection. A large government ice plant was erected, which sells ice and distilled water—so essential to health and comfort in the tropics—at a minimum figure. The pestilential moat surrounding the old Walled City was filled and made into a public recreation ground. Some twenty-three miles of foul-smelling *esteros* (canals) were cleaned, and steps taken to exterminate the swarms of mosquitoes, whose prevalence menaced health and made life a burden. Within a few years Manila was transformed from one of the plague spots of the Far East to a condition comparing favourably with any of the cities of our States.

Transportation facilities were revolutionized. Nearly two thousand miles of macadam roads were built, opening up the great interior of the country and making it possible for the people to market their products at a profit. The island waters were sounded and charted by the U. S. Coast



and Geodetic Survey and danger points studded with light-houses, making navigation something more than a lottery. Inter-island shipping was fostered and encouraged, a coast-guard fleet constructed, mail routes extended and cheapened, and the archipelago laced with cable and telegraph lines. The breakwater in Manila Bay was completed at a cost of more than three million dollars, the harbour dredged, and substantial piers erected, for the first time furnishing safe anchorage and docking facilities for ocean-going vessels. With material dredged from the bay a port area was created for warehouses and industrial enterprises; also a site for clubs, hotels, and a city parking system. Harbour improvements were also effected in Cebu, Iloilo, Zamboanga, and other shipping centres. In Manila, the Bridge of Spain was widened and two new and substantial bridges built across the Pasig River, greatly relieving traffic congestion; the old city walls were pierced by modern roadways, while the portion fronting on the Pasig was removed and the river dredged, thus furnishing ample berthing for local shipping; the botanical gardens were converted from an eyesore into a superb beauty spot; the streets were paved and many of them widened, shade trees planted, and parks and plazas cleaned and extended, and a scenic boulevard constructed along the bay shore. A model police force, recruited largely from non-commissioned officers of volunteer regiments, was organized; a fire department, with modern equipment, supplanted the toy affair theretofore used, and succeeded largely in preventing a recurrence of the frequent devastating fires which formerly swept the city; public bars were regulated and restricted, and the sale of intoxicants to members of wild tribes absolutely prohibited; numerous public schools, with spacious playgrounds,

opened a new existence to the children of the city, while the normal school and university buildings, with their attached dormitories, would be a credit to any country. Through government backing, a magnificent hotel was erected, which, in beauty of location and in accommodations and service, is unrivalled in the Orient. A public library was established, furnishing every facility to the public, to the student, and to the investigator. As a consequence of American occupation, the Commercial-Pacific cable lines were extended to Manila in 1902, and Manila to Shanghai in 1906; over forty-five miles of electric railway were built in Manila and outlying suburbs, and an up-to-date telephone system replaced the altogether inadequate service theretofore supplied. Under a government guarantee of four per cent. on the construction cost, the one hundred and twenty miles of railroad existing in 1898 were increased to more than six hundred, with some seven hundred miles in project and under construction.

A comprehensive census was taken of the islands, furnishing for the first time a reliable estimate of the population, and other facts and data of interest and value.

An irrigation system, financed by the Government under an arrangement for eventual reimbursement, was extended to various provinces, with a consequent large increase in agricultural output.

Through the construction of an automobile road into the Benguet highlands, there was brought within less than twelve hours of Manila one of the most scenic health resorts of the Far East. Baguio, which has an elevation of more than five thousand feet, is set in the heart of pine forests and verdure-clad mountains, and has a climate as cool and bracing as that of late autumn in our northern States.

What such a spot means can be appreciated only by those who have spent months, if not years, in the enervating heat of tropical lowlands. During Governor Forbes's administration Baguio was made the summer capital. A "government centre" was constructed, and officials and employees of the various insular departments (Americans and Filipinos) were transferred en masse from Manila for two months each year, and given an opportunity to recuperate health and energy without loss of time or personal expense.

Under the wise supervision and guidance of Hon. Dean C. Worcester and his corps of heroic assistants, the wild tribes of the islands, who took heads and slaughtered each other without let or hindrance in Spanish times, entered upon ways of peace, industry, and public order. Hundreds of miles of substantial trails were constructed throughout the Mountain Provinces of Luzon, making possible intercommunication between the various tribes and largely dissipating the distrust and antagonism which were their heritage. It is a work the magnitude of which has never been justly appreciated.

The Moros of Mindanao and Sulu, who were a disturbing and destroying element throughout the whole of Spanish sovereignty, were gradually brought to realize our pacific intentions, and comparative order was established throughout their territory. This result was fostered through non-interference with their religion, the establishment of schools and markets, and the preservation, so far as possible, of their tribal customs.

A new tariff act and internal revenue law were adopted, every effort being made to apply the burden according to the means of the individual rather than as formerly, according to class. A land tax was levied over the

vigorous protest of the landed proprietors, who had theretofore been exempt from such payment. All revenue collected, from whatever source, was retained in the islands and expended for the benefit of the Philippine people.

In 1903, the total revenues of the Philippines were \$11,089,299; in 1908 they amounted to \$14,112,129, and in 1913 had increased to \$20,567,925. Not a very big "working capital" with which to reconstruct, equip, and maintain a government comprising 116,000 square miles of territory and over nine millions of people, particularly when compared with that of other countries. The total revenues of the Philippines for the fiscal year 1912, insular, provincial, and municipal, amounted to but \$2.28 per capita. The revenues of Japan for 1912, excluding profits from government monopolies, were \$4.85 per capita. The revenues of the United States (Federal only) for 1912 were \$7.25 per capita, while for Canada they were \$18.80 per capita, and for Cuba (1911) \$21.53 per capita.

The total bonded indebtedness of the Philippines prior to 1913 was \$16,000,000, the proceeds being used for the purchase of friar lands, for harbour works and public improvements, and for Manila sewer and water works. Contrary to general belief, the Philippine Government receives no funds from the United States treasury. All insular expenses have been and are paid from Philippine revenues, the only outlay incurred by the United States being for army and navy expenditures, and for some portion of disbursements made by the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey.

Philippine imports from the United States increased from \$2,666,469 in 1901 to \$26,264,218 in 1913, and exports from \$2,572,021 to \$23,573,865. The total of island

imports increased from \$30,276,200 in 1901, to \$56,327,533 in 1913, and exports from \$23,222,342 to \$56,683,326. As will be noted, the bulk of increase both in imports and exports was with the United States. In August, 1909, through the personal intervention of President Taft, Philippine products were granted free entry to the United States, and *vice versa*—over the active opposition of American sugar and tobacco interests. The resulting advantage to Philippine industry and commerce in competition with foreign countries has been enormous, with still greater potentialities. This is something, however, which Filipino politicians, as distinguished from Filipino business men and the producing masses, do not like to discuss when urging the withdrawal of American sovereignty.

The above outline of accomplishments is a prosaic one, "the tale of common things," but upon scrutiny it will be found to include most of the factors which minister to the material, mental, and moral progress and uplift of a people, to secure and enjoy which our fathers struggled through the centuries. We would ask those who decry our occupation of the islands, whether Americans or Filipinos, to check this list of positive material achievements, and then, in the light of history and natural law, set over against it their "theories" of what would have been the outcome of a "Tagalog Republic" or its successors in interest. Idealism is beautiful, and as a theme lends itself to oratory and popular acclaim, but when the lives, the happiness, and the future destiny of a helpless, childlike people are involved, it is well to use a little common sense.

In the matter of government activities, and our pledge to grant the Filipinos a participation therein so far as consistent with public interests, the following appears:

On September 1, 1901, that is, within three months of the establishment of civil government, the Philippine Commission, being the legislative body of the islands, was increased from five to eight, the three additional members being Filipinos appointed by the President of the United States. The appointees were Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, Don Benito Legarda, and Don José Luzuriaga, who thereafter participated with the Commission in all its deliberations and, by counsel and suggestion, coöperated in serving the interests of their people. In 1908, a fourth Filipino, Don Gregorio Araneta, was added, and assigned the portfolio of Secretary of Finance and Justice.

On October 16, 1907, an elective Philippine Assembly was inaugurated, composed of eighty members. It functioned as a lower house, with the Commission as an upper house, all legislation other than that relating to the Moro Province and wild tribes requiring its sanction before becoming effective. If for any reason, however, this assembly held up appropriations necessary for the support of the Government, an amount equal to the sums appropriated in the last preceding bills would automatically continue. This contingency developed on three occasions prior to 1913. The creation of the assembly by the United States Congress was had through the efforts and at the express recommendation of Mr. Taft, then Secretary of War, who visited the islands when the assembly was organized, and presided at its opening session.

Under the Municipal Code as adopted by the Commission in 1901, the government of the various municipalities throughout the so-called "Christian" provinces, was made purely autonomous, the officials being chosen by the community. As to other subdivisions and departments of the Government, Filipinos were appointed and em-

ployed wherever possible without undue interference with efficient administration. The following summary shows the situation as of October, 1913:

Of the seven members of the Supreme Court, three were Filipinos, one of whom was Chief Justice.

The Attorney-General of the islands was a Filipino, as were also a number of his assistants.

Of the twenty-four Judges of the Courts of First Instance, twelve were Filipinos.

Three of the five Judges of the Court of Land Registration were Filipinos.

The Judge of the Municipal Court of Manila was a Filipino.

The Registrars of Deeds were all Filipinos.

All the Justices of the Peace throughout the islands were Filipinos.

The Governors of all the Christianized provinces, as also the third member of the Provincial Board, the governing body of the provinces, were Filipinos, elected by the people. The Provincial Treasurers were Americans.

In Manila, three of the six members of the Municipal Board were Filipinos, one of whom was President of the Board.

Of the 8,360 teachers in the Bureau of Education, 7,696 were Filipinos.

Of the 8,986 employees in the classified civil service, 6,363, or 71 per cent., were Filipinos.

The islands were also accorded two delegates in the United States Congress, both Filipinos, who were free to agitate against our sovereignty, or otherwise, as their personal convictions or political fortune might render expedient.

On July 1, 1902, Congress ratified the action of the President in appointing the Philippine Commission, as also all proceedings taken and laws enacted by the Commission under its original instructions and subsequent executive orders. Provision was made for the further civil administration of the islands, with specific reference to public lands, mining, forestry, bond issues, franchises, friar land purchase, coinage, harbour improvements, tariff, courts, census, etc. Excepting only the right of trial by jury and the right to bear arms, Congress, by the same Act, extended to the Philippines, and made applicable to their people, every right, privilege, and immunity guaranteed and safeguarded to Americans by the Constitution of the United States and its amendments. That protection from government interference in the life, liberty, and property of individuals, wrested by the Barons from King John at Runnymede, and now become the Magna Carta of free peoples everywhere, was conferred by a stroke of the pen upon the Philippine people, less than four years removed from the tyranny of Spain.

Can any one who dispassionately considers the foregoing say that we did not give full measure of performance in all that was promised when our sovereignty was undertaken? It is easy to criticize and complain, particularly when others bear the burden and responsibility, but only the ignorant, the self-seeking, or the prejudiced can refuse to recognize in this record of twelve years of altruistic endeavour something unprecedented in colonial administration, of which every patriotic American may well be proud.

What, then, was the reaction of the Filipinos to this transformation in material conditions and in political status worked by America on their behalf? The answer



must be that it was disappointing, or at least did not measure up to original expectations.

The early contact of our officials was necessarily with the better educated and cultured element, that small class at the top, mostly of mixed blood, which possesses all the graces of manner and fluency of speech characteristic of Latin-trained peoples. Judged by their professions, and their facile expression of ideas on almost every subject, the mistake was perhaps natural to overestimate their capacity—and with them the people as a whole—to appreciate and apply modern governmental methods and standards. When the United States occupied the Philippines, we were without experience in dealing with peoples different in the mass from our own; that is, peoples whose heritage of race, training, and environment gave them an entirely different slant upon life and its obligations. As Americans, born and reared in the traditions of a free people, and surrounded by those who have qualified through generations for the exercise of a responsible initiative in government, we are prone to forget that such a condition is not a general one. This is the fundamental error made to-day by many who pretend to pass long-range judgment upon Philippine affairs, or who simply pay a fleeting visit to Manila. It is true that our experience with the Negro problem at home should have taught us something, also the century-old chaos which has existed in countries south of the Rio Grande, but these have touched the average American at too few points to create other than a fleeting impression.

The only government of which the Filipinos had knowledge or experience was that of Spain, under which the "official" was everything, the masses nothing. Whatever their lip service, therefore, to "liberty, equality, and

fraternity," it was natural that Filipino leaders, when themselves vested with official position, should copy what they had known, and that the masses, sunk in ignorance, should continue to acquiesce in their old-time servitude to the *ilustrados*.

In 1905 a Congressional party visited the Philippines. At one of its public sessions a prominent Filipino leader stated that the essential ingredients of government were a "governing class" which should dominate, and a sheep-like mass trained to receive and obey the will of their overlords. He expressed his idea thus:

If the Philippine Archipelago has a governable popular mass called upon to obey, and a directing class charged with the duty of governing, it is in a condition to govern itself. These factors, not counting incidental ones, are the only two by which to determine the political capacity of a country; an entity that knows how to govern, the directing class, and an entity that knows how to obey, the popular masses.

Whatever else it might be, such a government would not be a "Democracy," or "of the people," nor could anything more be hoped for it than from its Spanish predecessor. Since the world began, the domination of a few, when unrestrained by an enlightened public opinion, has degenerated into misrule, oppression, and anarchy. The end sought by the United States, and to which every effort and energy were and are now directed, is to bring to this mass which has learned "how to obey," a realization that they have *rights* as well as obligations, and to train and qualify them to resist the encroachments and impositions of this top-side class which pretends a knowledge of "how to govern." In a special report made in January, 1908, to President Roosevelt, Mr. Taft as Secretary of War said:

What should be emphasized in the statement of our national policy is . . . that we are not merely to await the organization of a Philippine oligarchy or aristocracy competent to administer government and then turn the islands over to it. On the contrary, it is plain . . . that we are the trustees and guardians of the *whole Filipino people*, and peculiarly the ignorant masses, and that our trust is not discharged until those masses are given education sufficient to know their civil rights and maintain them against a more powerful class and safely to exercise the political franchise. . . . The standard set, of course, is not that of perfection, or such a government capacity as that of an Anglo-Saxon people, but it certainly ought to be one of such popular political capacity that complete independence in its exercise will result in progress rather than in retrogression to chaos or tyranny.

The goal set by Mr. Taft certainly expresses the minimum of our obligations, and should receive the unqualified support of every person who pretends to have the interests of the Philippine people at heart. How any one can advocate less and still claim to be acting either intelligently or patriotically, is not apparent.

Possibly the best illustration of the disillusion suffered by our authorities in their early estimate of Filipino governmental capacity, is found in the Municipal Code and Provincial Government Acts. Taking these laws as first enacted, and then studying the amendments successively added thereto, it will be found how, with further experience, the unpreparedness of the people for the measure of local control originally bestowed became apparent, and how various powers were gradually withdrawn and vested in the central government and in responsible American heads of departments. This action resulted not only from the ignorance and inexperience of the masses and their failure to protect themselves, but from a prevailing disposition of the dominant few to exploit their own people, and to use their authority for personal rather than public ends.

The coöperation counted upon within the islands did not altogether materialize, particularly from those with political ambitions. Left to themselves, the great majority of the people would have been perfectly content with our rule and the securities to life and property guaranteed them. Unfortunately, however, they were not left to themselves. From the very beginning a certain element, from whom the masses largely receive their ideas, systematically criticized and condemned our sovereignty and demanded our withdrawal. Either deliberately or through ignorance, they shut their eyes to the wider aspects of the tremendous transformation worked in their condition, and magnified every mistake or shortcoming of isolated officials or employees into a mountain of injustice, overshadowing every concession, privilege, or positive good accorded them through our occupation. They enthroned their so-called "political ideal" above the physical and economic welfare of the bulk of their countrymen, whose interests they would willingly sacrifice for the *ignis fatuus* of a questionable and uncertain independence.

Reference has been made to the Federal Party, organized shortly after the arrival of the Philippine Commission, whose platform favoured American sovereignty with eventual statehood under our flag. Preceding the election of delegates to the Philippine Assembly created in 1907 a new party, known as the *Partido Nacionalista*, was organized, whose slogan was immediate independence of the islands. Through its appeal to the pride and sentiment of the voters, this party triumphed overwhelmingly at the polls, and continued to do so thereafter. Based upon this fact the claim was and is made that the "Philippine people are a unit for independence." Waiving the fact that most of the electorate had and have absolutely

no conception of the duties, responsibilities, and dangers which would follow independence, the claim of "unanimity" is based upon a very slender foundation. In the first place, the "wild peoples" of the islands, numbering over a million, who had and have no vote, are, to all intents, a "unit" against independence, at least so far as their views find expression. Secondly, the qualified voters of the archipelago constitute a very small percentage of the population, and are not, in general, of the class to which our primary obligation is due. The franchise was granted to all male citizens over twenty-three years of age who could qualify as follows:

1. Those who, previous to August 13, 1898, held the office of municipal captain, gobernadorcillo, alcalde, lieutenant, cabeza de barangay, or member of any ayuntamiento.
2. Those who hold real property to the value of \$250, or annually pay \$15 or more of established taxes.
3. Those who speak, read, or write English or Spanish.

That these provisions are altogether liberal will hardly be questioned, and yet as late as the elections of June, 1912, the total number of registered voters was but 248,154, of whom less than one third qualified under the literacy test. In Manila 14 per cent. of the voters were illiterate, and in the provinces 70 per cent. The proportion of literate electors to the total population in the territory covered by the franchise was 1.47 per cent. Out of a total of 824 officials elected—municipal, provincial, and Assembly—there were 240 elections protested on the ground of fraud.

There remained, and still remains, a very wide gulf to cross before the masses "have education" sufficient to know their civil rights and maintain them against a more powerful class, and safely to exercise the political franchise."

As for the Philippine Assembly, its activities were regulated in large part upon advice of members of the Commission, constituting the upper house, who were also able to block unwise and foolish legislation. From 1907 to 1913 some three hundred and twelve acts passed by the Assembly were disapproved by the Commission. Investigation would show that American officials were far more concerned with the interests of the Philippine people as a whole than were their elected representatives, and that many of the acts proposed by the latter would have been a step backward in the process of general enlightenment.

One of the principal grounds urged by Filipinos for participation in legislation was that the government installed by the Commission was "too expensive." The third act passed by the Assembly, however, increased the per diem of its members from \$10 to \$15 and fixed the salary of its Speaker at \$8,000 per annum, while time and time again the aggregate of its appropriation bills exceeded the total revenue of the islands. Another act provided that local native dialects should be taught in the public schools, the effect of which would have been to perpetuate tribal distinctions with no compensating advantages, and to delay that homogeneity absolutely essential to intelligent political expression.

Until American occupation, chattel slavery existed among the Moros of Mindanao and Sulu. In September, 1903, slave-holding and slave-hunting were prohibited in this territory under heavy penalties. In the so-called "Christian" provinces, a form of peonage, or debt slavery existed, differing little from chattel slavery. The ignorant and improvident, through borrowing money or becoming otherwise obligated to their richer neighbours,

were compelled to serve their creditor until the obligation was satisfied. Through accumulations of interest and other "charges," the debt became perpetual, and the unfortunate debtor, and frequently members of his family, entered upon a life servitude. Existing laws were inadequate to prevent or punish the practice. For four successive years the Commission passed an act "Prohibiting slavery, involuntary servitude, peonage, or the sale of human beings in the Philippine Islands," and for four successive years the Philippine Assembly tabled the act and refused its passage. It was only when Hon. Dean C. Worcester, then Secretary of the Interior, compiled voluminous and conclusive data on the subject, with the purpose of securing Congressional relief, that the Assembly, making a virtue of necessity, finally passed this law, the sole purpose of which was to protect unfortunate, poverty-stricken Filipinos.

The Speaker of the Assembly was Sergio Osmeña of Cebu. First elected in 1907, he held the position successively until 1916, at which time the Assembly was succeeded by the lower house of the Philippine Legislature. He then continued as speaker of the new body until 1921, when he was elected to the Philippine Senate. As Speaker, and as undisputed head of the Nacionalista party, it can safely be said that for fourteen years his word was law among his colleagues, and that he absolutely controlled the attitude and actions of Filipino officials, not only in legislation and party councils, but in that much more vital matter to them—recommendations for government positions. It was only with the appointment of Harrison as Governor-General, and the return to the Philippines of Manuel Quezón, theretofore Filipino Delegate in Washington, that this leadership by Osmeña was

seriously questioned. With the election of Quezón as President of the Philippine Senate, in 1916, this conflict of ambitions between the two received fresh impetus, with frequent clashes in matters of patronage and policy, culminating finally in a split of the Nacionalista party by Quezón as the only means of dethroning his rival. This happening, however, will be developed in a later chapter.

"The blame of those ye better, the hate of those ye guard," the reward pictured by Kipling for those who strive to better the condition of backward peoples, finds no exception in the Philippines. No man ever worked more conscientiously and more whole-heartedly in the interests of the Philippine people, even to the risk of his life, than did Mr. Taft. As President of the Philippine Commission, as Governor of the islands, as Secretary of War charged with Philippine affairs, and as President of the United States, he acquired a detailed knowledge of the islands and the needs of their people, with both the power and will to help them. Through his personal intervention with the Vatican, the friar lands problem, which threatened perpetual discord, was satisfactorily adjusted; he originated and gave active support to the doctrine—"The Philippines for the Filipinos"; the elective Philippine Assembly of 1907 was due entirely to his efforts, the provision therefor in the Philippines Bill of 1902 having been written by him, and, through his intercession, restored after having been stricken out by the Senate; the granting of free trade to the islands in 1909, with the great resulting stimulus to island industries, was achieved by him as President in the face of strenuous opposition; in 1902, while Governor of the islands, he refused Mr. Roosevelt's offer of appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States, his greatest ambition, fearing his departure at



that particular time might jeopardize the interests of the Philippine people. What response in gratitude or appreciation did this unselfish devotion to duty receive from those who were enjoying both security and sinecures through his efforts? The following will show.

In December, 1912, a bill was offered in Congress providing for immediate autonomous government in the Philippines, with complete independence shortly thereafter. President Taft, in opposing the wisdom of such action, stated in a special message to Congress (December 6, 1912):

We must not forget that we found the Filipinos wholly untrained in government. Up to our advent, all other experience sought to repress rather than encourage political power. It takes a long time and much experience to ingrain political habits of steadiness and efficiency. Popular government must ultimately rest upon common habits of thought and upon a reasonably developed public opinion. No such preparation for self-government, let alone independence, are now present in the Philippine Islands. Disregarding even their racial heterogeneity, and the lack of ability to think as a nation, it is sufficient to point out that under liberal franchise privileges only about 3 per cent. of the Filipinos vote and only 5 per cent. of the people are said to read the public press. To confer independence upon the Filipinos now would, therefore, subject the great mass of the people to the domination of an oligarchic and probably exploiting minority. Such a course would be as cruel to those people as it would be shameful to us. I believe that no one to whom the future of this people is a responsible concern can countenance a policy fraught with the direst consequences to those on whose behalf it is ostensibly urged.

Because of this plea on behalf of the Filipino masses, President Taft was made the object of a vitriolic attack by members of the Philippine Assembly, a body which owed its very existence to his initiative. His sincerity and judgment were questioned, his motives impugned, and his friendship for the Philippine people denied, the Assembly adopting by unanimous vote a resolution supporting the

independence bill before Congress and asking its immediate passage.

The same treatment was accorded Hon. Dean C. Worcester, for twelve years Secretary of the Interior of the islands, whose constant journeyings throughout the archipelago gave him intimate knowledge of every stratum of the population. Because he championed the rights of the wild men and the downtrodden and voiceless among the people, and told brutal and unpleasant truths concerning the treatment accorded them, his name became anathema among that small coterie of Filipino *ilustrados* who seek to dominate the Government, and who regard their less fortunate fellow creatures as legitimate spoil.

This has been and still is the fate of any one who argues, or intimates, that the Philippine people are not yet ready for complete independence. No matter how deeply concerned such person may be for the welfare of the people as a whole, nor how sincere or well-founded his convictions, he immediately becomes a target for attack by that minority element which controls publicity, and which is supposed, however erroneously, to represent public opinion. The comparatively recent onslaught upon Governor-General Wood, engineered for political and personal ends by Manuel Quezón and a few subservient satellites, amply illustrates this fact. Plaudits are the exclusive portion of those who praise or flatter, or who urge immediate independence, regardless of the motives or "inducements" which inspire their action.

## VII

### THE WRECKING OF A GOVERNMENT—1913-21

IN 1913, Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, became President of the United States. The Philippines were then, as they are now, *terra incognita* to most Americans and had cut no actual figure in the campaign. Since 1900, however, when Bryan sought to make the Philippines a "Paramount Issue," the Democratic party had carried a stereotyped platform pledge to grant the Filipinos immediate or early independence, and its leaders now felt impelled to make some gesture in the matter. By a strange fate, Mr. Wilson, now called upon to effect this party declaration, had, as student and historian, specifically pointed out why such proposed step—given the existing condition of the Philippine people—would violate every principle of history and natural law. In a lecture on Constitutional Government delivered at Columbia University in 1907, he referred to our Philippine obligations as follows:

Self-government is not a mere form of institution, to be had when desired if only proper pains be taken. It is a form of character. It follows upon the long discipline which gives a people self-possession, self-mastery, the habit of order and peace and common counsel, and a reverence for law which will not fail when they themselves become the makers of law—the steadiness and self-control of political maturity. And these things cannot be had without long discipline.

The distinction is of vital concern to us in respect of practical choices of policy which we must make, and make soon. We have dependencies to deal with and must deal with them in the true spirit of our institutions. We can give the Filipinos constitutional government, a government which they may count upon to be just, a government based

upon some clear understanding, intended for their good and not for our aggrandizement; but we must for the present supply that government. But we cannot give them self-government. Self-government is not a thing which can be "given" to any people, because it is a form of character and not of constitution. No people can be "given" the self-control of maturity. Only a long apprenticeship of obedience can secure them the precious possession, a thing no more to be bought than given. They cannot be presented with the character of a community, but it may confidently be hoped that they will become a community under the wholesome and salutary influence of just laws and a sympathetic administration; that they will, after a while, understand and master themselves, if in the meantime they are understood and served in good conscience by those set over them in authority.

We, of all people in the world, should know these fundamental things and should act upon them, if only to illustrate the mastery in politics which belongs to us of hereditary right. To ignore them would be not only to fail and fail miserably, but to fail ridiculously and belie ourselves. Having ourselves gained self-government by a definite process *which can have no substitute*, let us put the people dependent upon us in the right way to gain it also.

Translated, this means that it is not given to any government or people to work miracles. However great our desire, we cannot override ethnological truth or hurdle the slow processes of evolution. If the Malay is to escape his inheritance it must be by the same road we have travelled, and history records that the journey was a slow and painful one. We may inaugurate a few "short cuts," but the ingrained racial characteristics and habits of ten millions of people cannot be transformed in a generation, nor in many generations.

Acting upon this historical truth, our early administrators bent their energies to giving the islands a good government, a government wherein the people would be protected in their rights and at the same time learn, through precept and example, the essentials to any possible self-governing, self-respecting democracy.

Let it be said to our credit also, that however the

Philippine question was used at home to lure votes from an uninformed electorate, none of this party juggling found echo in the islands. Of the five governors-general who served prior to 1913, Taft and Ide were Republicans, Wright and Smith were Democrats, while the politics of Governor Forbes were unknown until the eve of his departure. Before receiving their respective appointments as Chief Executive, Judge Taft had served in the islands over a year; General Wright three years and a half; Judge Ide six years; General Smith eight years, and Mr. Forbes five and a half years. All of them—and they were men of calibre and character—out of a fund of knowledge of the situation gained through years of study, experience, and observation, pursued a *uniform policy*, which was to further the betterment of the people and the development of the islands as a whole, retaining in their own hands, or in those of responsible subordinates, such a measure of control as would insure an honest, efficient, and just administration. Fitness for employment was not determined by party affiliations ten thousand miles away. The question was one of *men*, and of our duty as Americans to serve in the best possible way the needs of this people whom we had taken into our household.

With affairs in this shape came the change of administration at Washington in 1913. There was nothing really inimical to the policies of this new administration in the work then being done in the islands. The Republican party had granted the Filipinos an Elective Assembly in 1907, and of the nine members of the Philippine Commission, four were Filipinos. Natives were in entire control of local affairs, save as experience showed a wise supervision to be necessary, and were being incorporated into the civil service as rapidly as they qualified therefor,

if not more rapidly. What happened, however, when Olympus spoke?

At one fell swoop the Governor-General and members of the Philippine Commission, that body of men particularly and peculiarly trained to their work, were ingloriously swept into the discard, save one lone Filipino. Such a thing could not have happened elsewhere in the world. Governments other than ours, dealing with distant possessions calling for special knowledge and experience, place a premium on efficiency bought by trial and service, and not only struggle to retain such officials, but reward them handsomely when they voluntarily retire. Our system is different. Mr. Forbes, then Governor-General and a man of independent means, had served in this tropical outpost for nine years, giving the Filipino people the benefit of his eminent abilities as an organizer and administrator. Sacrificing his own ease and comfort, he contributed without stint of his time, his energies, his health, and his personal means, to the work and service of his country. It is interesting—humiliating—to note how these years of unselfish devotion to duty were “recognized” by the powers at Washington, lately elevated to positions of authority.

The first inkling received by Governor Forbes that he was to be replaced came through glaring headlines in the Manila press, announcing that the name of his successor had been sent to the Senate for confirmation, followed, later, by “official” notice of the fact. Three days afterward, he received the following remarkable cable:

Washington, Aug. 23, 1913.

FORBES, MANILA.

*Confidential.* Harrison confirmed August 21st. The President desires him to sail September 10th. Will it be convenient to have your

resignation accepted September first? Harrison to accept and take oath of office September second. The President desires to meet your convenience. Should Harrison take linen, silver, glass, china, and automobiles? What else would you suggest? Wife and children will accompany him. Please engage for him servants you leave.

McINTYRE.

In Manila, where Governor Forbes was universally admired and respected, this curt demand for his resignation within eight days, coupled with its "employment agency" appendage, was received with general indignation. It was something foreigners could not understand and created a most deplorable impression.

President Wilson, disregarding his own statement as to what constituted self-governing capacity and "the processes necessary for its development," proceeded to reverse the policy of his predecessors based upon his own gospel. To accomplish this end, he appointed a New York Congressman as Governor-General, Francis Burton Harrison, a man without knowledge or experience of the Philippines or of the Orient, partisan, prejudiced, and narrow in his point of view, and wholly unfitted by political training to guide the toddling footsteps of our Filipino wards in ways of decency and civic righteousness.

The appointment was made at the request, or suggestion, of Manuel Quezón, then one of the Filipino delegates at Washington, and possibly the cleverest politician the Philippines have produced, which is saying much considering that "politics" is the chief industry of the islands. He personally conducted his protégé, the new Governor-General, to Manila, where he remained at his elbow for some months as confidential adviser. At a banquet given Mr. Harrison shortly after his arrival, he placed his arm affectionately over Mr. Quezón's shoulder and publicly

credited him with his (Harrison's) appointment. This is something he would not have done had he known his Orient better and realized that his Filipino audience would immediately catalogue him as "Quezón's man," through whose influence anything could thereafter be secured.

The replacing of Governor-General Forbes and the veteran members of the Philippine Commission by imported politicians was bad enough, "but the worst was yet to come." Had these new arrivals sat tight for a time, and taken counsel with those who had shared the hardships and overcome the mistakes incident to our constructive work; had they permitted the machine, built with such travail by their predecessors, to continue in operation until they could pass intelligent judgment upon its efficiency, the harm would have been minimized. Instead, they swung into the arena, breathing slaughter, fired with the idea that the whole system theretofore established was inherently vicious, to be overthrown, root and branch. In a speech delivered shortly after his arrival, Mr. Denison, the new Secretary of the Interior, in criticizing the policy of his predecessor, stated that the Government theretofore established was "up side down," and that the new régime would turn it "right side up." In so stating, he admitted that his views were not based upon "accurate knowledge of details of fact" but upon "general principles of conduct and upon fundamental political conceptions." The man whose policies he criticized, Hon. Dean C. Worcester, had twice visited the Philippines prior to American occupation, had served upon both the Schurman and Taft commissions, had held the portfolio of Secretary of the Interior for more than twelve years, and had done a piece of constructive work for the "wild peoples" of the islands which will ever



prove a monument to his altruism, his energy, and his ability.

When Governor-General Harrison arrived in October, 1913, he found a government honestly and efficiently administered, manned at every essential point by Americans who had, through long years of heartbreaking difficulties, become identified with their work and took a deep personal pride therein. Without hesitation, and with a dispatch and precision worthy of his political heritage, he proceeded to tear this model structure to pieces, scatter its trained operators to the four winds, and to man the wreck with untried and inexperienced amateurs. The proffered counsel of those who had learned their lesson through actual contact with affairs, and who were familiar with the idiosyncrasies of Filipino character, was disdained. Obsessed with his idea of "Filipinizing" the service, he drove recklessly ahead, the pliant tool of shrewd native politicians who used him largely for personal or party ends. Whether actuated by a sublime self-confidence, or by a desire to centre in himself all the glory of the "New Era" proclaimed by him, he deliberately eliminated as immediate advisers all those who might have saved him from the wreck which ultimately followed.

During his inaugural message, delivered within an hour of his arrival, the new appointee dramatically exclaimed: "People of the Philippine Islands, a new era is dawning." This expression became historical, the term "New Era" taking its place as the accepted designation of the Harrison régime. On the same occasion, and naturally without opportunity to weigh the consequences, it was announced that Filipinos would at once be given a majority on the appointive Commission, thus conferring upon them control of the upper as well as lower house. Inasmuch as the

Governor-General was without veto power at the time, the effect was to eliminate all check upon local legislation, save by Act of Congress.

Following this auspicious beginning, no time was lost in giving effect to the "black list," the first official head to fall being that of Thomas Cary Welch, Assistant Executive Secretary, who had achieved his position after ten years of meritorious service in the islands. His resignation was demanded within the first twenty-four hours, and the place given to Stephen Bonsal, writer and publicity man, who had accompanied the Governor-General to the Philippines. Mr. Frank W. Carpenter, Executive Secretary, who had served the civil government since its inception, who knew every detail of the administration and the rating of every Filipino of prominence in the islands, and was peculiarly fitted to give valuable counsel to the Governor-General, was shipped to Mindanao as Governor of the Moro province and his position given to a Filipino.

Then followed, in rapid succession, the decapitation of Capt. Chas. H. Sleeper, Director of Lands, and his Assistant, John R. Wilson; Col. Henry B. McCoy, Director of Customs; John S. Leech, Director of Printing, and his Assistant, J. A. Hoggsette; Frank Helm, Director of Navigation; Wm. E. Parsons, Consulting Architect; Jack Harding, Chief of Police; W. A. Steere, Assistant Collector of Internal Revenue, and Major Bishop, Prosecuting Attorney, City of Manila, while various other positions were "eliminated" and with them the incumbents.

The inevitable effect of these wholesale dismissals was to inject such an element of uncertainty—both as to tenure and promotion—into positions held by Americans, as to cause officials and employees, even when not discharged,

to place themselves elsewhere as rapidly as possible. Among those thus early to quit the service were C. M. Cotterman, Director of Posts; F. W. Taylor, Director of Agriculture; M. L. Stewart, Director of Prisons; B. L. Falconer, Director of Civil Service; and various Judges of First Instance, all of them experts in their several lines. Despite this steady exodus of Americans, many of whom had given the best years of their life to this work and were ill prepared for new ventures, a diabolically clever scheme was devised to accelerate the process. This consisted in what is known as the "Osmeña Act," which provided that any official or employee who had served the Government continuously for six years or more could be *retired* upon application to the Governor-General, and, in case of retirement, would receive an annual gratuity for three years, based upon a percentage of his salary according to length of service. Note, however, how the African emerges. The Act was passed February 4, 1916, and provided that its benefits would *accrue only* to those applying for retirement *before* June 30, 1916. Failing to apply by that date, they would receive nothing though discharged the following day. Given the uncertainty of their tenure, practically every American in the service of over six years standing applied for retirement, this application being tantamount to a "resignation" in the hands of the Governor-General, to be accepted at his pleasure. The persons affected were those longest in the service and who could least be spared by the Government. This Act, and its ready application, effectually destroyed whatever remained of as fine a body of civil servants as ever existed under our flag. That wonderful *esprit de corps*, and that fine unselfishness and joy in accomplishment which had theretofore animated the service, disappeared, and Gov-

ernment became simply something to live on rather than to live for.

On January 1, 1913, there were 2,623 Americans in the Philippine service; on July 1, 1921, there were but 614, a loss of 2,009. Of those remaining, 436 were in the Police, Constabulary, and Bureau of Education, leaving but 178 in all other departments. In the meantime, the 6,363 Filipinos in service on January 1, 1913, had become 13,240, an increase of nearly 7,000. During the same period, the cost of operating the Executive Departments of the Government had swollen from \$10,454,506 to \$16,734,955. Given the war cry of "economy" with which the New Era cohorts charged the government pay roll, this somewhat staggering increase in personnel and expense is not proclaimed from the housetops.

A Filipino was appointed Director of Lands, who lasted but a few months, to be followed by a succession of others with no special training or fitness for the work. Formerly one of the best administered of the government departments, it has become possibly the worst, and, to-day, is years behind in its handling of lease, sale, and free patent applications. It is characteristic of Filipino legislators that this bureau, charged with administration of the friar estates and with public lands and mines, and in every way vital to the material progress of the country, has received utterly inadequate government support. Between 1913 and 1921, insular revenues increased approximately 150 per cent., whereas appropriations for the Bureau of Lands increased less than 32 per cent. Completely Filipinized as it now is, with its records in utter chaos, this bureau has proved utterly incapable of protecting homestead claimants against the rapacity of influential land-grabbers, who, operating in conjunction with venal Justices of the

Peace and other local officials, systematically despoil the small proprietors of their holdings once they become valuable. Poor, ignorant, and servile, the latter stand little chance against the intrenched power and corruption of the *cacique*.

A queer importation from the States, named Herstein, was made Director of Customs, who floundered about for a time in his unaccustomed surroundings, and then departed whence he came. The bureau is now Filipinized from top to bottom, one of the reasons urged for eliminating Americans being a saving in expense. In 1913, however, the net expenditures of this bureau were \$488,725, and the cost per dollar collected was .054; whereas in 1920 the net expenditures were \$765,533, and the cost per dollar collected was .095, or nearly twice the former amount; while there has been a marked decrease in efficiency and service.

Reference has been made to the contagious and deadly cattle disease, rinderpest, which decimated the herds of the islands prior to and following American occupation. Through the Bureau of Agriculture, officered by Americans, and utilizing a corps of trained veterinarians in the field, the infection had been reduced by October, 1913, to thirty municipalities in eight provinces; while by January 20, 1914, there remained but nine infected municipalities in four provinces. With the strenuous fight of years almost won, and the eradication of the dread disease within sight, control was taken from the Bureau of Agriculture and vested by the Philippine Legislature in provincial and municipal officials. The inevitable happened. These officials, influenced by their desire to please an ignorant electorate, did not enforce the law. By May, 1914, thirty-two municipalities in nine provinces were again infected, with the disease steadily spreading. As a tardy

measure, control was ultimately restored to the Bureau of Agriculture, but the awakening came too late. Most of the American veterinarians had been forced out of the service, cattle inspectors had been dropped, and the Bureau "Filipinized." The following report, dated July 31, 1921, is illuminating:

One hundred and thirty-four towns of 27 provinces are still infected with rinderpest, according to a report of the chief veterinarian of the Bureau of Agriculture for the period July 11 to July 25, 1921. The report shows that 20 towns have just been entered on the list, the towns infected on July 11 numbering 114. The new cases registered on July 9 were 807 and the deaths 670. On July 15th, these figures went up to 1,417 and 1,087 respectively.

At a minimum estimate the aggregate loss in cattle and crops since the "New Era" developed its rinderpest policy in 1914, runs well over a hundred million dollars, the price already paid by Filipino farmers for the doubtful privilege of having a few more of their countrymen on the government pay-roll. For the year 1923, the Philippine Legislature gave the Bureau of Agriculture but \$50,000 with which to finance its fight against rinderpest, locusts, and plant pests. As there is little prospect of rinderpest, locusts, or other like pests, being eliminated under existing conditions, what further price the farming industry will pay for a "Filipinized" service is left to the imagination. In all this, however, the Filipinos are simply giving practical effect to Mr. Harrison's ideas as expressed in one of his early messages, where he said: "Business is intended to serve government, and not the government to serve business."

In the matter of Public Health, the story runs much the same. American health officials were gradually eliminated or "retired," the process being hastened by a Legislative

Act providing that any physician receiving a yearly salary of \$1,500 or more from the Government could not engage in private practice. Theretofore, a considerable number of American doctors had served the Government with privilege of doing outside work—a right enjoyed to-day by officers of the Army Medical Corps. As against twenty-four American doctors employed in the Philippine Health Service in 1913, only three remained in 1921. Those who naturally suffered most by this policy, were the poor and helpless among the Philippine people, for the exclusive services of trained specialists cannot be secured for any salary authorized by the Philippine Legislature.

The culminating tragedy, however, resulted from the inevitable slacking down by Filipino health officials in revaccination against smallpox. Reduced to 700 deaths for the archipelago in 1912, the disease reasserted itself in 1918, and before it burned itself out in 1919, 126,369 cases were recorded, with 59,926 deaths. Unrecorded cases would likely swell this total by thirty per cent., making a death roll of approximately 70,000 from smallpox alone within two years. If human life means anything, either to the victims or to those who sorrow at their death, this also would seem a high price to pay for Mr. Harrison's New Era theories.

There was a recrudescence of cholera in 1918 and 1919 with 22,657 deaths. During 1918-20, deaths from malaria totalled 91,500, with 9,796 from typhoid. The infant mortality rate in Manila for 1920 was 213 per thousand, with 231 per thousand in the provinces. Deaths from tuberculosis have steadily increased, while recent investigations by American medical experts show that possibly 90 per cent. of the population has hookworm infection. Following the arrival of Governor-General

Wood, the Rockefeller Institute was induced to place a medical unit in the islands, which is now doing a splendid work in restoring and promoting health conditions.

The Bureau of Science, formerly manned by experts in their several lines, and a centre for original research into the utilization of Philippine products and of ways and means for the prevention and cure of tropical diseases, was reduced to an empty shell. The high estate it had achieved among scientific institutions throughout the world was frittered away, and all hope or promise of further material contributions to the Philippine people or to mankind effectually destroyed.

The policy of transferring the various government departments to Baguio during April and May—the height of the hot season in Manila—was abandoned, notwithstanding that experience had altogether justified the arrangement. Mr. Harrison, however, spent two or three months each year enjoying its advantages, as did also his associates on the Commission, all without diminution in salary or perquisites. As for the sweltering clerk, if he needed or desired a change in climate, let him use his accrued leave and meagre savings to secure it.

The Philippines prospered during the war, peak prices being obtained for sugar, hemp, copra, coconut oil, and other staple export products, with a corresponding increase in imports and internal business. In consequence, the insular revenues, which totalled less than \$21,000,000 in 1913, increased to more than \$43,000,000 in 1920. Wonderful results in the way of public improvements would naturally be expected, particularly when contrasted with accomplishments prior to 1913. Efficient machinery had been created and set up by the former régime, the new operators being simply required to “speed up” in pro-



portion to increased resources. What actually happened is illustrated by the fact that when Harrison left in 1921, there was not a single completed public building or improvement of consequence in the City of Manila which did not exist upon his coming. In large measure the same can be said of the islands as a whole. While the mileage of provincial roads was extended, the old system of upkeep was not maintained and deterioration was rapid.

In Manila an elective Municipal Board of ten members, with an appointive mayor, replaced the commission form of government composed of three Americans and three Filipinos. The interests of the public have since been sacrificed through constant bickerings between the elective members and the Mayor as to their respective "rights and prerogatives," and the formerly orderly administration has been transformed into a madhouse.

For no reason yet published, the Harrison administration purchased the Manila Railroad—being the lines on Luzon—obligating the Government in something over \$36,000,000. Manuel Quezón became president of the Company in due course, using it as a clearing house for political favourites and as an adjunct of the Nacionalista Party. In one year this "Government-owned" enterprise issued 80,000 free passes—a fair record for 645 miles of road. Former employees with practical railroad experience were discharged, rates were raised, service became execrable, and the public treasury met inevitable deficits in revenue.

Lacking, as the Filipino does, the initiative and executive ability to compete with foreigners in economic enterprises, this handicap was sought to be overcome through organization of "National Companies" financed from public funds. These companies were chartered by special

acts of the Legislature, the Government taking 51 per cent. of the stock and offering the balance for sale. The list includes the Philippine National Bank, a National Coal Company, a National Development Company, a National Cement Company, a National Iron Company, and a National Petroleum Company, all but the last two having been launched. While in reality private corporations with the Government as principal stockholder, they were granted all manner of special rights and privileges denied corporations organized through regular channels. Being politically operated, however, the competition was neither serious nor lasting. The Philippine National Bank, "crowning achievement of the Harrison administration," incurred losses within six years aggregating \$38,000,000, and has been saved from bankruptcy only through backing of the insular treasury. The Coal Company has lost approximately \$3,000,000, and is practically defunct. The same is true of the National Development Company, which stands to lose possibly a million and a half dollars. The Cement Company is yet to be heard from.

One of the first moves of Governor-General Wood was "to get the Government out of business," in which, despite strenuous Filipino opposition, he would seem altogether justified. In this connection, and because it illustrates many things, the following excerpt is quoted from the annual report of the National Coal Company for 1920-21, made by the Acting President, José Paez:

There are two conditions that make it difficult to market coal cheaply in the Philippines: transportation and labour. It costs us better than eleven pesos per ton to ship coal from Malangas [Mindanao] to Manila, while Japan coal is often shipped to Manila for as low as six yen per ton. While local production costs at the mine will compare favourably

with the United States or Europe, the cheap labour of China and Japan, especially the former, will render competition difficult. Chinese labourers in Borneo are contracted for at thirty centavos per day, without subsistence. They are experienced miners and such prices enable certain Borneo mining companies to produce coal at a very low cost in spite of otherwise unfavourable conditions. In the interior of China, in the region where the Pekin syndicate is operating, miners get less than ten centavos per day. Contrast this with Philippine conditions where inexperienced miners are demanding, and obtaining, two pesos per day.

A visit to the cemetery at Malangas discloses some 350 graves, each one containing the body of an adult Filipino labourer who was lost to his country through our efforts to achieve economic independence by developing our natural resources. In the United States most pioneering work of this kind was, and still is, carried on at the expense of the labouring classes of foreign countries. Consequently the industrial development of America did not result in the loss of the native-born adult labourer who goes to make up one of the principal assets of a nation. Even a casual observer should be impressed with the wisdom of providing means to carry on this class of work by controlled immigration of selected racial types, rather than at the expense of Filipinos.

It is perfectly safe to assert that the native-born population of the Philippines will never be decimated through "pioneer enterprise." Moreover, if the sturdy American stock which developed the agricultural, mineral, and forest wealth of our great West could read the above reference to "selected racial types," their mirth would be Homeric.

It is conceded by all that education of the Filipino masses is an absolute prerequisite to any intelligent participation in government, and, toward this end our early authorities gave liberally of their efforts and scant revenue. The peculiar situation existing in the islands, however, has made the problem difficult and discouraging. The great body of children to be reached speak simply the dialect of their locality, which has no educational merit. A

mastery of English, or of some language having literary and commercial value, is indispensable to progress; with the result that English was chosen as the medium of instruction. What, however, is the situation? Throughout the primary and intermediate grades, where a thorough foundation in English should be laid, the language of the home and playground is in dialect, while the English of the classroom is supplied by Filipino teachers to whom it is an acquired tongue, many of whom have themselves received it through other Filipino teachers. English thus diluted, with little or no opportunity to hear it spoken correctly, or of using it at all, results generally in a mixture of unintelligible words and phrases of no practical value. This is the situation to-day, with little or no prospect of improvement except through the importation of sufficient American or English speaking teachers to give the children of the islands a proper start. Statistics showing the number of Filipino children "attending school" are largely misleading, therefore, when it comes to appraising actual accomplishment. For all practical purposes the masses are now at a standstill from an educational standpoint.

Originally, trained American teachers were scattered throughout the provinces, and came into actual contact with the pupils and their parents, and while their sphere was limited, the work accomplished was substantial and along right lines. On January 1, 1913, there were 725 Americans in the Bureau of Education. On July 1, 1921, after eight years of the New Era, with largely increased revenues, this number had been reduced to 381. The "Filipinization" of the service includes not only the primary and intermediate grades, but extends in large measure to the higher schools and University, with a marked decrease in standards and efficiency. How this process is

calculated to produce a "homogeneous people," fitted for self-rule, is not apparent. To what language instruction would revert in case of American withdrawal remains a question. Certainly the masses would continue to speak their native dialects as at present, and the small impression thus far made upon them go by the board.

Even with education as it exists to-day, it is estimated there are a million and a half children unprovided with school facilities. Moreover, there is a marked tendency, due to Spanish influence and training, to regard manual labour as degrading, with the result that those who secure an education turn to politics, clerkships, and the "learned professions," rather than to agriculture and other productive industries.

When Harrison took charge, there were two political parties in the islands, the Nacionalista and Demócrata, both of which advocated independence. Being united upon this point, there were and are no real "issues" to distinguish them, the only struggle being as to which can secure the most official positions. Political campaigns are devoted largely to personalities and to vilifying the opposition, in which all are adepts. Educated Filipinos talk, eat, and sleep politics, their newspapers being devoted to little else. Jobs being the *desideratum*, the natural tendency is to affiliate with the party which controls the patronage. During the Harrison administration this lay with the Nacionalistas, headed by the two chiefs, Osmeña and Quezón, who dictated appointments from Auxiliary Justices of the Peace to Supreme Court Justices. Every position in the service was card-indexed, and distribution made according to standing in the party councils rather than fitness for the particular employment. Against this combination, backed by the Governor-General, the Demo-

cratas were helpless, electing but one lone senator out of twenty-four when that body was organized in 1916. The Nacionalistas took no chances, however, and used their power in such devious ways that the courts were clogged with "election fraud" cases. Following the 1916 election a prominent Filipino, member of the Demócrata party, wrote one of the high priests of the "Anti-Imperialist League" in Boston as follows:

At the last election held in this country the Nacionalista party, which is now in power, made its great effort in order that their candidates could win in the said election though by means of frauds. They violated the whole provisions of the Election Law, merely to win their candidates. And it will be possible that a revolution against the Nacionalistas might be happened if they should not stop violating the wills of the people.

In the absence of a controlling authority, there is little question but that the "revolution" would have happened as per historical schedule.

One of the things America was supposed to instil in the Filipinos above all else was a sense of civic honesty, and to punish with severity every infringement of political rights. The trial courts did their part, and many of those found guilty of election frauds were convicted and their sentences affirmed by the Supreme Court. In one of its decisions this latter court, speaking through Mr. Justice Johnson, said:

The people of the Philippine Islands have been granted the right to select, by secret ballot, the men who shall make laws for them. They have been given a right to participate directly in the form of government under which they live. Such a right is among the most important and sacred of the rights of the people in self-government, and one which must be vigilantly guarded if a people desire to maintain for themselves and their posterity a republican form of government. It behooves the people under a free government to prosecute to the limit,

without stint or favour, every person who attempts, in the slightest degree, to interfere with, or who attempts to defeat, their direct participation, by secret ballot, under the forms prescribed by law, in the affairs of their government.

It happened, however, that the numerous convictions were of members of the Nacionalista party, which, as indicated, dominated the Government. Result, all of the persons thus convicted through expensive court process, and whose punishment might have minimized further election frauds, were pardoned by his Excellency, Governor-General Harrison, without having served a day of their prison sentences.

*La Nación*, official organ of the Demócrata party, had this to say in the matter:

The part Governor-General Harrison played in pardoning the convicted men is a black stain upon the American administration in the islands, and undermines and weakens all the great precepts of honesty and high-mindedness in public affairs that Americans as a whole have attempted to inculcate. The Americans came here to help us establish a government based upon the principles of a genuine democracy, but the attitude of Governor-General Harrison does not conform to this asseveration. Not only that, but it is directly to the contrary because it has converted itself into a conscious instrument of immorality for the corrupting elements of popular suffrage.

As to the Philippine National Bank, its record should bring pause to those who argue present preparedness of the Philippine people to stand alone. Certainly the degree of ability and honesty necessary to run a government should not be less than that necessary to run a bank, and yet this latter experiment under Filipino management has proved a total and hopeless failure. Pages could be devoted to describing even a part of its phenomenal course, but a brief summary must suffice.

During the first few months of its existence the presidency of the Bank was held by a person from the States whose knowledge of banking was more theoretical than practical. The position then passed to a Manila American with no banking experience, a former secretary of the Governor-General. He was succeeded by a Filipino protégé of Señor Osmeña, also without knowledge of banking. With a Filipino president, an inexperienced Filipino staff, a Filipino majority on the Board of Directors, and millions at their command, it required no seer to foretell the end. Branches were established in the United States and Shanghai, together with forty-five branches and agencies throughout the islands. Equally with the Government-owned Manila Railroad, the bank became a vehicle for rewarding political favourites and was devoted to serving the needs and uses of those who could bring the proper "influences" to bear. On the other hand, any one who was *persona non grata* to the ruling powers found the doors closed against him. National Companies, sugar centrals, coconut-oil mills, and other enterprises which Filipinos had shown no disposition to undertake with private funds, sprang into existence, financed from this reservoir of government money.

Rumours of what was transpiring having percolated to Washington, an examination of the bank was ordered by Secretary of War Baker, who appointed as his representative Mr. F. Coates, Jr., Clearing House Examiner, Cleveland Clearing House Association. Mr. Coates and a corps of assistants began work on November 30, 1919, and continued until April, 1920, when further investigation was discontinued. The following excerpts from the report submitted show something of the situation:



The conditions developed in the various departments of the Bank indicate the almost complete lack of control that exists and the necessity of providing a strong and efficient management.

The examiner has expressed the opinion to those concerned that there is not one experienced or trained banker on the staff; and this opinion was also expressed by the president personally; while discussing himself he made no pretensions.

Very, very slight surveillance and control is exercised by the constituted authorities over the main office in Manila, and there is practically an entire absence of this control in so far as the branches and agencies are concerned. There probably exists no parallel case in any banking institution in the world.

In a letter of recommendation to Governor-General Harrison, Mr. Coates said:

I feel, as do also I believe yourself and Señores Osmeña and Quezón, that native timber [Filipinos themselves], however smart or capable, are not, with possibly few exceptions, educated or experienced in finance, executive procedure, or banking detail sufficiently to assume and competently administer the important phases of such a large institution. Personal responsibility, and the assumption of it by them, is a paramount question, and I have expressed my belief to you and to the others interested, that this can be imparted to them only by association with, and training by experts, and until this is done it will, I believe, be impossible for them to function properly in positions other than clerkships. This suggestion is in line with your ideas, and will, I believe, be concurred in by Señores Quezón and Osmeña.

Mr. Harrison is quoted as conceding that ability to run a bank could be imparted to Filipinos "only by association with and training by experts." Evidently, however, he did not consider the same principle applicable to "ability to run a government."

The report found a deficiency in cash reserve of \$15,000,000, and in currency reserve of \$40,000,000. A list was given of those who had secured credits from the bank on "deficient security," with probable losses running into millions, the list reading like a "Who's Who" of

prominent Filipino politicians and their favourites.

A subsequent examination of the bank, extending over almost a year, was made by Messrs. Haskins & Sells, certified public accountants of New York, who stated, among other things:

Our examination thus reveals the fact that the bank has been operated, during almost the entire period of its existence prior to the appointment of Mr. Wilson as manager, in violation of every principle which prudence, intelligence, or even honesty dictates.

Among the officers and employees of the bank who were thereafter prosecuted and convicted of embezzlement and other criminal charges were: the president and general manager; vice-president and assistant general manager; manager of the Foreign Department; assistant manager of the Foreign Department; assistant chief note teller; manager of the Iloilo branch; manager of the Aparri branch, who confessed and committed suicide, and also various subordinate employees.

To all those not wilfully prejudiced or partisan, this experiment of "Filipinizing" an institution requiring executive ability and financial capacity and responsibility should prove illuminating.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE WRECKING OF A GOVERNMENT—1913-21 (*Continued*)

**I**N THE Philippines, where the rights and liberties of the masses are regularly exploited by the *ilustrado* class, an able and independent judiciary is peculiarly essential. In October, 1913, the bench of the islands, excepting only Justice of the Peace Courts, would compare favourably with that existing in America and other progressive countries. A majority of the Supreme Court was American; while on the Courts of First Instance and Court of Land Registration, comprising twenty-nine judges, fourteen were American and fifteen Filipino.

In July, 1914, the Judiciary Act was amended by abolishing the Land Court and increasing the Judges of First Instance to thirty-six. As American Judges retired, their places were filled by Filipinos, there being but three Americans left on the Courts of First Instance in 1921. The resulting situation is thus described in report of the Wood-Forbes Mission to the President in 1921:

During the existence of the Philippine Commission, a most serious effort was made to secure the best available men for the bench, without regard to party affiliation, and the men appointed at that time as a rule enjoyed public confidence. In later years, the same care has not been exercised.

There are pending, in the courts of the islands to-day, approximately 50,000 cases, including some 8,000 probate and guardianship cases. Conditions are growing steadily worse, and with present personnel and methods, the dockets will never be cleared.

The condition of the Courts of First Instance is generally deplor-

able. The number of cases filed from year to year has steadily increased. The number of judges has not been increased proportionately, and is insufficient to dispose of, promptly and efficiently, the great volume of business they are called upon to transact. The abolition of the Court of Land Registration imposed a heavy additional burden upon these courts. The judges in too many courts do not realize the necessity of reaching early and prompt decisions and are too ready to postpone hearings and trials.

The clerks of the Courts of First Instance are too often without necessary experience. There is no uniform system of filing records, and in many instances it is difficult for attorneys to secure records promptly.

It became a practice of the Nacionalista leaders to assign some particular judge in whom they had "confidence" to try election-fraud cases in districts where the discretion of the regular incumbent was doubtful. Finally Judge Borromeo, a Filipino of character, refused to be used in this manner and stuck to his post, his stand in the matter being sustained by the Philippine Supreme Court. The Philippine Legislature thereupon passed what is known as the "Judiciary Lottery Law," whereby at the end of every five years, judges drawing the same salary were required to exchange districts, the new assignment to be "determined by lot," but in no case to be that last occupied. This Act was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Public opinion, backed by these court decisions, has put an end for the present to this organized effort to undermine the Judiciary.

Commenting on the conclusions of the Wood-Forbes report as to the Court situation, *La Nación*, a Manila newspaper representing the Demócrata party, stated:

If we have to look at things from the right angle, Mr. Osmeña [President of the Nacionalista party] should have no motives to be surprised at the contents of the report of the Mission touching the ad-

ministration of justice in these islands. It is an open secret that the standard of our Courts of Justice has declined ever since the inauguration in these islands of the Harrisonian "New Era," which may, with more propriety, be denominated the "Era of Deception and Disillusionment." And that standard has declined because the Nacionalista bosses, instead of dignifying this important administrative branch of the Government by surrounding the same with the most solid guarantees, deprived it of all inducements, and even went so far as to attempt to convert our judges into mere instruments of political expediency and partisan ends.

During the war, Governor-General Harrison was appointed Philippine Representative of the Alien Property Custodian, Washington, and in that capacity took over and administered various German-owned properties in the islands. He appointed his brother "manager" of the receivers designated for the sequestered holdings, this brother having also been appointed secretary and director of the Philippine National Bank. Sales of these properties, some thirteen in number, were carried out under circumstances which proved a scandal to the community; so much so that President Wilson, by executive order, revoked the action taken and sent a representative from the United States to take charge. The grounds specified by the President for setting aside the sales were:

- (a) The short notice given of the sales and inadequate opportunity for purchasers to inform and prepare themselves to bid;
- (b) The exclusion of the public from the sales which deprived it of the publicity required by the aforesaid Act of Congress as amended;
- (c) The advertised conditions of the sale excluded American corporations who are legally entitled to bid, and contained several objectionable details;
- (d) The sales were not made under the rules and regulations prescribed by me and as required by said Act as amended, and not in accordance with the instructions and policy of the Alien Property Custodian.

No information has ever been given out as to the salaries or other compensation paid the receivers of these properties, despite insistent public demands therefor.

It was Mr. Harrison's ambition to be the last American Governor-General of the Philippines. This doubtless explains, in part, his rapid Filipinization of the service and the abdication of his executive functions in favour of an extra-legal Council of State, as also his subsequent offer to resign as Governor-General provided a Filipino was appointed in his stead.

Inasmuch as this proposed abandonment of the islands by the United States was predicated on the theory that "it would be in the interests of the Philippine people," it became necessary to minimize many of the outstanding dangers involved. Possibly the most difficult of these to camouflage, from an internal standpoint, was the existence of a million or more "non-Christians" or "wild peoples," inhabiting the great islands of Mindanao and Sulu, Palawan, Mindoro, and the mountain provinces of Luzon. This is still something which immediate independence advocates are inclined to ignore or "soft pedal," even to forbidding a sale of photographs depicting such peoples in their native state.

Prior to 1913, the matter of providing a form of government for these wild tribes was vested in the Philippine Commission, a majority of which body was American. Through sympathetic treatment a remarkable work had been done in transforming this non-Christian element into peaceful, law-abiding, and industrious communities, and in affording them protection from their Christian neighbours who had theretofore imposed upon and despoiled them as opportunity offered.

The islands of Mindanao and Sulu, with an area of

38,000 square miles, or approximately one third of the archipelago, are inhabited principally by Mohammedan Moros, hereditary enemies of the Christian Filipinos, with whom they have little or nothing in common. They constitute, in fact, a separate people, different in religion, customs, traditions, and point of view, their status to-day being much as it was when Magellan discovered the Philippines in 1521. Inasmuch as the ultimate disposition of these half million Moros, and particularly the relation they would bear to any possible Philippine Republic, affects vitally any claim that the people as a whole are fitted for self-rule, a heroic drive was made during the Harrison régime to demonstrate that Mohammedan Moros and Christian Filipinos were "brothers," and spoke with one voice in demanding American withdrawal. To this end, control of Mindanao and Sulu, and other non-Christian territory, was vested in the Philippine Legislature, and the matter of their government delivered largely into the hands of Filipino officials. The experiment proved abortive, however, its result being simply to arouse age-long antagonisms and precipitate unrest, trouble, and bloodshed. In a message to Washington, November, 1923, dealing with a series of Moro outbreaks, Governor-General Wood reported:

Killing of constabulary grew out of alleged grievances against constabulary and local supervising teacher, all Filipinos. At the basis lies old antipathy between Moros and Christian Filipinos, and the objection of the former to being governed locally by the latter. This is the principal basic cause of unrest in Moro province.

He further stated that the policy of appointing Filipino Governors for the Moro province was inaugurated before his administration, and that he was attempting to give the

Filipino Government every opportunity to demonstrate its capacity before changing the policy.

A fact which cannot be ignored in any eventual disposition of the Philippines is that the Moros are unalterably opposed to being governed by Christian Filipinos, and any possibility of their submitting to such a government, either now or later, unless backed by American authority, is about as hopeless as attempting to square the circle. This is generally true also of the half million pagan peoples of the archipelago, whose early progress has been checked by a Filipinized service. Americans who had spent the best years of their life among these wild peoples, and had won their confidence and trust, were displaced largely by Filipinos who knew little or nothing of the problems involved. It is to be borne in mind that these particular wards of ours, be they Igorot, Ifugao, or Moro, are but little interested in "systems of government," their conduct being influenced and regulated almost entirely by the personality of the officer in charge. When he treats them fairly, when he keeps his word to them, and when they realize he is concerned with their welfare and administers justice impartially, they will do his bidding; when these conditions fail they cannot be moved and trouble stalks at every turn. It is because we had in these out-of-the-way corners of the archipelago, men of character and mettle—the survival of the fittest—who knew how to deal with these wild tribes honestly and fearlessly, that such remarkable results were achieved in little over a decade of American rule.

Philippine currency is on a gold basis, exchange rates and the parity of the "peso" being maintained by a Gold Standard and Reserve Fund. Through a juggling with these funds, combined with the frenzied operations of the



Philippine National Bank, the islands were brought, by 1921, to the verge of financial chaos. Omitting details, what happened was this:

The Insular Government had to its credit in New York what is known as the Gold Standard Fund, ranging from fifteen to twenty-five per cent. of the money circulation of the islands, its purpose being to stabilize exchange transactions. When the balance of trade was against the islands, pesos were deposited with the Treasury in Manila and gold paid out in New York; when it was favourable, gold was deposited in New York and pesos paid out in Manila. These two funds, gold in New York and pesos in Manila, if kept intact, insured a stable exchange as against ordinary trade fluctuations. The system also provided for the issue of Silver Certificates in the Philippines as against a deposit with the Insular Treasury of an equal amount in silver coin, this being known as the Silver Certificate Fund and designed to maintain the parity of the peso.

In 1914 the law was changed so that part of this security for silver certificates could be kept in gold coin, which was thereupon deposited in United States Banks. In 1917 the 65,000,000 pesos of silver certificates in circulation were supported by 24 per cent. of silver coin in Manila and 76 per cent. gold deposits in the United States. In 1918, through another change in the law, these two trust funds were amalgamated into one fund known as the Currency Reserve Fund, represented by some \$41,500,000 on deposit in the United States.

Early in 1916, the Philippine National Bank was created by Act of the Philippine Legislature, the investment of the Government therein eventually totalling \$16,199,000, comprising 96 per cent. of the capital stock. This bank

was made the "official depository" of the Government, and took over all the insular funds theretofore on deposit with various banks in the Philippines and the United States. Included among these deposits, was the \$41,500,000 Currency Reserve Fund held in the United States, which was first transferred to the New York agency of the Philippine National Bank and then shifted in due time to the parent bank, Manila, where it was early tied up or lost in a remarkable series of loans and alleged business investments.

When the balance of trade turned against the islands in 1919, the Gold Standard Fund in New York had been depleted to a point where it could only be protected through raising the official exchange rates. By November, 1919, this rate reached the high point of 15 per cent., representing a depreciation in that amount in the Philippine peso and bringing heavy losses to business interests compelled to buy gold exchange. Not only this, the Currency Reserve Fund, which should have been maintained at 100 per cent. of Treasury certificates in circulation, had been reduced to but 28 per cent. of such certificates, leaving 72 per cent. nothing but fiat money. While this situation was brought about by bank officials, Governor-General Harrison, together with Mr. Osmeña, Speaker of the House, and Mr. Quezón, President of the Senate, comprising the "Board of Control," were charged with responsibility, and knew, or should have known, what was being done. Whether it was stupidity or cupidity which caused the unwarranted diversion of these funds, the result was equally disastrous to the islands.

The branch bank established in Shanghai lost something over \$5,000,000, and was closed. Practically all of the branches opened throughout the islands lost heavily

and many of them have been closed by Governor-General Wood despite energetic protests by Filipino politicians.

In a message to the Philippine Legislature on February 6, 1923, General Wood brought out the following facts:

That during the first six years of operation, the bank losses aggregated \$37,500,000, which wiped out the entire capital investment of the Government, *i.e.*, \$16,199,000, together with \$15,346,500 in government deposits; that this loss had required the issuance of \$23,000,000 in bonds to reestablish the currency system, which is again fully protected; that the bank is carrying virtually no reserves behind its \$40,837,500 in deposits and \$16,379,000 in circulating notes, which it is impossible for the bank to redeem in lawful money as required by law. Commenting upon this situation Governor-General Wood said:

Under the above conditions there can be no question of the bank's insolvency. In accordance with the ordinary rule of law it would have been my duty to close the bank as soon as this condition was clearly revealed. It is unjust for the Government to fail to enforce its own laws against an institution of its own creation while enforcing the same law against private institutions. In following such a course, private capital is unjustly discriminated against, and the foundation of our business prosperity, which must be based upon private initiative, is undermined. However, conditions here have been exceptional, and I felt for this and other reasons, that it would be unwise to close the bank, at least until after the Legislature had been given full knowledge of the situation. The force of necessity has required that the bank must be kept in business despite the fact it was operated in open violation of the law and in competition with private institutions contrary to the Government's policy of getting the Government out of business.

It is interesting to note that this message of the Governor-General was suppressed by Senate and House leaders, and did not become public until August, 1923, and then only upon demand of the opposition or Demócrata

party. Notwithstanding that the bank was insolvent and its continued operation flagrantly unfair to private institutions, Filipino leaders could see in this no reason whatsoever for closing it.

Space forbids a reference to all the government departments in detail. While their wreck was not so immediately apparent as that of the National Bank, the general decline in service and morale was steady, and much of the ground theretofore gained was lost. Every artery of the body politic became gradually steeped with the lethargy, the shiftlessness, and the corruption of Spanish times against which and to cure which such a promising fight was made during those early years of American occupation when our officials dealt in facts and not in theories.

All manner of merit has been claimed by Filipinos and attributed to them by propagandists because "they remained loyal to the United States during the war,"—Mr. Harrison devoting an entire chapter of his book to the theme. No particular reason is given why they should have done otherwise. From the very beginning, the United States has showered them with gifts, nor could they muster any list of "grievances" upon which to base acts of disloyalty. Because of the war, the islands were enjoying the greatest period of prosperity in their history, and, under our protection, were pursuing a placid and undisturbed course amid all the turmoil and carnage of a world gone mad. Moreover, with some four million Americans under arms at the time, and our fighting machine and the temper of our people geared to the highest tension, it would have been a decidedly fatuous proceeding for the Filipinos to have then made an overt attack upon our authority. Even had any disloyalty been contemplated, which it was not, do not Mr. Harrison and others

belittle the intelligence and judgment of Filipino leaders by intimating the possibility of their having chosen that particular occasion to "start something"?

To point a contrast Mr. Harrison states: "Great Britain is believed to have been obliged to withhold from the main area of war half a million men to hold down discontented populations in her extensive colonies." The reference is somewhat unfortunate. It is true Germany counted upon such a possibility, and did all possible to foment trouble in India and other British possessions, but failed miserably. An American writer who visited India during the war, speaking of the wonderful response of the Indian people to England's call to arms, says:

A cheerful Indian army soon came to be represented to a greater or less extent in practically every war zone which happened to be England's particular concern, while in India a smiling and coöperating people went about its daily life and performed its appointed tasks without much regard to anything except the business in hand.

Shortly after America entered the War, Manuel Quezón, President of the Philippine Senate, visited the United States and offered the President, "on behalf of the Philippine Government," a division of 25,000 Filipino troops. The impression gained in the States, both by press and public, was of 25,000 trained and equipped men awaiting a call to arms by the President. In fact, there were no such troops, nor had any such offer been authorized by the Philippine Government, the first knowledge of the matter in the islands being a cable from Washington reciting the occurrence. While Mr. Quezón readily influenced the Legislature to ratify his action, the matter of actually recruiting such division proved another story. For over a year the entire native press of the islands, the whole

machinery of the Nacionalista party, and every influence of the Governor-General, were brought to bear to secure enlistments. The different provinces were parcelled out and a specific quota assigned to each; placards were posted promising \$30 per month and "keep" to volunteers, and the service painted in most attractive colours. Finally, given the lack of response, the proposed Division was cut to 13,000, which number, by waiving a strict physical examination, was finally gathered together by November 1, 1918, or some ten days before the Armistice. Governor-General Harrison, as Commander-in-Chief of the Island Militia, designated himself "Major-General" of the force, holding such rank until advised shortly thereafter from Washington that there would be no Major-General. The whole affair, which it is generally felt was engineered largely for political and personal ends, cost the islands something over \$3,000,000.

At about the same time the Philippine Legislature authorized the construction, under direction of the United States, of a modern submarine and destroyer to be offered the President for service in Philippine waters or elsewhere as required, these vessels to constitute "the nucleus of a Philippine navy." The construction cost, however, estimated at \$2,250,000, was not to be defrayed by popular subscription among the Filipinos, but from public funds, secured through a bond issue in the United States. The offer was not accepted by our authorities.

The above facts are cited with no purpose of discrediting Filipino loyalty during the War. There is no question but that the great bulk of those who knew what was transpiring were anxious the United States should win. In the main, however, their interest was a passive one, and involved little personal sacrifice.

On August 29, 1916, Congress passed what is colloquially known as the "Jones Bill," providing a more autonomous government for the Philippines. The principal change effected was the creation of an elective Senate of twenty-four members, to replace the Philippine Commission, theretofore acting as an upper house. The Governor-General, formerly a member of the Commission, with legislative functions, became Chief Executive only. He is vested with a veto power over legislation, subject to a two-thirds vote by both houses. If an Act is passed over his veto and he still does not approve, it is transmitted to the President of the United States, whose approval or disapproval becomes final. Appointive positions are filled by the Governor-General by and with the consent of the Senate. He is given general supervision and control of all departments and bureaus of the Government, with power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures. The Philippine Legislature is granted general legislative powers, and is authorized to create such executive departments as it may see fit, and fix their respective duties. The appointment of Vice-Governor, to be designated Head of the Department of Public Instruction, and the appointment of the Insular Auditor and members of the Supreme Court, remain in the President. Trade relations between the islands and the United States continue to be governed exclusively by the United States Congress. All acts of the Philippine Legislature relating to the public domain, timber, and mines (being property of the United States), as also acts relating to Philippine tariff rates, or affecting immigration, currency, or coinage, do not become law until approved by the President, while Congress reserves the right to annul all or any acts passed by the Legislature.

With a Governor-General alive to his duties and responsibilities, vigilant to veto unjust or unwise legislation, and holding an even and impartial course between all classes and factions, this Act of Congress could have been made an instrument of real progress in Philippine democracy. Unfortunately, however, Governor-General Harrison did not measure up to these requirements. He permitted the Legislature to run wild, vetoing but five bills, and these of minor importance, during his entire incumbency. He abdicated his executive functions in a large measure to an extra-legal Council of State, comprising the Speaker of the House, President of the Senate, and department secretaries, and became, so far as internal policies and perquisites were concerned, simply the mouth-piece of the Nacionalista party, representing one faction of the community. Instead of halting hasty and unwise legislation, and acting as a curb upon precipitate control of government activities by Filipinos, he urged them on to greater demands and greater failures.

Mr. Harrison's policy was based upon the announced theory that "The best way for Filipinos to learn the art of self-government is to govern themselves,"—a position into which those who support or defend his administration are inevitably forced. Is it, then, a correct theory? The Right Honourable James Bryce, than whom there has been no greater authority on forms of government, says it is not. In his work "Modern Democracies," after reviewing the history of Latin-American Republics, he says:

About the moral of the whole story there is no question. Do not give to a people institutions for which it is unripe in the simple faith that the tool will give skill to the workman's hand. Respect Facts. Man is in each country not what we may wish him to be, but what Nature and History have made him.



Judged by the practical application of Mr. Harrison's theories in the Philippines, the right of the matter would seem to be with Mr. Bryce. As we have seen, the premature vesting of control in Filipino officials by Mr. Harrison included among its fruits: untold losses to Filipino farmers through the spread of rinderpest, the sacrifice of tens of thousands of lives through an inefficient health service, the corruption of the Courts, the almost complete paralysis of education as applied to the masses, the stagnation of the Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Science, the slacking down of public works, the wasting of public moneys on a top-heavy personnel and politically managed "National Companies," the looting and wreck of the Philippine National Bank, the debasement of the island currency, and, finally, the virtual bankruptcy of the Government. Surely this sort of tutelage and example is not calculated to fit an imitative people, wholly inexperienced in self-rule, for the responsibilities of a democratic form of government.

No one, probably, would deny that ability successfully to operate a responsible business can only be acquired through "association with and training by experts." It is a strange phenomenon, however, that when it comes to the business of Government, having to do with the lives, property, and happiness of human beings, and offering far more complications, difficulties, and dangers than are involved in commercial transactions, many persons, otherwise sane, apparently believe that the laws of nature are reversed, and that neither training nor experience is required.

It is undisputed that the inhabitants of the Philippines, educated or uneducated, were without any experience in popular government when America took charge. It would

seem *prima facie*, therefore, that the better equipped and more efficient the agencies through which the masses are taught and trained in the art of self-government, the better and quicker will the desired end be attained; that when you lower the standard of instruction you put a corresponding brake on development. No one questions this truth when applied to the classroom or the home, and it is only the ignorant or wilfully blind who refuse to accept it when applied to a government. It would seem palpable, therefore, that the advancement of the Philippine people along every line was better served under our early policy, which looked to the progress and uplift of the masses through competent leadership, than it was under the "New Era" administration, which delivered this schooling into untrained and inexperienced hands, and concerned itself largely with the interests of a self-seeking minority. Instead of accelerating progress, therefore, Governor-General Harrison not only blocked and delayed the logical development of the movement, but diverted it into channels from which escape is now difficult if not dangerous.

In his book on the Philippines, Mr. Harrison seeks to explain the criticisms of his administration by Philippine-Americans, and his personal lack of popularity, by lugging out the old bogie of "big business" and its desire to place dollars above the claims of humanity. After asserting he was warned before leaving the United States that if he did not govern to suit American financial interests in the Philippines matters would go hard with him, he proceeds:

The campaign began before I left America; it was well organized and well managed, and apparently conducted without any scruples; it would be "weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable" to recount here all of its features. No misrepresentation was too gross and no rumour too wild

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for transmission to those in the United States who knew how to make use of them effectively upon the platform and in the press. . . . It is of little profit to recount all of this to-day; the fight was the kind which any public man must face if he undertakes to place human rights above the claims of big business; or if he values the man above the dollar.

Aside from the implication that his predecessors were complaisant to these "financial interests," and that Americans in the islands are concerned simply with dollar-grabbing, there is the other necessary deduction that "big business" had interests at stake in the Philippines.

As to the first implication, it is a gratuitous insult to as fine a body of outstanding Americans as ever did pioneer service under our flag; who devoted themselves wholeheartedly, often at the expense of health and financial prospects, to bringing to a backward and primitive race the various blessings and privileges which are the heritage of free peoples. To those with personal knowledge of the facts, or who examine the record impartially, there can be no question as to which "Era" better and more faithfully served the real interests of the Philippine people. While it is true that Mr. Harrison's predecessors held and hold that nothing but tragedy can result from a present or proximate withdrawal of American sovereignty, it nowise follows that those who so believe are not better friends, and more sincerely interested in the welfare of the Filipino people, than those others who, for various ends, proclaim otherwise.

Unfortunately, there was not in 1913, nor is there to-day, any "big business" in the Philippines, nor has it thus far shown any particular disposition to go there. The sugar and tobacco interests, admittedly big business, succeeded for some ten years in preventing the free entry of Philip-

pine sugar and tobacco into the States, and it was only through the persistent efforts of Mr. Taft that these products were finally placed on the free list and brought into competition with these "financial interests." So far as big business has shown any interest in the islands, it has apparently been more concerned in stifling than in encouraging the development of Philippine resources.

Of the total area of the Philippine archipelago eighty per cent. is still public domain under control of the Bureau of Forestry and Bureau of Lands. With unlimited possibilities for the growing of sugar, rubber, tobacco, hemp, coconuts, and other staple products, and with a wealth of forest resources unrivalled in the world, the uncertain political status of the islands, combined with restrictive legislation, has effectually prevented other than comparatively meagre investments.

The Filipinos aspire to political independence but have shown no disposition or ability to realize the condition precedent—economic preparedness—either through their own efforts or through encouraging outside capital to help them. The islands are admirably suited for rubber production, for which hundreds of millions of dollars are spent annually by the United States. In repeated instances, however, when rubber concerns have been disposed to invest in the islands, and utilize a fraction of the waste lands of the archipelago in rubber plantations, they have met with such scant encouragement at the hands of Filipino officials that their millions were diverted to Sumatra, the Straits Settlements, and other more hospitable countries. After twenty-five years of American rule, and despite the phenomenal potential wealth of the islands, the total insular revenues are but little over

\$30,000,000 per annum, while in the meantime, a bonded indebtedness of some \$75,000,000 has been created. There is not only room and opportunity, but a crying need in the islands for every dollar of capital that can be induced to come, the investment of which, however much it might profit the owners, would increase the present inadequate revenues and materially enhance the prosperity of the Philippine people as a whole.

Mr. Harrison's failure to achieve popularity with his fellow countrymen in the Philippines, and his departing the islands "unwept, unhonoured, and unsung," cannot be explained by "big business" or any like cause. The matter went deeper than this, being grounded upon the fact that in his personal and official conduct he brought discredit upon the American people whom he represented and for whom he stood; that he used official position and influence to vent personal spite and animosities; that by his partisan attitude and policies he produced a situation fraught with disaster to the islands and their people; and that he disrupted and largely destroyed the work of his predecessors, men whose lives reflected the highest type of Americanism and whose record of achievements was a matter of pride to every person who has the honour of our country and the welfare of the Philippines at heart.

The Vice-Governor of the Philippines, and Acting Governor-General for some months following Mr. Harrison's departure, was Hon. Charles E. Yeater of Missouri. Mr. Yeater was and is a Democrat, and committed to the general policies of that party. He is, however, a man of character and ability, sincere, impartial, and disposed ever to do the right and honourable thing regardless of race, party, or personal considerations. He played no

favourites, either American or Filipino, his single purpose being to insure the progress and promote the welfare of all. The American community of the Philippines, painted in such unflattering terms by Mr. Harrison, would have been entirely satisfied to have Mr. Yeater continue indefinitely in charge of the Government, and when he finally retired, did him unanimous homage in a popular *despedida* (farewell), which evidenced alike their admiration for him and their appreciation of sterling worth irrespective of political affiliations.

An impression prevails that Mr. Harrison, however he may have been regarded by the American community, was universally popular with the Philippine people and became their hero. In fact, however, this popularity was limited to members of the Nacionalista party, whom he favoured throughout his administration, and did not include a very considerable body of the people affiliated with the opposition or Demócrata party. *La Nación*, official organ of the latter party, in its issue of December 6, 1921, commenting upon the findings of the Wood-Forbes Mission, stated editorially:

For our part, we want to say that if in the past there have been serious errors and a most scandalous corruption in the government; the entire Filipino people cannot be held responsible for the misfortune. It is the Nacionalistas who should be condemned, men who by means of intrigue and election frauds prevented the masses of the people from sweeping them away, as they deserved, from the pedestal of stolen authority. We can also say here that the Nacionalistas are not the only ones responsible for the terrible political mix-up. Francis Burton Harrison, a former governor-general, with his backboneless policy of political complacency, his veritable abdication of his powers, his shameful neglect of duty which did great harm to the country and cast a most deplorable stigma upon the honour of the Government that he represented here, is also to be held responsible.

While there is an intimation that had the Demócratas been in charge the situation would have been different, the fact remains that the Nacionalista party was maintained in power through the vote of the Philippine electorate, who must, in the last analysis, be held responsible for the shortcomings of their representatives.

## CHAPTER IX

### GENERAL WOOD AND THE FILIPINOS

SOME two months following the arrival of Governor-General Harrison in the Philippines, and when his purpose to scrap the existing organization was manifest, a popular banquet was tendered by the American community of Manila to Hon. Dean C. Worcester, late Secretary of the Interior of the islands. At this banquet given in his honour Mr. Worcester, quoting the old adage that "Those who sow the wind will reap the whirlwind," remarked that the new administration was sowing a goodly quantity of "wind seeds," and that a prolific harvest was promised. Events more than fulfilled his prophecy, but unfortunately the full fruits of this sowing, and the need to provide ways and means to stem the whirlwind, did not fall to Mr. Harrison, as justice required, but became the difficult and thankless task of his successor, Governor-General Wood.

In his attempt to bring the islands back to an even keel, and to start the Philippine people once more on the only possible course leading to economic and political stability, Governor-General Wood met with mutiny and insubordination from those who pretend a patriotic interest in his venture. The head and front of this opposition, and primarily if not solely responsible therefor, was one Don Manuel Quezón, a politician repudiated by a considerable percentage of his own people, but fighting to retain the power and prestige so lavishly accorded him by Mr.



Harrison. Inasmuch as these attacks upon General Wood find their alleged basis in what is termed a curtailment of "political privileges" theretofore granted by Congress, it is necessary to trace briefly the influence of Mr. Harrison's "wind seeds" in creating the disturbance.

In a book seeking to justify his Philippine doings, Mr. Harrison credits his appointment as Governor-General to Mr. Quezón, then Philippine Delegate in Congress, a like admission having been made, as before mentioned, in a public address shortly after his arrival in Manila. This open recognition of Quezón as "King-Maker" enabled him to play a conspicuous and influential rôle in island affairs during the Harrison administration. When, in 1916, an elective Philippine Senate was authorized and created, it was altogether natural that Mr. Quezón should become not only a member, but also its president. Sr. Sergio Osmeña, his only outstanding rival in power, was Speaker of the House and President of the "Nacionalista," or dominant political party.

Congress, in its Organic Law for the Philippines, adopted the American plan of government, provision being made for Executive, Legislative, and Judicial divisions, each having well-defined powers and limitations. The functions of the Executive, having to do with appointments to and removals from office, the enforcement of laws, and supervision of executive departments, were vested in the Governor-General.

In the Philippines, as in every country where there is a small, dominant upper class and a subservient popular mass "called upon to obey," the ruling political ambition is for "executive authority." The vicious circle of revolutions in Mexico and other Latin-American countries for the past hundred years hinges upon this struggle

of rival leaders for executive control of the Government. Under the Organic Law, however, Messrs. Quezón and Osmeña were without executive power, having only such authority as was vested in them as presiding officers of the Senate and House respectively. While they completely dominated the legislature and its every action, they coveted control of the Executive and its perquisites as well. This they finally achieved through Harrison's complaisant creation, by Executive Order, of a so-called "Council of State," upon which the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House were given seats. This body, which also included the Department Secretaries, was to "aid and advise" the Governor-General, being fashioned after the system in vogue in parliamentary governments.

Exercising, as they already did, complete control over the various Filipino Secretaries of Departments, Quezón and Osmeña were now enabled through this council, to which Harrison abdicated most of his prerogatives, to dictate the policies of both the executive and legislative branches of the Government. Control of the judiciary was averted only through refusal of the United States Senate to sanction a Filipino majority on the Supreme Court; something proposed by Harrison and acquiesced in by President Wilson.

Filipinos themselves concede that this Council of State is utterly without legal sanction, and a deliberate encroachment upon the powers of the Executive as fixed by Congress. Despite this fact, however, and doubtless because of it, the Philippine Legislature early incorporated provisions in its laws recognizing such council as a legal entity. Not only this, but it sought to insure perpetuation of this extra-legal body through investing it with such

wide powers and discretion in the execution of laws that its abolishment would completely nullify a large number of Acts. Attempts were also made in various instances to confer exclusive powers upon Department Secretaries (Filipinos) in matters where Congress had specifically vested authority in the Governor-General. In all this the Legislature was given free rein, it being Governor-General Harrison's announced policy not to exercise his right of veto no matter what the character of laws enacted. As heretofore noted, he vetoed but five bills, and these of minor importance, during the whole of his incumbency.

As a consequence of the War, with its increased demand for island products, the revenues of the government, which totalled less than \$21,000,000 in 1913, increased to over \$43,000,000 in 1920, thus furnishing a substantial sum to play with. As a convenient means for diverting these funds into political channels, and with it a corresponding increase in the powers and perquisites of Messrs. Osmeña and Quezón, the old vehicle of "government-owned" enterprises was adopted. A proved failure in countries far more advanced in civilization and ethical standards than the Philippines, this suggested no argument to Mr. Harrison against acquiescing in the arrangement.

The orgy of "National Companies" which followed, including purchase of the Manila Railroad, organization of the Philippine National Bank, and creation of a development company, coal company, cement company, iron company and petroleum company, has already been referred to and their activities and failures described. Authority to vote the government interest in all these companies was vested in a "Board of Control," comprising the President of the Senate (Quezón), Speaker of the House (Osmeña), and the Governor-General. In

this triumvirate, as will be seen, Quezón and Osmeña held the balance of power and become responsible for the personnel and management.

Besides serving personal and party ends, these National companies were also intended to furnish a medium for getting Filipinos "into business," and placing them in a position to compete with industries established by outside capital. With every facility themselves to exploit the potential resources of the islands, nothing of real importance has been accomplished throughout Philippine history, every worth-while business or development project having been initiated by foreigners, or, in rare instances by Filipinos with an admixture of foreign blood. This situation was now to be remedied through operation of these government-owned companies; while, in addition, the resources of the Philippine National Bank were utilized with reckless abandon in financing sugar centrals, coconut-oil mills, and other like ventures which Filipinos had shown no disposition to undertake with private capital.

In August, 1916, Congress, in a preamble to what is known as the "Jones Bill," stated that it was the purpose of the United States to withdraw its sovereignty from the Philippine Islands, and to recognize their independence "as soon as a stable government can be established therein." In 1918 the Philippine Legislature created an "Independence Commission," and appropriated half a million pesos from insular funds to defray the cost of independence propaganda. In 1919 a "Mission" comprising twenty-eight members was sent to the United States (at public expense) to urge that this "stable government" had been achieved and to demand independence. It is to be noted that, while more than ninety-two per cent. of the inhabitants of the Philippines are pure

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Malays, with the limitations characteristic of that race, twenty-one members of this Mission were Spanish or Chinese Mestizos (half-castes), in no sense typical or representative of the great mass of the people.

Following the Republican victory in 1920, and fearing the possible advent of a Governor-General with sufficient courage and sense of responsibility to veto this dipping into public funds under the loose head of "Propaganda," the Philippine Legislature made a standing appropriation of 1,000,000 pesos per annum (500,000 pesos to each House) to defray the expenses of the "Independence Commission," this amount to be considered as included thereafter in the annual appropriation acts without specific mention. Mr. Harrison approved this measure shortly before his departure.

The signature of the Senate President (Quezón) or of the Speaker of the House (then Osmeña), as to the portion corresponding to the two Houses respectively, was the sole requisite for disbursement of this slush fund, evidencing again the clever manipulation of these "Gods of the Machine," who thus became the undisputed and secret purveyors of half a million dollars annually. There was no pre-audit of expenditures by them, and every effort during the past several years to secure a public statement showing how these government moneys have been spent, grafted, or wasted has failed.

On the eve of his retirement from the islands, with full knowledge of the failure of the Philippine National Bank and other public agencies under Filipino control, of the debasement of the local currency, and of the bankruptcy facing the Government unless outside relief was afforded, Governor-General Harrison represented to President Wilson that a stable government had been established by

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Filipinos and urged that immediate independence be granted them, which action was recommended to Congress by the President. As for Mr. Harrison, it could hardly be supposed he would condemn his own handiwork. To do so would be to admit himself in error and his administration a failure. What he failed to acknowledge was that such a government as existed in the islands—and it was then bad enough—had been created originally through external agencies, and was maintained as a going concern simply because the power and prestige of the United States were back of it. The real question is and must be, what sort of government would result should this backing be entirely removed and the Filipino people be left to their own resources and devices. The surprising feature is not that Mr. Harrison, interested in justifying his own theories and conduct, should ignore this fact, but that President Wilson, who must have realized the distinction, should support Mr. Harrison's project and give credence, both in the Philippines and in the United States, to beliefs and claims at variance with actual conditions.

In these facts, and in those heretofore recited, we glimpse the luxuriant growth of Mr. Harrison's "wind seeds," and the pass to which the Philippines and their people had been brought through a premature "Filipinization" of the service and a surrender by the Executive of the safeguards imposed by Congress in its Organic Law. It was at this time (November, 1920) Mr. Quezón, in a Senate speech, declared that he preferred "a government run like hell by Filipinos to one run like heaven by strangers." It is to be said that Mr. Harrison did all possible to make this dream come true, with Mr. Quezón occupying the stellar rôle. If we remember our Bible correctly,

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however, hell holds few delights except to those who administer it.

In March, 1921, President Harding, advised that matters were not exactly as represented by Mr. Harrison, commissioned General Leonard Wood and W. Cameron Forbes to go to the Philippine Islands, and

there make a study of the situation and report thereon, in order that I may have a judgment on which I can base my action and my recommendations with a consciousness that I am dealing justly with the Philippine people and pursuing a policy which the American people will sanction and support.

Both General Wood and ex-Governor Forbes had formerly served in the islands for years, and brought to their work not only ability and integrity but a thorough knowledge of local problems. The investigation occupied four months, during which time they visited practically every province and municipality in the islands, with every facility at their command to ascertain the facts. Their report to the President, which necessarily reflected the deplorable situation, financial and otherwise, which their investigation disclosed, concluded as follows:

We feel that with all their many excellent qualities, the experience of the past eight years, during which they [Filipinos] have had practical autonomy, has not been such as to justify the people of the United States' relinquishing supervision of the Government of the Philippine Islands, withdrawing their army and navy, and leaving the islands a prey to any powerful nation coveting their rich soil and potential commercial advantages.

We are convinced that it would be a betrayal of the Philippine people, a misfortune to the American people, a distinct step backward in the path of progress, and a discreditable neglect of our national duty were we to withdraw from the islands and terminate our relationship there without giving the Filipinos the best possible chance to have an orderly and permanently stable government.

We recommend that the present general status of the Philippine

Islands continue until the people have had time to absorb and thoroughly master the powers already in their hands.

This Wood-Forbes report, based as it is upon indisputable evidence, could not be controverted, however unpalatable it proved to the small coterie of politicians to whom Harrison had abdicated control. In effect it was an indictment of the Nacionalista party, and of Quezón and Osmeña, its leaders, who had dominated the government for eight years. The Demócrata, or opposition party, acknowledged the findings of the report as true, cast the blame upon Harrison and his Nacionalista henchmen, and appealed to the people "to turn the rascals out." *La Nación*, official organ of the Demócratas, in its issue of December 13, 1921, stated editorially:

Let us not deceive the Filipino people with cablegrams from our Resident Commissioners in Washington who present President Harding as a man ready to disregard the recommendations of the Mission, because it is a fact that no Filipino delegation can deny the truths printed in the report of the Mission. Should the Delegates air the Filipino case in the halls of the American Congress, it would be still worse for the Philippine Islands, because then the whole history of the scandals and calamities which characterized the administration of Harrison in the islands will be unfolded before the bar of American public opinion.

What is more important for us to do at the present time is to accept the bitter truth, and to rectify the errors of the past. From now on the basis of appointments must be the fitness of the candidates for discharging a public duty and not merely the interests of a certain party. That is the only way we can avoid any serious conflict with the Chief Executive of the islands, and fulfil the letter and spirit of the Jones Law. Thus shall we show the Chief Executive that we have no intention of limiting his powers as provided for in that law.

Mr. Quezón met this situation in characteristic fashion. For years he had chafed at dividing his power and prestige with Mr. Osmeña, who, as head of the Nacionalista party,



had the weight of that organization behind him. Quezón had sought to supplant him in this position and failed, and now took the only other course to dethrone his rival, which was to disrupt the party and at the same time cast the onus of its shortcomings upon Mr. Osmeña. He accordingly branded the Nacionalista party as "Unipersonalist," or one-man rule, and proceeded to organize a party styled the "Colectivist," or rule of the many. In the light of after events a letter written by him to Mr. Osmeña when the break occurred has become historical. Mr. Quezón said:

Since the Government of the Philippines was established by virtue of the provisions of the Jones Law (1916), the members of both houses of the Legislature, as well as the Nacionalista members of the Cabinet, permitted that you control and direct legislation in our country on the one hand, and the administration of public affairs on the other. It may be said that practically all measures which received your approval were transformed into laws and no law could be approved without your consent. The department secretaries, individually and collectively, guided their course of action under your inspiration, and nothing that was against your opinion was ever done by them. Recommendations on appointments made by the secretaries to the Governor-General were made upon your initiative, at least with your consent. Your veto in these cases was final and definite. The majority of the Senate with the exception of the President [Quezón himself] was not aware of these recommendations before they were submitted to the Governor-General. However, it was pretended that each and every one of these appointments was to be confirmed by the Senate, as in fact they all were.

This practice put the executive and legislative powers of the government of the Philippines in the hands of one, or at the utmost in the hands of two men. I say two, because all this was allowed to go on with my knowledge and consent, or at least with my tolerance.

Discounting only Mr. Quezón's inclination to minimize his personal responsibility for this perversion of powers, the control which he here concedes was exercised by Osmeña over both houses of the Legislature and the

Executive from 1916 to 1921, existed as to the Assembly, or lower house, from 1907 to 1916. His analysis, however, reflects little credit upon his benefactor, Mr. Harrison, and is a rare admission to make by one who has sanctioned and quite largely shared the spending of hundreds of thousands of dollars annually to convince our public and Congress that the Philippine *people* had established and were maintaining a stable and "representative" government. For all practical purposes, the elective Senate and House were superfluous, the government being administered under the orders of two men, neither of whom is Malay nor in any sense typical of Filipino capacity or limitation.

In the elections (June, 1922) following Quezón's attack on Osmeña and the Nacionalista party, several things happened. Osmeña, sensing defeat in the House, of which he had been Speaker since its organization in 1907, was elected to the Senate, where he is side-tracked, at least temporarily. The Demócrata party, relieved of Harrison and his Nacionalista backing, and with the damaging record of that party and its Colectivist offspring as a point of attack, elected a goodly number of Senators and Representatives, and made a clean sweep of municipal officials in Manila and Cebu. The Nacionalista and Colectivist parties split fairly even, with result that in the House neither of the three groups held a majority. Quezón still dominated in the Senate, and was reëlected its President. After a prolonged struggle in the House he was able to effect a combination against the Demócratas and elect his candidate, Manuel Roxas, as Speaker. As Roxas is "his man," Quezón thus accomplished his purpose, becoming the virtual dictator of both houses of the Legislature, as also of the Board of Control in charge of

“National” companies and of the Filipino members of the Council of State. The “one-man rule” denounced by him in Osmeña was now glorified in his own person, and the Colectivist slogan upon which he had split the Nacionalista party and eliminated his rival, went into the discard. His every effort was now directed toward healing the breach with that party and effecting a coalition against the Demócratas. Within less than two years after his memorable letter to Osmeña, therefore, Quezón had created a situation which brought upon himself, and with more justification, a similar condemnation at the hands of his opponents. Ruperto Montinola, President of the Demócrata party, in describing the turn of events said:

During the last seven years of Nacionalista régime, we had a government of men and not of laws. Osmeña was the sole god of those last years. He did as he pleased. Nothing moved without his consent; no bill ever passed the Legislature without his approval. The courts were invaded by politics. In the provinces, election frauds were the rule rather than the exception. Nacionalistas nominated their candidates on the eve of election days, and such nominees always came out elected, whether the electorate wanted them or voted for them.

To-day Quezón occupies the same position in politics. When Governor Wood made a statement about the next budget, Quezón immediately replied saying the Legislature will approve its own budget regardless of what the Governor proposed. Who is Quezón any way? Is he the Legislature? Do the Nacionalista and Colectivista legislators act like effigies in accordance with the movement of Quezón’s finger? The case is one of two alternatives. Either the coalitionist legislators follow Quezón blindly or they do not know their duties.

In the meantime (October, 1921) President Harding had prevailed upon General Wood, as the one man best qualified by training and experience for the work, to become Governor-General of the Philippines, and undertake the gigantic task of bringing order and stability out of the havoc wrought by Harrison. In accepting the appoint-

ment, General Wood relinquished a life position as Provost of the University of Pennsylvania, carrying salary of \$25,000 a year; that of Governor-General—of uncertain tenure—paying but \$18,000, the great bulk of which is consumed in entertainment expenses and other public outlays. Despite this considerable personal sacrifice, however, and with no illusions as to the difficulties involved, he shouldered the responsibilities as a patriotic American interested in the welfare and prestige of his country.

The first imperative step was to rehabilitate the "Currency Reserve Fund," sacrificed through the frenzied operations of the Philippine National Bank; also to supply working capital to the Government, a considerable portion of whose funds had been lost or "frozen" in like manner. The Wood-Forbes Mission had sent a hurry call to Congress in June, 1921, to authorize an increase in the bonded indebtedness of the islands, which authorization was promptly granted. Between August, 1921, and July, 1922, Philippine bonds were sold in the United States aggregating \$48,000,000. Of this amount, \$33,000,000 were issued at  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., \$5,000,000 at 5 per cent., and \$10,000,000 at  $5\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., all at approximately par value. At the same time, France and other countries were floating loans in the United States at from 7 per cent. to 10 per cent. and accepting a material discount from par.

Filipino politicians offered no opposition to borrowing this money, despite the heavy burden it imposed upon island credit and revenues. They have, in fact, evinced no hesitation at any time in securing public funds from whatever source possible. To General Wood's appeal, however, that liberal subscriptions to such bonds be made by Filipinos themselves, thus evidencing their patriotism

and saving interest payments abroad, not a dollar was forthcoming. The query naturally suggests itself: Where could sale of these bonds, absolutely necessary to save the islands from financial chaos, have been effected, and at what interest rates, without the backing of the United States? Possibly in Japan, whose press almost unanimously favours "Philippine independence." It is conceivable, however, given the somewhat shaky nature of the security, that that country would exact more than "interest rates" as a reward for her benevolence.

Propaganda purveyors to the contrary, Governor-General Wood leaned backward in his efforts to secure coöperation and harmony in restoring the islands to normal conditions. The extra-legal Council of State, which he could have dissolved by a stroke of the pen, was continued; nor were there any material changes in personnel. Under the Organic Law he was without power to initiate remedial legislation, nor could laws theretofore enacted, however unwise or foolish, be repealed by him. It was this situation Mr. Quezón had in mind when, with the departure of Harrison, he remarked that the new administration could do the Filipinos (meaning the politicians) no harm, "as things had been so fixed that this would be impossible."

The Wood-Forbes report to President Harding included the following recommendations:

We recommend that the responsible representative of the United States, the Governor-General, have authority commensurate with the responsibilities of his position. In case of failure to secure the necessary corrective action by the Philippine Legislature, we recommend that Congress declare null and void, legislation which has been enacted diminishing, limiting, or dividing the authority granted the Governor-General under Act No. 240 of the Sixty-Fourth Congress, known as the Jones Bill.

We recommend that in case of a deadlock between the Governor-General and the Philippine Senate in the confirmation of appointments that the President of the United States be authorized to make and render the final decision.

We recommend that under no circumstances should the American Government permit to be established in the Philippine Islands a situation which would leave the United States in a position of responsibility without authority.

Congress took no action upon these recommendations, thus leaving the Governor-General largely at the mercy of ambitious politicians, empowered to reject his appointments to office and block any effort to diminish the powers and perquisites gratuitously accorded them by Harrison. With infinite patience and tact, General Wood sought to overcome these obstacles, and to secure constructive legislation and action on behalf of the Philippine people as a whole.

During the legislative session of 1921-22, being before the split in the Nacionalista party and when its leaders were smarting under the attacks of the Demócrata opposition, a number of necessary reforms were instituted and a disposition shown to be guided by the recommendations of the Governor-General. Beginning with the 1922-23 session, however, politics again obtruded to the detriment of public interests. While Quezón had triumphed in his clash with Osmeña, and now occupied an undivided throne, his hold thereon was precarious. Not only did the growing strength of the Demócrata party hold a constant menace, but his attacks upon the Nacionalista party had left no little antagonism. There was also the other disturbing fact that General Wood refused to play personal or party politics, and had no hesitation in running counter to Mr. Quezón's desires and recommendations, which naturally lessened his influence

and prestige. Some bold stroke was necessary, therefore, to recapture popular fancy and bolster his waning political fortunes. This, he believed, would result from his posing as "the champion of Filipino rights against the autocracy of the Governor-General," and demanding his recall.

Such then was the genesis of the controversy staged by Mr. Quezón, from which he hoped to emerge not only a national hero but, mayhap, himself to become Governor-General. It is to be recalled that Mr. Harrison (who stated that "in all but race he was a Filipino") offered to resign as Governor-General provided a Filipino was named in his stead; doubtless having in mind his good friend Mr. Quezón. Coupling this with the demand that General Wood be removed and a Filipino successor appointed, the answer is fairly clear.

That the attack was forced, and had its origin in political rather than patriotic motives, becomes evident when the charges are analyzed. In effect, claim was made that General Wood usurped powers theretofore conferred upon the Philippine people by Congress. At most this was purely a legal question, to be determined through regular channels. Without awaiting any such solution, which would have been the logical course had he been sincere, Quezón immediately precipitated the crisis, acting on the assumption that his interpretation of the law must be infallible. Being hard pushed for an "issue," however, no other course was possible.

The episode finally grasped as a *casus belli* involved a minor secret-service officer named Conley, who had been quite active in raiding élite gambling houses, among them the "Nacionalista" Club. Conley had been suspended by the Mayor of Manila under direction of the Secretary of

the Interior, and two criminal charges of graft filed against him. Tried upon one of these charges by a Filipino judge, he was acquitted, and the other charge dismissed by the prosecuting attorney, also a Filipino. Not content with this, a demand was made by his accusers for an "administrative" investigation, which was conceded by General Wood under agreement that if again exonerated he would be reinstated. The investigating board found nothing justifying dismissal and suggested "that said Conley may be reinstated to his position." In the meantime, Conley had drawn no salary during his suspension, and stood to lose not only this pay but also his retirement gratuities and accrued leave unless restored to his position. Given his acquittal both in court and administratively, every principle of justice and fair play required this action without intervention by the Governor-General. As this was not forthcoming by Conley's superior officers, General Wood acted directly and ordered his reinstatement. This occurred on July 14th, and on July 16th Conley, to prevent further turmoil, tendered his resignation, which was accepted by the Governor-General.

Justice had been done in the premises, and the incident, under ordinary circumstances, would have been closed. The Mayor of Manila and the Secretary of the Interior, however—both of whom had been rather deeply enmeshed in the prosecution—tendered their resignations "in protest against such reinstatement." Just how far Quezón influenced this action is not known. He seized the occasion, however, and cajoled or intimidated the remaining secretaries of departments into also tendering their resignations to the Governor-General, which was done on the evening of July 17th, Conley being then out of the



service. While the joint letter of resignation had much to say about General Wood's "curtailment of Filipino autonomy," no instance was specified save the Conley reinstatement. In accepting the resignations (which included those of Quezón and Roxas as members of the Council of State) General Wood said:

In my opinion your action is wholly uncalled for. I beg to state most definitely and emphatically that each and every declaration made in your statement which charges neglect of the prerogatives and rights of the secretaries or disregard for the Organic Law, is without the slightest foundation in fact. You are aware of this, because here in your own presence Secretary Santos, Secretary of Justice, has declared that during our entire association covering more than a year no recommendation of his has ever been disapproved. Secretary Corpus, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, makes the same general declaration. These are the two secretaries with whom I have had most dealing.

We need go no further. Your plans have been deliberately made and your action is in the character of a challenge and a threat which I cannot ignore.

I regret exceedingly this occurrence. It can only be productive of unfortunate results prejudicial to the cause in which we are both interested. It means an abandonment of your posts and obligations at a time of great responsibility, on alleged issues unsupported by evidence and unworthy the attention of serious-minded men.

An interesting detail is found in the fact that these department secretaries, through lending themselves to Mr. Quezón's schemes, sacrificed positions paying \$6,000 per annum, whereas Mr. Quezón sacrificed nothing. He did not resign as President of the Senate, but simply as a member of the Council of State, an extra-legal body which could be dissolved at any time and which carries no emoluments. In accusing Mr. Osmeña of exercising dictatorial powers, and making it his excuse for a break with him, Mr. Quezón wrote:

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The department secretaries, individually and collectively, guided their course of action under your inspiration, and nothing that was against your opinion was ever done by them.

In the present instance the "dictator" had changed but the powers and their exercise were identical, the secretaries being simply puppets who followed his lead.

As the Conley affair, standing alone, proved somewhat flimsy material for a political fanfare, General Wood was further charged with vetoing bills having to do with internal affairs, with refusing to suspend penalties for non-payment of land taxes, and with trying to close out the "National" companies chartered by the legislature. So far as specific charges are concerned these would seem to be the sum of his offending.

It is not disputed that the Organic Law gives the Governor-General authority to veto all bills, a power similar to that vested in the President of the United States and in the Governors of our several states. Equally, the Philippine Legislature is authorized to override such vetoes by a two-thirds vote, which had not been done concerning any of the acts then cited as horrible examples of autocracy. It was Harrison's failure to veto legislation affecting internal affairs which produced the chaos in island affairs existing when General Wood took charge. As to the land tax, it is a favourite pastime of local politicians to urge that payment be deferred without penalties, and then condemn the Governor-General, who is finally responsible, for failure to do so. At the same time, possibly a million and a half Filipino children are without public school privileges through lack of funds; a situation which apparently concerns the politicians not at all. In the matter of the politically managed "National" companies, their disastrous records left General Wood

no option but to try and "get the Government out of business" as rapidly as possible, a step in which he would seem more than justified in the interest of public economy and public morals. Mr. Quezón, in a public speech, referred to this policy as follows:

The absurdity of letting Washington or its representative in the Philippines fix the policies of this government on purely local affairs, especially financial and economic, is that our policies would then be determined not by our electorate whose own interests are at stake, but by the electorate of the United States.

In the case of the bank, the railroad, and other business enterprises created by the legislature, the legislature went further than merely creating them: It kept them under its own control by placing the supreme authority of their management in the hands of the Board of Control, the majority of which is composed of the presidents of both houses of the legislature [Quezon being one].

While the Board of Control has supreme authority over the bank, yet the Governor-General, in the use of his executive powers, may order the closing of the bank. But I can assure you that while there is money in the treasury, the Philippine legislature will open another bank.

Given the history of the bank, the railroad, and other business enterprises over which Messrs. Quezón and Osmeña exercised "supreme authority" through the Board of Control, comment is superfluous. It might be asked, however, what Mr. Quezón would do when there was "no further money in the treasury," a condition confronting the islands when General Wood took charge.

The War Department, Washington, to whom the controversy was submitted, cabled General Wood as follows after securing legal advice upon the points involved:

The controversy with the legislative leaders and certain executive officers is at bottom a legal one. The Congress, after full consideration, vested the authority of control and supervision over all departments and bureaus in the Governor-General, which makes these officers

directly responsible to him and not to the legislature as in a parliamentary form of government.

The powers of the Governor-General have not been exceeded or misused by you in any instance of which the War Department is advised. If the legislature has enacted legislation violative of the provisions of the organic law, such legislation is to that extent null and void, and in so far as it provides for encroachments on the authority of the Governor-General is in no way binding on that official.

The legislature has in a number of instances delegated legislative power in violation of the principles of constitutional government. Silence of Congress on such legislation does not effect a modification or amendment of the organic law.

The veto power granted to the Governor-General is applicable to all legislation, whether it be local or otherwise.

The legislature has provided for the establishment of a bank and for certain investments of a business or semi-business character. This was within the authority of the legislature. In agreement with this administration you believed these investments unwise and have advised the legislature accordingly. This was your duty. Certain officials connected with the bank were corrupt. You have brought them to trial. Your duty in the premises has been fulfilled.

It is somewhat interesting to note that a Filipino paper, *La Nación*, in an editorial written before Mr. Quezón formulated his "charges," expressly recognized that the "supreme executive powers" of the Governor-General could not be curtailed by the Philippine Legislature. In its issue of December 7, 1921, *La Nación* said:

It is true that ever since the illegal formation of the Council of State, the Philippine Legislature has been dictating laws giving the Governor-General and the Council of State certain joint powers. But this does not prevent the Chief Executive from exercising the "supreme executive power" in accordance with the provisions of the Jones Law. It is very plain that if the powers of the Governor-General are now limited by the Council of State, they are so limited by the will of the Governor-General himself.

Prior to action by the Washington authorities, the *Philippine Herald*, Mr. Quezón's personal organ, had stated (July 18, 1923):

At bottom the question is a sharp but honest difference of opinion upon the construction of the law. The Governor-General also invokes the law in order to justify his stand. If he is mistaken, as we honestly believe, the remedy is to submit the case to the Washington Government.

Following the submission of the case to Washington, Mr. Quezón said:

The legislature, or at least the coalition majority, will disregard entirely all recommendations Governor-General Wood may make in his message to that body. We will not pass any measure he recommends, because he has disregarded the Council of State and has not asked the advice of the department secretaries in preparing his message.

As will be noted, Mr. Quezón, while simply presiding officer of one branch of the legislature, here states (before-hand) exactly what action would be taken. General Wood kept within the powers granted him by Congress and has been assailed and condemned by Filipino politicians for so doing. Have his critics been as scrupulous in their respect for Congressional action? Manuel Roxas, Speaker of the House, stated in a public address:

Filipino members of the Cabinet and our other representatives in the government have encroached on the powers and prerogatives of the Governor-General. That is true. We have encroached upon the rights of the Governor-General, because in that guise liberties are won.

Mr. Quezón, in addressing four thousand students of the University of the Philippines, said:

I am betraying no secret if I tell you that our ultimate aim in sustaining the controversy between the Governor-General and the leaders of the Filipino participation in the government, which culminated in the present crisis, is to make of the Governor-General of the Philippines a mere figurehead. It is unpatriotic for any Filipino to stand by Governor Wood in his policies.

In other words, Mr. Quezón proposed making General Wood a second Harrison, with the Government of the United States "in a position of responsibility without authority."

Possibly the best commentary on the situation, no less than upon the fundamental difference between American and Filipino conceptions of official responsibility, is furnished by various press dispatches from Manila during the period August to October, 1923. These chronicle a personal investigation by General Wood of the deplorable health conditions in Samar, of a visit to Mindanao to secure first-hand information concerning Moro outbreaks, of a tour of the northern provinces to investigate economic conditions, and of active measures taken to combat tuberculosis, of which more than 30,000 Filipinos die annually.

The same dispatches reported Quezón and his following busy in Manila with their political cabal, indulging threats of "non-coöperation" and other measures calculated to embarrass and obstruct the Governor-General in his efforts for the betterment of their people. Politics is the chief industry of those who agitate against American sovereignty, but their activities are utterly divorced from any constructive programme looking either to economic stability or to the development of civic capacity in the population as a whole. This may answer so long as responsibility rests with the United States, but it is hardly the road that leads to a self-sufficient, self-sustaining government of their own.

Quezón's break with General Wood was cleverly capitalized by him in a special senatorial election, held October 2, 1923, comprising the City of Manila and three adjacent provinces. Pedro Guevara, the regular incumbent (a

Nacionalista), was elected in February, 1923, as Filipino Delegate to Congress. As the district is now strongly Demócrata, there was every chance of their electing his successor. Fearing this, a special election was delayed by Senate leaders for months, through the simple expedient of not "certifying a vacancy" to the Governor-General. Immediately upon resignation of the department secretaries and the Mayor of Manila, this certificate was filed, and a date set for the election. Mr. Quezón thereupon effected a coalition of the Nacionalista and Colectivist parties, selected Ramón Fernandez, the former Mayor of Manila, as their candidate, announced the issue as "anti-Wood," and urged the people to unite against the arbitrary usurpation of powers by the Governor-General. An effort was made to stampede the Demócratas into also supporting Fernandez—and thus have the "protest" appear unanimous—through charging that failure so to do would brand them as "pro-Wood" and "traitors to the aspirations of the Filipino people." The Demócrata party, however, sensing rightly that the whole manœuvre was purely political, refused to be rushed in this manner, or to treat the issue as a "National" one, and placed their own candidate, Juan Sumulong, in the field.

The campaign was an intensive one, Quezón's whole programme, and with it his personal prestige, hinging upon the election of Fernandez. Every resource of the combined Nacionalista and Colectivist parties, backed by long-intrenched power and political experience, and every appeal to the pride, sentiment, and prejudice of an uninformed electorate, were brought to bear to insure victory. A fact difficult to realize in the United States, where newspapers and magazines are almost universally read, is that the combined circulation of the press of the Philippines—

Native, Spanish, and English—is approximately 150,000 for a population of 11,000,000. There is no informed opinion on public questions, the appeal, such as it is, being a personal one, coloured to suit the needs of the occasion. Standardized resolutions are prepared by political leaders upon issues of their own creation and then adopted blindly by the masses, who are without means of learning the truth. A patent illustration of this is found in the “unanimous demand” for General Wood’s recall by Filipino labourers in Hawaii, made within a week after resignation of the Department Secretaries, when such labourers were without any knowledge whatsoever of the merits of the controversy.

Given this condition of affairs, it was a foregone conclusion that Quezón’s candidate would win, the only surprise being at his comparatively small majority. The district has a population of approximately 900,000. The total vote cast was 95,925; of this Fernandez received 55,773 and Sumulong 40,152, or some 42 per cent. of the whole. Mr. Quezón’s play to become a popular idol failed of realization, and he now occupies a tottering throne.

During all this time the “Philippine Propaganda Bureau,” Washington, operating with public funds controlled by Messrs. Quezón and Roxas, was industriously seeking to discredit General Wood before the American public. A “Press Bulletin,” issued regularly by that Bureau, was sent, according to announcement, “to members of Congress, prominent citizens, and to 15,000 editors of weekly and daily newspapers, the list comprising every newspaper and periodical published in the United States.” In furtherance of Quezón’s charges, every change was rung upon the fact that General Wood was, or had been,



a military man, and must, *ipso facto*, be an "autocrat" and incapable of administering justice. Editorials reflecting a like opinion were culled from isolated newspapers among the "list of 15,000," and then broadcasted as evidencing the judgment of Americans generally as to General Wood's fitness for his post. Naturally, the true history and underlying causes of the controversy were not given, the Bureau having been created for "propaganda purposes," and not to recite facts or tell both sides of a case.

Following the dramatic resignation of the Department Secretaries in protest against reinstatement of a minor police official, this Propaganda Bureau was deluged with "ammunition" to explain and justify what seemed a rather childish proceeding. This material was supplied through the Independence Commission, Manila, which was roused to "great indignation" at being required to pay regular cable tolls on its messages, claiming the right to transmit them at "official government rates." Evidently a sense of humour is not one of their strong points. Truly, it is an astonishing thing, this annual spending of half a million dollars of public funds, derived within American territory, to malign the representatives of our government and to incite an emotional and credulous people against our sovereignty. Particularly is this true, given the paucity of Philippine revenues, and the fact that possibly 90 per cent. of the whole is contributed by persons not in sympathy with such propaganda. The danger lies not so much in deluding the American people, who are inclined to stop, look, and listen before taking decisive action in such matters, but in creating a state of mind among the unthinking Filipino masses which will seriously handicap or render abortive our further efforts on their behalf.

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In November, 1910, Hon. J. M. Dickinson, then Secretary of War, after an extended tour of the Philippines, stated in a special report to the President:

Advantage was taken of the announcement of my coming by politicians, through the press and in other ways, to stimulate a general demand for immediate independence. . . . The similarity in the movement everywhere and the form of expression indicated very clearly that a concerted campaign had been made to elicit such demonstrations. . . . The significant and questionable feature was that stirring up the people to such demonstrations was calculated to engender expectations as to immediate independence which would certainly be disappointed, and thereby result in discontent with the present administration of affairs, and operate as an encouragement to those who are sowing the seeds of discord between the American Government and the Filipino people, all of which tends to retard the development for which we are striving.

The intemperate and altogether flimsy charges indulged by Mr. Quezón against General Wood, repeated and enlarged and given vicious application by those lacking the capacity or inclination to weigh the facts, cannot but rebound to the hurt and prejudice of the Philippine people. To satisfy his own personal ambitions and prestige, Mr. Quezón planted in the minds of an ignorant and subversive following seeds of distrust and antagonism which, unless eradicated, must inevitably delay and obstruct the political and economic stability of the islands, and render any orderly or self-sustaining government by Filipinos utterly impossible of realization.

To those who have not lived in the Philippines, and are without personal knowledge of local conditions, the conflicting versions of what is transpiring may well breed confusion. In this particular controversy, however, any conclusion as to its merits might well be based upon the confidence inspired by the respective parties involved. As to General Wood, possibly no man was better qualified

to give an estimate of his character and what he stands for than President Roosevelt. Writing in the *Outlook* magazine shortly after General Wood had finished a tour of duty in the Philippines and had become Chief of Staff under President Taft, Mr. Roosevelt said:

Like almost all of the men mentioned, as well as their colleagues, General Wood of course incurred the violent hatred of many dishonest schemers and unscrupulous adventurers, and of a few more or less well-meaning persons who were misled by these schemers and adventurers; but it is astounding to any one acquainted with the facts to realize, not merely what he accomplished, but how he succeeded in gaining the good-will of the enormous majority of the men whose good-will could be won in honourable fashion.

His administration was as signally successful in the Moro country [Philippines] as in Cuba. In each case alike it brought in its train peace, an increase in material prosperity, and a rigid adherence to honesty as the only policy tolerated among officials.

His rise has been astonishing, and it has been due purely to his own striking qualifications and striking achievements. Again and again he has rendered great service to the American people; and he will continue to render such service in the position he now holds.

Certainly this expression of opinion by one of our greatest Americans, who had intimate personal knowledge of General Wood and his characteristics, should go far to offset the attacks upon him by Filipino politicians and by a subsidized Press Bureau maintained by them and administered in their interests.

## CHAPTER X

### PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE

IT IS altogether natural, perhaps, for Americans to regard liberty and independence as interchangeable terms, and to sympathize with the demands of any people for self-rule. School texts have stressed, and we have commonly accepted as a fact, the idea that our Revolutionary War was waged for the single purpose of securing political freedom from Great Britain. The recitals of the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created free and equal," and that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed," have become a part of our national creed and are seldom questioned.

In all this, however, as in the acceptance of other traditional beliefs and dogmas, there has possibly been too little analysis of the fundamentals of our faith. Examination shows, for instance, that our break with the Mother Country was in fact inspired by quite a list of substantial grievances, the historic Declaration detailing twenty-six specific charges of "injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these States." Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, on the other hand, peopled much as were the American Colonies, have not—lacking such grievances—demanded political separation from Great Britain and are to-day proud members of that Empire. We are also prone to forget that in setting up their own household, our Revolu-

tionary forbears brought to the task not only stability of character and a high average of intelligence, but long experience in self-government, gained through town meetings, municipal councils, and church organizations, wherein the body of the people took an active part.

Most Americans, when discussing our Philippine obligations, lose sight almost completely of the historical background and geographical location of the islands, no less than of our own Negro problem and of the lessons to be learned from what has happened and is happening in Mexico, Cuba, and various Central and South American countries, where the status of the people is far more favourable to an independent government than exists in the Philippines.

As to the proposition that all men are created free and equal, the president of one of our greatest American universities recently stated the fact of the matter as follows:

The one inexorable law of nature is inequality. Men are unequal physically, unequal mentally, unequal morally, unequal socially, unequal in every conceivable way.

Most people think that the proud, slave-holding, Indian-hating aristocrats who were responsible for the Declaration of Independence meant that all human beings were created equal. Of course they did not. They meant that certain property holders on this side of the Atlantic were equal to certain property holders on the other side; that was all. Negroes and Indians and poor whites and women were not equal to Virginia planters—not for a moment. When we realize this, we will begin to believe that one who recognizes facts and states that men are not equal may be just as loyal to the Constitution as the men who signed the Declaration of Independence would themselves have been.

The Declaration of Independence had been written almost ninety years before a quasi-equality, political or otherwise, was extended the American Negro; women waited one hundred and forty years before emerging from

the category of infants and idiots and receiving a grudging participation in government, while our various Indian tribes are still "wards" of the State. Moreover, the right of suffrage granted the Negro has been so limited and restricted in practice as to become largely a dead letter, despite his long contact with modern civilization.

The purposes of government have also been overlooked too often through stressing the form rather than the substance of things. "The end of political society is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These Rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression"; or, as stated in the Declaration of Independence, "the rights of Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." History shows that in practically every case where an existing government has been overthrown or repudiated by the people themselves, it has been to preserve these rights; that is, to secure relief from oppression and tyranny. Viscount Bryce expresses the fact thus:

When a rising occurred it was because men desired good government, not self-government. Popular government has been usually sought and won and valued not as a good thing in itself, but as a means of getting rid of tangible grievances or securing tangible benefits, and when these objects have been attained, the interest in it has generally tended to decline.

In discussing a possible withdrawal of American sovereignty from the Philippines, therefore, it is well to keep our feet on the ground and not be stampeded by sentiment or by ill-digested theories of government and the ends to be accomplished. As a practical question we are concerned with knowing who among the inhabitants of the Philippines are demanding independence and why, and how the "liberty, property, security, and happiness" of

the rank and file of the population would be affected should such a demand be granted.

There are those among our people who argue that the Philippines are a burden and a menace to the United States, and that we should abandon them irrespective of obligations assumed or of the consequences to the Filipinos. In justice to Americans generally, it is to be said that the advocates of this scuttle policy, with its negation of every principle of national honour, are comparatively few and in no sense representative. We are satisfied that when and in the event the United States withdraws its flag across the Pacific, it will be from no selfish interest, real or imagined, but from a sincere belief that the step will conduce to the welfare and happiness of the islanders as a whole. Having destroyed Spanish sovereignty, and voluntarily assumed responsibility for the orderly administration of government in the islands, we can no more permit the masses of the Philippine people to be misgoverned, exploited, and impoverished by a minority element among themselves, than we could justify consigning them to a like fate by outsiders. Justice and decency alike estop us from casting them adrift until they are fitted to safeguard their rights against both eventualities. Mr. Taft, in a speech at Manila on August 11, 1905, while Secretary of War, referred to the attitude of the American people as follows:


They believe that they have become the trustees and protectors of the whole Filipino people; not alone of the eight or ten per cent. who speak Spanish; not alone of the smaller percentage who may be described as the educated part of the people; but of the whole Christian Filipino people and of the whole non-Christian Filipino people; and that they cannot discharge this trust without a due regard to the rights of all their wards; and that they must be especially careful to observe and protect the rights of the uneducated and the poor of their wards,

who by reason of circumstances are unable to speak for, or protect themselves. Enjoying as Americans do a government of free institutions, a government of liberty regulated by law, a republican form of government resting in its last analysis upon an intelligent public opinion, they do not think that their duty to the whole Filipino people can be discharged without preparing that people to maintain a stable, popular government in which shall be secured the civil liberty of all. They do not conceive that they have the right to relieve themselves of the burden of wardship or guardianship of this whole people by attempting to assign the burden of government to a small element of that people, however confident that educated element may be of its ability to carry on a government for the Filipino people.

Upon American occupation in 1898, the islands had an estimated population of 7,000,000, of which number possibly seven to eight per cent. spoke or read Spanish, the remainder being limited to their local dialects. Of these the Tagalogs, living in and adjacent to Manila, numbered some 1,275,000; the Visayans, inhabiting the central islands, 2,835,000; the Ilocanos, in the north and west of Luzon, 725,000; the Bicolis, in southern Luzon, 500,000; the Pangasinans, north central Luzon, 290,000; the Pampangans, north of Manila, 250,000; and the Cagayans, in the north and east of Luzon, 125,000. These comprised what is known as the Christianized element of the population, that is, those "who came within sound of the bells." In addition were the non-Christians (Moros and Pagans), numbering approximately a million, and split into dozens of ethnographic groups, inhabiting the mountain provinces of Luzon and the islands of Mindoro, Palawan, Mindanao, and the Sulu archipelago.

Of the total population some 7.36 per cent. were Chinese and Spanish Mestizos, that is, having a considerable admixture of Chinese and Spanish blood, living in and adjacent to Manila, Cebu, Iloilo, and other populous centres. Included in their number were most of the





wealthy and better-educated members of the community, as also those conversant with Spanish. While not, strictly speaking, Malays, they are the class which now dominates politically, and from whom the masses of the people receive their ideas and voice their desires. The two outstanding figures in local politics, Messrs. Osmeña and Quezón, are predominantly Chinese and Spanish respectively.

Neither in theory nor in practice did Spanish rule furnish even a rudimentary training in self-government, the only lesson taught being one of blind submission to an autocratic official class. Twenty-five years of American tutelage, however much may be claimed for it, has been able to reach and affect but an insignificant part of the population. The *cacique*, or local boss, still dominates the smaller communities, while two or three "leaders" arrogate supreme authority in the higher councils of government.

Education, which offers the only possible avenue through which the masses can eventually escape their inheritance, is, as we have seen, almost at a standstill. Lacking, as do the native dialects, any literature of consequence, the great body of the people have no real knowledge of public or world affairs or of how to exercise and protect their political rights.

Moreover, it is a fault of most Filipinos and of many Americans to believe that it is only necessary to educate a people to qualify them for any task or responsibility, governmental or otherwise. Biological science teaches us, however, that "natural capacity" has no relation whatsoever to education. That education while it may enable an individual to utilize more fully his inherent ability, does not and cannot create inherent ability. In other words,

peoples no less than individuals are the sum of their heredity and environment. Education and right surroundings may accelerate progress from a lower to a higher type, but inborn characteristics can be changed only through breeding with a superior stock or through the slow-moving processes of evolution. The American Negro is more advanced than his kinsmen of the African jungle, but generations of contact with American institutions have but slightly changed his inherent capacity or natural inclinations. For this reason we have a Negro problem in the United States, and have also tardily realized that the steady influx of lower-type stocks from southern Europe, with a diminishing supply of the desirable north European types, was creating a situation fraught with serious menace to our government.

Viscount Bryce, in his work "Modern Democracies," referring to the part played by education in qualifying for government, says:

The diffusion of education among backward races such as the Filipinos or the African Bantu tribes, or even among the ignorant sections of civilized peoples, such as the Russian peasantry, or the Chinese, or the Indian ryots, will not, desirable as it is, necessarily qualify them to work a democratic government, and may even make it more difficult to work in its earlier stages. These conclusions may damp hopes, but must not discourage action. Instruction must be provided, in civilized and uncivilized countries, and the more of it the better, for every man must have his chance of turning to the best account whatever capacity Nature has given him. The seed of education will ultimately yield a harvest in the field of politics, though the grain may be slow in ripening.

It may safely be said that the fundamental capacity of the Filipino-Malay, in whatever form it may seek expression, is little if any greater or different from what it was upon American occupation of the islands.

A fact to be borne steadily in mind, and which we have repeatedly stressed, is that the characterization given is of the inhabitants of the Philippines as a whole, and not of the small percentage of *ilustrados* through whom the casual visitor to Manila or Americans at home derive their impressions of the islands and their people. The great bulk of the population—and this includes the so-called Christian Filipinos—are but at the threshold of modern progress and civilization, and their ultimate fate hinges upon the character and standard of the encouragement and protection given them.

While there is a Filipino race there is in fact no "Filipino people" in the sense of a homogeneous body of citizens capable of expressing any concerted or well-matured purpose or desire. The various elements of the population, whose "rights" are to be consulted in determining our responsibility, may be roughly classified as follows:

The aboriginal Negritos, hunted and enslaved from time immemorial by Malay invaders;

The Mohammedan Moros, virile, warlike, and bitterly antagonistic to Christian Filipinos;

The Pagan tribes or "wild peoples," to whom American rule brought the first rudimentary ideas of modern progress and enlightenment;

The *Taos* (peons) in the paddy fields and the nipas, comprising the bulk of the population, ignorant of their rights, polyglot in their language, and passive to the will of the local *caciques*;

And last, that small coterie of *ilustrados* (largely Spanish, Chinese, and other blend Mestizos), who control the native press and other sources of publicity, who dominate in politics, and who would, either ignorantly or selfishly,

sacrifice the welfare and progress of the great body of their people upon the altar of personal ambition.

Upon whom, then, rests the decision as to what the "Filipino people" want? What is best for them now and through the years? Is it the Philippine Legislature and its "Propaganda Bureau" offshoot, the only entities now vocal in their claims and demands? Mr. Manuel Quezón, who should know the facts, has stated that every act and resolution of this legislative body from the beginning has been shaped at the will of one or at the most two men. It is not and never has been "representative" of the people as a whole, and cannot be accepted as voicing their present needs or future welfare.

The countries of Latin-America, when undertaking governments of their own, had a common language, solidarity of territory, a large sprinkling of whites or mixed whites, and an indigenous population at least equal in natural ability to the Filipino-Malay and with far greater opportunities in the way of Spanish civilization and culture. Moreover, their geographical location saved them from being overwhelmed economically by more energetic and industrious peoples, while they were and are protected from foreign aggression and exploitation through the application and enforcement of our Monroe Doctrine.

Favoured as these countries have been, however, the history of most of them, for the past hundred years, has been simply a record of revolution and bloodshed, with the "rights of the people" an unconsidered item.

In Mexico 20 per cent. of the population is pure or nearly white, 43 per cent. is of mixed European and Indian blood, with 37 per cent. Indian or native, and yet Mexico has not held an honest election during the hundred and more years of her existence. The nearest approach was

*The N.S. protects "from industries and energetic peoples so that such peoples will not interfere with the N.S. in exploitation" protection by N.S. means exploitation by N.S. !!! Such hypocrisy!*

*Its not hypocritical given the notion of Social Darwinism of which this author was a part.*

that of Madero in 1911, who was deposed and killed shortly afterward. In all her turbulent history, past and present, the only period of repose and substantial progress was under Porfirio Díaz, who disregarded both Constitution and Legislature and ruled for some thirty-five years as an absolute dictator. Referring to his régime Viscount Bryce says:

Díaz was one of the great men of his time, resolute, clear sighted, swift in action. He even tried to induce his Legislature to pass measures on its own initiative, but found before long that it was unsafe to leave with them a power they were likely to use unwisely. Could he have found a successor who, while following out his policy with equal energy, would have given the land to the people and brought education within their reach, Mexico might within half a century have begun to be fit for constitutional liberty.

We granted independence to Cuba, small in area, compact in territory, rich in productive resources, unified in language, protected from outside aggression, safeguarded in her trade and foreign relations, and yet we have twice intervened to preserve order and protect property rights, with other like interventions in the offing. Without this protection and guidance it is altogether certain that Cuba would have proved a second Mexico, or worse. There, as in other Spanish-American countries, politics centres in persons rather than in principles, with the defeated candidate ever disposed to "insurrect" and go gunning for his adversary, with or without reason. Through the assurance furnished by American supervision against periodical revolutions, the material development of Cuba since freed from Spain has been phenomenal, her foreign commerce having increased over 700 per cent. Internal affairs, however, are in local hands, and there has been little or no development of the *Cuban people*. Fifty-two

per cent. of the population still remains illiterate, there being a smaller percentage of the population in the schools to-day than in 1907. Outside Havana sanitation is practically nonexistent. With immense revenues, there is scarcely a decent public highway in the island. Tens of thousands of ignorant and oftentimes diseased and criminal blacks, who intermix but do not assimilate with the native element, are imported annually by "Presidential Decree" to satisfy the needs of sugar planters. Public funds are openly and flagrantly grafted by the official class and their underlings, while private wealth is centred in the hands of a fortunate few. The unfortunate many, for whom governments are supposed to be instituted, live in their old-time ignorance and poverty, without means or hope of materially bettering their condition. Such is the "Republic of Cuba" to-day.

Knowing and appreciating these facts, it is certainly anomalous that so many Americans, with their reputation for practical sense, should believe, or profess to believe, that within twenty-five years the United States could miraculously transform the heterogeneous peoples of the Philippines into a self-governing, self-sustaining community; that somehow or in some way the Filipinos have acquired in this brief period "the steadiness and self-control of political maturity," and are fitted to succeed where these others have failed and now to administer a democratic, popular government wherein the rights and welfare of all will be served and protected.

The wonder grows when we consider that the Philippines have neither the compact territory nor the more or less homogeneous population which characterizes these Spanish-American republics. They comprise, instead, some three thousand islands, large and small, scattered

over a thousand miles of tropic sea; ninety two per cent. of their people is pure Malay, speaking diverse tongues, with no background in heredity or environment for political self-expression; a million or more are Moros and Pagans, without the slightest conception of popular government and in no way disposed to be ruled by Christian Filipinos; but a small percentage of the archipelago is under cultivation, while immediately adjacent are the congested millions of China, Japan, and other Oriental countries, eager to exploit the undeveloped resources of this land of promise; the exposed insular location and strategic military and commercial importance of the islands render them liable to aggression from every corner of the earth; they are burdened with a large bonded indebtedness, and lack, even with present advantages, sufficient revenues to minister properly to the needs and progress of their people. And, further, the Monroe Doctrine does not extend to Asia, and once the islands are cut loose and our Army and Navy withdrawn, the right of the United States to intervene in Philippine affairs will be identical with that of Great Britain, France, Japan, Holland, or any other country having interests in the Pacific.

A writer familiar with every phase of the Philippine situation recently stated:

The Filipino people to-day enjoy more political privileges and opportunities for commercial and social development than any other people in the wide world, with less cost per capita. They are more independent than any territory of the United States ever was, and they are as independent to-day in all essential respects as any one of the forty-eight States of the Union.

Briefly summarizing the facts, what do we find?

In 1898 the United States freed the Philippines from



Spanish tyranny, and through payment of a \$20,000,000 debt levied against the islands, and the establishment of American sovereignty, saved them from again reverting to Spain, or from being sold to Germany or occupied by some other foreign Power.

Thereafter, law and order were restored from out the chaos of war and disrupted industries; courts were organized where justice was impartially administered; a comprehensive system of public instruction was implanted; a Bureau of Health cleaned the islands of small-pox, bubonic plague, and other endemic diseases, while the stagnant economic life of the country was revived and developed through construction of a network of splendid highways and the opening of new markets for island products. The welfare and progress of the entire people were consulted, and a participation in public affairs given the small educated class up to and frequently beyond the danger point, when measured by the interests of all.

Not only did the United States open a new world to the Philippine people, wherein every right, privilege, and opportunity theretofore denied them became possible, but there accrued to them through the fact of American sovereignty and through Congressional action, a body of advantages and immunities which make of them to-day a favoured race among earth's peoples. Among many of these resulting advantages the following are outstanding:

The debased and fluctuating currency of the islands was replaced and stabilized by a monetary system based upon gold, the only lapse being during the brief financial excursion undertaken by Filipinos during the Harrison régime.

The Chinese Exclusion Act applicable to the States was extended to the islands, thus protecting the Filipinos from

a competition which they have neither the numbers, industry, nor business capacity to meet on even terms.

The Public Lands of the islands, estimated at 63,000,000 acres, title to which is vested in the United States, have been placed, "under the control of the government of said islands to be administered and disposed of for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof."

Backed by the moral responsibility and credit of the United States, Philippine bond issues totalling \$75,000,000 have been floated at minimum interest rates and the proceeds used in the construction of sewer and water systems, harbour improvements, development of irrigation, extension of rail lines, and in works of far-reaching public utility.

Taxes are levied under local laws, all revenue collected being spent within the islands for the use and benefit of the Philippine people. The per capita is under \$4 per annum, being a fraction of that now paid in most countries of the world. For 1922 the average per-capita tax in the United States, local, State, and Federal, was \$68.37, the portion corresponding to the Federal Government being \$29.47.

The Filipinos are safeguarded in their personal and property rights by the might and power of the Army and Navy of the United States, and enjoy equally with Americans the protection and service of our diplomatic and consular officers, and yet no contribution whatsoever has been asked or received from them in return.

The Philippines prospered greatly during the World War, and enjoyed undisturbed peace and security through our sovereignty, notwithstanding which Filipinos have not been required to share any portion of the tremendous burden in debt and taxes imposed upon the American people because of their part in that struggle. Americans, on the other hand, residing or deriving income in the

islands, have been called upon to participate in these war taxes while their Filipino and foreign competitors, engaged in like business, go free. Congress saw fit to discriminate against our own nationals in our own territory and to perpetrate upon them a piece of class legislation obnoxious to every principle and theory of our Government and Constitution.

Since October, 1909, the products of the Philippines have enjoyed free entry to our markets, and *vice versa*. In consequence, the import and export trade of the islands with the United States jumped from \$14,847,918 in 1909 to \$132,387,472 in 1923; while the import and export trade with foreign countries increased from \$43,991,032 in 1909 to \$73,153,184 in 1923, the total trade for the latter year being \$208,582,737.

The U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey and its officers, compensated in part by the United States, have sounded and charted the waters of the archipelago and its myriad islands, making navigation something other than a gamble with tide, rock, and reef, as was the case upon our coming.

Freedom from governmental interference with the life, liberty, and property of individuals, achieved by Anglo-Saxon peoples only through centuries of struggle and heartbreak, and now embodied in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution, was conferred upon and is now enjoyed by the Philippine people without sacrifice and without price.

Through the Four-Power Treaty of the Washington Conference the Philippines are assured protection and safety from foreign aggression, or from interference in their internal affairs, so long as they remain "an insular possession of the United States."

Filipinos of all classes have free and unrestricted access to the United States and its territories, a privilege denied

other Asiatics and enjoyed only within prescribed limits by peoples of other nationalities.

Whatever the grounds for urging Philippine independence, therefore, it is somewhat far-fetched to cite our Revolutionary War as a precedent. Not only has the United States committed no "injuries and usurpations" in the Philippines, or evidenced any purpose to establish a "tyranny" therein, but it has freely accorded the Philippine people all and more rights and privileges than are enjoyed to-day by American citizens in any State or territory of the Union. The recent outcry against General Wood had as its basis no "usurpation" of authority by him, but simply that he sought to give effect, in the interests of justice and in the protection of Filipinos as a whole, to powers granted him by Congress, which had theretofore been "usurped" by the Philippine Legislature.

Not the least remarkable thing about the work and effort of the United States in the Philippines is that Filipinos (that is, the vocal part of them) have not only accepted every benefit and privilege accorded them, as a matter of course, but take credit very largely to themselves for what has been accomplished. There has been and is very little appreciation of the transformation worked in their condition, the burden of their song being one of criticism and complaint with a constant clamour for still further concessions.

Liberty means "equal laws for all, a recognition of civil rights, and exemption from the exercise of arbitrary power." It is this we have given the Filipinos—except as thwarted by local *caciques*—and which we are seeking to preserve to them against a small coterie of their own people who seek to control the Government, free from all interference. The "Independence" now urged by certain

Filipinos is simply an end in itself, regardless of how it affects "the life, liberty, property, and security" of those mostly concerned, that is, the masses of the people. Manuel Quezón expressed the idea by stating that he "preferred a government run like hell by Filipinos to one run like heaven by Americans." Inasmuch as it is the masses of the people and not Mr. Quezón and his fellow politicians who pay the freight, it is conceivable they might not sanction this inevitable price of Filipino rule.

It is well to bear in mind that even under United States sovereignty, political power among Filipinos has centred in the hands of a few persons. The granting of independence now or in the long future would not change this situation. The great body of the people have not now, nor would they have then, any more voice or actual participation in government than have the peons of Mexico or of Central America. Independence would simply mean that the protection and security now afforded by American authority, and the restraints which our presence exercises over rival political leaders, would be lifted, and every "liberty" we have given and are seeking to give the people as a whole, would go by the board. Filipinos of intelligence frankly admit this privately and occasionally express it publicly. In its issue of October 11, 1923, the *Independent*, a Filipino paper, referring to a rumoured uprising against Americans, said:

The Government and the Americans may rest assured that no armed disturbance threatens them. Here, at present, no one thinks of an armed revolution against them or against the established institutions. The ire of the people is directed against certain oligarchical Filipinos, hated to death by the whole country. And if this ire of the people has been under leash up to the present—why should not this fact be bared? It is because of the presence of America and the Americans. Had

they not been here, the Filipino people would have long since placed, through force, other men at the head of the government in this country.

The same paper, in its issue of October 30, 1923, referring to the demand for General Wood's recall and the appointment of a Filipino Governor-General, stated:

Let us be frank. What is aimed at in this plan advocating the appointment of a Filipino Governor-General is not the independence of the country, but the complete centralization of all the powers of government in the hands of Quezón and Osmeña. They want to lord it over this unfortunate land for the benefit of themselves and of their sycophant and weak-kneed followers. And they well know that the day following the lowering of the Stars and Stripes, other men will be elected by the people for the management of public affairs. Let the Washington government appoint Sumulong, Araneta, Montinola, or any other Filipino who is not a Coalitionist as Governor-General, and our Resident Commissioners would be the first to favour the continuation of Leonard Wood in office.

It might well have been added that any effort to "eliminate" Messrs. Quezón, Osmeña, *et als*, upon American withdrawal, would be resisted by them—with the usual consequences. Just where the common Filipino, whom their national hero Rizal termed "the ignorant victims of deception," would get off, is another story.

The near riots in Manila last October (1923), when Quezón's secretary was stoned and various of his following manhandled because of alleged frauds in the election of a Coalitionist Senator, are illuminating as to the turn affairs would take without the hovering might of American authority and control. Equally significant was an event staged in December, 1920, when an entire company of native constabulary, resenting certain actions of the Manila police, went gunning for the latter and killed eleven of them, including an American police captain and three American patrolmen, before being brought under control.

In 1912 the Empire of China became a "Republic." It is a country rich in literature and art, with a people qualified through natural capacity, industry, and thrift to compete successfully with the nationals of any country. The Chinese are a civilized race, having an ancient culture, "which the lowliest coolie has felt somewhere along the line of his ancestry and which he instinctively expresses in his life and philosophy." Despite all this, however, their attempt to found a self-governing democracy has proved abortive, and their country to-day, governmentally, is in a state of chaos. The answer is found in the fact that for untold generations their training has been one of submission to the rule of an autocracy, where public office meant simply opportunity for private plunder; that their interests have ever been local rather than national, and that the great body of their people are totally inexperienced in the expression of individual initiative in government or in the assertion of personal rights.

The position achieved by Japan among the nations has frequently been cited as indicative of the capacity of Orientals to administer a progressive government. Possibly, if these others shared the heredity and traditions of the Japanese, together with their *form* of government. What these are and how they operate in practice have been described by a recent authority as follows:

In Japan the religious devotion to a dynasty whose origin is lost in the mist of fable, together with the personal devotion of the feudal retainer to his lord, have combined to produce that self-forgetting loyalty to State and Nation which has made the Japanese warrior feel it a privilege to offer up his life to the national cause. Nowhere does this sort of loyalty seem to have equally pervaded all classes of people.

Japan is not a democracy and in no sense a "government by the people." The greatest menace she faces to-day,

and one which may yet paralyse her progress, is the growing self-consciousness and self-assertion of a heretofore subservient proletariat, and their refusal further to accept implicitly the fetish of a dynasty divinely called to regulate and rule their every thought and action.

Filipino advocates of independence pretend they are now qualified to establish and operate a modern democracy, and any judgment as to the fact must have reference to that *particular kind* of government. What it involves and the conditions for success were stated by Viscount Bryce as follows:

Democratic government rests upon and requires the exercise of a well-informed and sensible opinion by the great bulk of the citizens. Where the materials for the formation of such an opinion are so artfully supplied as to prevent the citizens from judging fairly the merits of a question, opinion is artificially made instead of being let grow in a natural way, and a wrong is done to democracy.

I use the word democracy as denoting a government in which the will of a majority of the qualified citizens rules, taking the qualified citizens to constitute the great bulk of the inhabitants, say, roughly, three fourths, so that the physical force of the citizens coincides (broadly speaking) with the voting power.

No person having personal knowledge of the congeries of peoples inhabiting the Philippine Islands can consistently argue that they remotely meet this requirement, or that it is possible for them to do so within a future at all proximate. This conclusion involves no criticism of or reflection upon the Filipino race. No more would it be an arraignment of a child to say that he is not prepared to assume the financial and other responsibilities of a household. It would be asking and expecting the impossible for Filipinos, with the limited facilities at their disposal, to achieve in twenty-five years a position which it has required other peoples centuries to attain.



Filipinos have given no evidence that they can reverse the laws of Nature, or that they stand alone in matters governmental among the peoples of earth. As pressure has been removed, or opportunity offered, they have run true to form, differing in no respect from like types wherever found. Despite the protection afforded them by American sovereignty, and the material and other advantages accruing from the connection, their few brief years of license under Governor-General Harrison sufficed to demoralize and bankrupt the government and to enthrone two or three of their leaders as supreme arbiters in island affairs. It required some \$48,000,000 in bond issues to place the Government in working order once more, while the appetite for power, whetted in a few individuals by the unrestricted control given them, created a situation embarrassing to American authority and destructive of the true interests of the Philippine masses. As a test of self-governing capacity, or of ability on the part of the people as a whole to administer a "stable government," the Harrison experiment proved a cruel one, accentuating as it did traits and characteristics better kept in the background.

It is within the power of the United States to abandon the Philippines and to replace our sovereignty by a turbulent and short-lived oligarchy. It is not within the power of our Congress to confer upon Filipinos "the steadiness and self-control of political maturity," without which any independent government launched by them is foredoomed to failure.

## CHAPTER XI

### PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE (*Continued*)

THE present demand for "immediate and absolute Philippine independence" is voiced by the Philippine Legislature, by the native press of the islands, by propaganda organs and spokesmen, and by various others, Filipino and American, who echo what they believe to be a popular cry. While there is every reason to believe that many of these neither expect nor desire "absolute" independence, all of them have one trait in common, which is a refusal dispassionately to consider or discuss just what would happen to the Philippine people and to the Far East generally should their demand be granted. Every attempt to bring them to grips in this regard is met by the stereotyped reply, "Give us independence and we will cross that bridge [or bridges] when we come to it."

Considering that once independence is granted its perils cannot be sidestepped, wisdom would counsel that the possible dangers be thoroughly canvassed before taking the plunge. It is not enough for native politicians to declaim their preference for a government run like hell by Filipinos to one run like heaven by the United States. Americans and Filipinos alike are entitled to know just how much hell would result and whether it is to their respective interests deliberately to invite it. What, then, would "absolute independence" involve to those mostly concerned—the Philippine people?

In the first place, every advantage and privilege now

accruing to the islands through American sovereignty or by congressional action would automatically terminate. These include, among others, our backing of their currency system, Chinese exclusion, credit for bond issues, protection of the United States Army and Navy, service and protection of American diplomatic and consular officers, free entry of island products to the United States and *vice versa*, security from foreign aggression, and unrestricted access of Filipinos of all classes to the United States and its territories. Waiving the matter of preservation of internal order and restraints exercised over rival and bellicose leaders, now assured through American authority, how are the Filipinos prepared to surmount the sacrifice of these specific benefits?

The total insular revenues are now less than \$35,000,000 per annum. It is generally conceded that failure of worthwhile capital to invest in the Philippines during the past twenty-five years has been due almost entirely to the uncertain political future of the Government. Certainly this situation would not be bettered through a complete withdrawal of American sovereignty. It is *prima facie* that any normal increase in revenues must have as its basis increased development and production, which can occur only through favourable investment conditions. A Philippine Republic, lacking American protection and denied free access to our markets, must inevitably suffer in its income, whereas the requirements of the situation would be materially enhanced. Every outlay now incurred by the United States on behalf of the islands, or which is saved to them because of our sovereignty, would then become a burden upon insular revenues and represent a clear addition to present expenditures.

In the matter of providing for national defence, plans

and estimates recently prepared by an American army officer fix the minimum cost, distributed over a ten-year period, at not less than \$125,000,000 annually. As the raising of this or any like sum in the islands through taxation, exclusive of other public needs, is prohibitive, any adequate provision by a Philippine Republic against foreign aggression would be hopeless. To preserve internal order, however, and to police outlying islands, a Philippine army of at least 25,000 men, also various gunboats and naval craft, would be indispensable. Aside from the original cost of vessels and army equipment, the subsequent maintenance of such units would hardly be less than \$25,000,000 annually. Other millions would be required to support diplomatic and consular officers throughout the world, upon which service, given the natural love of Filipinos for ostentation, large sums would inevitably be wasted.

By the Treaty of Paris, the United States paid Spain \$20,000,000 to satisfy an indebtedness charged against the Philippines, and acquired from Spain, as part compensation for war expenses, her public holdings in the islands—agricultural, forest, and mineral. Even should these former Crown Lands, to which Filipinos at no time held title, be donated to them along with independence, a refund of the cash outlay of \$20,000,000 would seem in order. Added to this obligation are \$75,000,000 in bonds, sold to American investors, for the payment of which the United States is morally if not legally responsible. The interest and funding charges on this indebtedness amount to some \$6,000,000 annually, being a further drain on Philippine resources. It is interesting to note that in October, 1923, when Filipino politicians were assailing General Wood and demanding his recall, the provinces

and municipalities of the islands requested authority of the Chief Executive to issue further bonds in the sum of \$27,500,000 all of which, if authorized, were to be floated in the United States. This at a time, too, when these same provinces and municipalities, through petitions formulated by political leaders, were urging independence and clamouring that payment of a minimum land tax be postponed without penalty.

During the brief period under Harrison when Filipinos controlled insular finances, Philippine currency became 72 per cent. fiat and was restored to its former parity with gold only through large bond issues in the States. This occurred under American sovereignty. What would happen to an independent Philippines, limited in revenues, pressed for funds, inexperienced in finance, and without borrowing capacity, can be readily imagined. The Philippine "peso" would shortly join the German mark and the Russian rouble, with like consequences to island credit and foreign commercial relations.

Less than 45,000 Chinese in the Philippines to-day own, control, and operate three substantial banks; while a lesser number of Japanese are served by a branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank in Manila. In the whole of the archipelago, however, with its 11,000,000 population, there is not a single bank established with Filipino capital or controlled by Filipinos. Commenting upon this fact *La Vanguardia*, a leading Filipino newspaper, stated in its issue of January 8, 1923:

In our economic life there are frequent cases where a great difference of opinion arises. We have, for instance, the case of the banks. It is said that all kinds of stimulus be given private Filipino capital so that it will establish its own banks. We are hoping for the day to come when we ourselves will be able to organize our economic life. But such a

stage of economics is a product of long and extended evolution. We cannot expect a country like ours, whose agriculture is not totally organized, to establish banks to foster Philippine trade. The Philippine Government should take the initiative until a certain point to develop our resources.

Prudence would counsel that an equal or longer evolution be awaited before undertaking to organize and operate the more complicated finances of government. The experience of the Philippine National Bank, administered by Filipinos, possibly explains why a private bank under like control and management would not be patronized. However reckless Filipinos may be with public moneys, they indulge no risks with personal funds, whether deposited in a bank or invested in private business. In all such cases they seek honest and efficient management, and make no quibble about the nationality of those giving them the service.

The lack of initiative by Filipinos as to banking extends to practically every other industry of the islands. Their investment in mining is but 1 per cent. of the total, in foreign shipping 3 per cent., foreign trade 4 per cent., embroidery 5 per cent., vegetable oil mills 12 per cent., cigar and cigarette manufacture 14 per cent., rope making 19 per cent., sawmills 25 per cent., coastwise shipping 41 per cent., sugar centrals 50 per cent. As to sugar centrals, these were constructed almost entirely with funds secured from the Philippine National Bank, which stands to lose approximately fifteen million pesos through the operation. In 1920 there were 83,145 foreigners in the Philippines. Representing less than one per cent. of the population they rendered 5,852 income-tax returns, whereas Filipinos, representing the remaining 99 per cent. rendered but 3,667 returns.

It is a characteristic of most educated Filipinos to prefer the spotlight of politics and the learned professions to the more prosaic paths of commerce and industry. Unfortunately, therefore, the increase in general education afforded by American sovereignty has produced a much larger crop of politicians and agitators than it has of forward-looking business men. For those who care to deal in realities rather than indulge fanciful dreams, some idea of conditions may be found in the fact that the annual revenues of the Island of Formosa (Japan), with population of 3,500,000, are \$50,000,000, whereas the Philippines, with population of 11,000,000, yield but \$32,000,000 annually.

With independence and application of the "most favoured nation" clause of our treaties, the present free trade between the United States and the Philippines would cease. Just what this would mean in dollars and cents and in its effect upon the producing masses of the islands, is not generally realized.

Philippine products now entering our markets enjoy a preference over like imports from foreign countries as follows: Sugar, except Cuban, \$50 a ton, and as to the latter \$40 a ton; coconut oil \$44.80 a ton; tobacco \$2.10 a pound; cigars and cigarettes \$4.50 a pound plus 25 per cent. *ad valorem*; mats 35 to 40 per cent.; embroideries 75 per cent.; rattan furniture 60 per cent.; hats 35 to 60 per cent., and woods 25 per cent. *ad valorem*. Excepting hemp, which pays no duty, these comprise the principal exports of the Philippines.

As heretofore noted, the granting of free trade to the islands in 1909 doubled their trade with the United States within a year; while by 1923 such trade amounted to \$132,387,472 as against \$14,847,918 when regular tariff

rates applied. In 1923 the United States supplied 60 per cent. of Philippine imports and took 67 per cent. of her exports, these latter including the great bulk of staple products listed above. All such products are produced by and could be imported into the United States from other tropical countries should the Philippines be unable to meet the resulting competition when called upon to pay duty.

It is estimated that the advantage accruing to Philippine producers of sugar, coconut oil, tobacco, embroideries, etc., through free trade with the United States, now amounts to \$40,000,000 annually. Deprived of this saving or leeway over foreign competitors, it is self-evident that this \$40,000,000 would have to be taken up in production costs, involving a radical reduction in the wage rate of Filipino labourers. In consequence of American occupation, wages are double and treble those paid in Spanish times and the scale of living and normal requirements of Filipinos are now far higher than in other Oriental countries. This fact, coupled with their natural proclivities, would render it difficult if not impossible for Filipinos to meet on even terms the cheap labour of China, Japan, Java, and other countries whose products would come into competition with those of the Philippines. It is certain that tobacco exports to the States would altogether cease, while the making of hats and embroidery, now furnishing lucrative employment to thousands, would be largely paralysed. It is also doubtful that Philippine sugar, with all its potential promise, could survive a handicap of \$50 a ton upon existing costs. The same is true, in lesser degree, of coconut oil, now a leading export, which would encounter difficult sledding.

Strenuous protests were filed by Filipinos when tobacco



interests in the States recently sought to have Congress restrict the importation of Philippine tobacco and cigars, and like protests went forward when effort was being made to secure a further preference for Cuban sugar and to reduce the tariff on cordage. They strain at the gnat and lustily cry for the camel.

With the principal industries of the islands paralysed or sorely stricken through denial of our markets, and the masses of the people reverting to the poverty and misery of Spanish days, the reaction upon public revenues would be immediate and disastrous. After paying from its depleted store the salaries of multiplied public officials and employees, defraying the cost of a Philippine army and navy, supplying the needs of a Foreign Service, maintaining a currency reserve fund, paying interest on its bonds and providing for their redemption, and meeting other "incidental" appropriations, individual and public, it requires no gift of prophecy to foretell that a Philippine Republic would have little or no surplus available for education, sanitation, public works, and "general uplift" of the people. It is altogether certain that the importation of English-speaking teachers would cease, and this avenue of intellectual escape to the masses from the prison house of existing local dialects would be permanently closed. As indicating even a present trend, a bill was offered in October, 1923, by Gregorio Perfecto, Representative from Manila, requiring that "Tagalog" should be taught in both public and private schools and its use authorized in public documents and in the various government departments and offices. The inevitable effect of such a proposition was to incite sectional antagonism, ever near the surface in the islands, with a natural query from Visayans, Ilocanos, Bicolos, Pampangans, etc.,

as to why Tagalog should be thus favoured over their particular dialects.

Thus far we have dealt only with the financial and economic difficulties which an independent Philippines would encounter, having assumed that otherwise there would be nothing to interfere with the orderly course of government. Disastrous, however, as the lack of economic preparedness and training must prove, the islands and their people would face other dangers fraught with even greater menace to their security and happiness.

Aside from inevitable clashes between rival leaders and factions, inspired alike by regional jealousies and thwarted political ambitions, there would remain the following specific problems and sources of disorder which a Philippine Republic would be helpless to solve or counteract, *i. e.*, the question of the Moros and other "non-Christian" peoples of the archipelago; the competition of Chinese, Japanese, and other Orientals, who would shortly inundate the country; the commercial and eventual political control which Japan would unquestionably seek to exercise over the islands, and the crisis this latter would perforce precipitate in Far Eastern affairs.

Referring to the wild tribes inhabiting Luzon, Hon. J. M. Dickinson, Secretary of War, after a tour of the Philippines in 1910, reported to the President as follows:

These people have absolutely no conception of government except that of force, to which, if justly administered, they cheerfully submit. It is doubtful if any kind of training will make them capable, as a mass, of intelligently participating in the administration of self-government. Certainly no such transformation can be expected, under the most favourable conditions, within a century.

In the same report, referring to the Moros of Mindanao, he said:

The Moros are Mohammedans, and are firmly fixed in their religious belief. They are warlike, manly, independent, and have a strong hostility for the Filipinos. They have no conception of a republican form of government. The only government which they know is autocratic. They are peaceful now because they have been subjected to military power and are controlled with firmness and justice, which they appreciate. The main province of our army among the Moros is merely to keep the peace among them. They would have to be essentially re-created to make of them an integral part of a republican government uniting them with the Filipinos. If Filipino independence is to be postponed until such a condition can be brought about, then its realization is so remote as to make it not worth while now being contemplated.

Outbreaks in Moro territory have recently become acute and will continue and spread so long as Christian Filipinos are maintained in authority there. At this time the Philippine Government imposes its will upon this Mohammedan element through an insular constabulary of 6,000 men, a body of Philippine scouts of 5,000 men (supported by the United States), and also a considerable force of American troops should occasion require. The anomalous situation now exists, of the United States lending its offices to kill and destroy these unarmed Moros, favourable to American sovereignty, because they resent the control and maladministration of Filipino officials saddled upon them by the Harrison administration.

Spain, with all her power and resources, failed during more than three centuries to bring the Moros into subjection, while her supervision over the pagan tribes of Luzon and other islands was limited and precarious. Should these peoples, by any fatality, be delivered into the care and keeping of a Philippine Republic, the shrift of Christian Filipinos among them would be swift and tragic. With arms smuggled from Borneo, the Celebes, and other adjacent islands, the Moros would early dominate the great

southern islands of the archipelago, and could be precluded only through foreign intervention from renewing their old-time raids on Filipino coastal towns to the north. Both as a fighter and sea rover the Moro is in a class by himself and is feared and dreaded by his more docile Christian neighbours.

Filipino spokesmen now urge the right of "self-determination." Should independence be granted, what would be their attitude toward the Moros, who not only claim to be but are a distinct people and want none of them, when they asserted the same doctrine? Whatever the answer, the result would be the same, as the Moros would very soon take matters into their own hands. Realizing this inevitable happening, coupled with the expressed desire and willingness of the Moros to continue under American sovereignty, suggestion has been made that in any grant of independence to the Philippines, the United States retain Mindanao, Sulu, and adjacent islands. The objection of a prominent Filipino to this plan is instructive, his argument being that while such arrangement would doubtless be in the interest of the Moros, it would hardly be fair to the Government (Republic) instituted for the northern islands, inasmuch as every Christian Filipino who possibly could would then move to Mindanao in order to have the protection and advantages of American rule.

As to the Igorots, Ifugaos, Kalingas, and other pagan peoples of the islands, their experience with Christian Filipinos has been largely one of petty imposition and exploitation and no love is lost between them. With American authority eliminated, with the scant government revenues diverted to other needs, and without sufficient force to insure effective control, these wild tribes would

early revert to their accustomed head-hunting, primitive ways, and the splendid beginning made to improve and better their condition would be obliterated.

There are to-day some 45,000 Chinese in the Philippines, as against 11,000,000 Filipinos. Comprising but one half of one per cent. of the population, these Chinese, nevertheless, do approximately eighty-five per cent. of the interior merchandising of the archipelago. There is not a hamlet or barrio, however small or remote, which the Chinese trader has not penetrated. He lives with the natives, intermarries with them, sells them their supplies, and buys their products. These local traders are, in turn, the agents and representatives of Chinese firms in Manila, Cebu, Iloilo, and other of the larger centres, where the products are centred. In diligence, in thrift, and in business ability, the Filipino is comparatively helpless in competition with them.

During Spanish times, resentment against the dominance of Chinese in business found vent in frequent massacres and expulsions, which operated as a check upon their numbers and influence. With American occupation, the Chinese Exclusion Act applicable to the States was extended to the islands and Filipino labour and industry protected from further competition and absorption from this source. As a Philippine Government could not resort to massacre, and would hardly undertake the impossible task of enforcing exclusion against fellow Orientals, themselves citizens of a powerful "Sister Republic," the flood gates would be opened and the tide resistless. If 45,000 Chinese now do eighty-five per cent. of the merchandising business of the islands, multiply this by ten, twenty, or more, and extend the competition to include Filipino labourers as well as traders, and you have

the answer. Some indication of the effect upon existing wage rates and standards of living can be inferred from a report of José Paez, acting president of the National Coal Company, heretofore mentioned, where he says:

Chinese labourers in Borneo are contracted for at thirty centavos per day, without subsistence. They are experienced miners and such prices enable certain Borneo mining companies to produce coal at a very low cost in spite of otherwise unfavourable conditions. In the interior of China, in the region where the Pekin syndicate is operating, miners get less than ten centavos per day. Contrast this with Philippine conditions where inexperienced miners are demanding and obtaining two pesos per day.

Filipinos themselves, when not obsessed with their political ideals, fully realize their inability to cope successfully with Chinese in business, and that a removal of existing barriers would precipitate a losing economic struggle. During the visit of Hon. J. M. Dickinson, Secretary of War, to the Philippines in 1910, a joint petition was presented to him by the Nacionalista and Progresista parties, then dominant, which included the following:

Even though we are assured that Congress in its wise enactments will not alter the prudent policy established relative to Chinese exclusion, we believe, nevertheless, that we should enter here the unanimous feeling of the country in favour of this policy.

An "Agricultural Congress" is held annually in Manila by Filipino plantation owners. For years they have recommended "restricted" Chinese immigration to meet the existing labour shortage, to promote the interests of agriculture, and to hasten the economic development of the islands. Notwithstanding that these planters ask admission of but a limited number of Chinese, to be employed in agriculture only and to leave the islands upon

expiration of their contracts, Filipino labour has raised such a storm of protest in every instance that the local legislature has never dared act on the recommendation. Current feeling on the subject is expressed by *La Nación*, a Filipino daily strong for independence, which refers in its issue of July 11, 1923, to the present "alarming yellow invasion of the islands," and urges that existing laws excluding Chinese be made even more rigorous. This finds echo in *La Vanguardia*, another Filipino daily, which states under date of July 9, 1923, that Chinese and Japanese already control local trade in every part of the Philippines.

Possibly the most illuminating recognition of this inability to meet the Chinese on even terms is found in the now famous "Book-Keeping Law," passed by the Philippine Legislature and approved by Governor-General Harrison in February, 1921. This law, effective November 1, 1921, provides:

Art. 1. It will be illegal for any person, company, firm, or corporation engaged in business, industry, or other activity for purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing laws, to keep their books of account in a language other than English, Spanish, or any native dialect.

Art. 2. Any violator of the provisions of this law will be punished upon conviction by fine of not exceeding ten thousand pesos, or imprisonment not to exceed two years, or both.

This was admittedly directed at Chinese traders who operate some fifteen thousand establishments throughout the islands. As few of them read and write other than their own language, compliance with the law meant employing bookkeepers who could convert Chinese into English, Spanish, or some one of the fifty-odd dialects whose use is sanctioned. Not only is there no such

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number of bilingual bookkeepers available, but the cost would be prohibitive in most cases. The excuse offered was that such law would facilitate the collection of revenue, something largely disproved by failure to except the varied assortment of local dialects, and the fact that the same end could be served through employment of a few examiners by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. No such legislation is found in the Dutch Indies, the Straits Settlements, Indo-China, and other countries where Chinese are far more numerous than in the Philippines. Enforcement of the law was protested by practically every business concern in the islands other than Filipino, by Chambers of Commerce throughout China and by many in the States, and the action generally branded as unjust, unnecessary, and wholly unprecedented. Official protest was filed with the Secretary of State, Washington, by the Chinese Minister, who urged that the action of the Philippine Legislature be repudiated. General Wood, upon becoming Governor-General, prevailed upon the local lawmakers to suspend operation of the Act for one year, hoping it would then be repealed. Upon expiration of this term, however, the Legislature refused a further extension or repeal, this course being backed by native periodicals on the plea that "any other action would cast doubt upon the ability of our legislators." Steps were thereupon taken to enforce the law and the question of its legality is now before the Courts. If held valid and strictly enforced it will ruin or drive out of business the great bulk of Chinese traders and shopkeepers in the islands and largely paralyze local industry.

Remembering that a comparatively small handful of Filipinos, standing alone, could not enforce exclusion or discriminatory legislation against over four hundred mil-



lions of Chinese at their very threshold, the handwriting on the wall becomes plain for those who care to read.

To Japan, an independent Philippines, with its inexperienced, easy-going, volatile peoples, would present few obstacles to the working out of whatever plans or designs she might formulate. Adepts in trade and politics, industrious, virile, persistent beyond all measure, and willing to await patiently the long future to effectuate their purposes, the Japanese would find the Philippines a fruitful field for expansion and exploitation.

What is the situation? Smaller in area than California, with less than seventeen per cent. of her land arable, Japan has a population of 57,000,000. She is lacking in essential minerals, particularly iron ore and oil, while her coal deposits already barely suffice for local needs. Her nationals are denied access to the United States, Canada, and Australia, where they would naturally gravitate because of high wages and the immediate opportunity of bettering their condition. Korea which she has annexed, and Manchuria which she largely controls, offer comparatively little outlet for her steadily mounting population. With every advantage resulting from government preference, Japanese cannot successfully compete with Chinese and Koreans in business economy and standards of living, and their efforts to colonize such territory have been virtually abandoned. Occupying much the geographical position of England, conditions have forced Japan to become a manufacturing nation and to import the bulk of her raw materials. She lacks, however, the far-flung colonies which have assured England a constant supply of food and other products and have absorbed millions of British emigrants.

What possibilities do the Philippines offer to supply

Japan's imperative needs in this regard, once the road is opened through American withdrawal? Among the manifold attractions and advantages of the islands, the following are outstanding:

A scant population, lacking in industry and business organization, who would offer little serious competition to Japanese workers; millions of acres of fallow and now unproductive lands whose development to sugar, rubber, hemp, coconuts, tobacco, rice, and other staple products, would afford employment and investment opportunity to multiplied thousands of Japanese and yield a golden harvest; immense areas of magnificent forests offering an abundant source of supply to the world's fast-diminishing store of hardwoods; practically unlimited deposits of iron ore, there being estimated reserves in Surigao alone of more than 500,000,000 tons, with 12,000,000 tons in the Camarines and still other millions in Bulacan; apparently exhaustless reservoirs of coal in Mindanao, Cebu, Batan, Polillo, Mindoro, and Masbate, including a superior grade of anthracite, with every indication of petroleum deposits in Tayabas, Leyte, Cebu, and Mindanao; copper mines of proved richness in Lepanto, awaiting only transportation to make them a bonanza; gold, asbestos, and bituminous rock, all of which are now being profitably mined; waters abounding in fish, shell, and other sea products, affording a source of food supply and business opportunity as yet scarcely touched. In every way the islands are a veritable treasure house, lacking only the magic wand of capital and willing labour to open their portals and realize their dormant riches.

Even without independence, it is doubtful if Filipino legislators, under the guise of "preserving the patrimony of the people," will be permitted indefinitely to block

development of these tremendous latent resources and perpetuate the paucity of insular revenues. The talent of natural wealth bestowed so bountifully by Providence upon the Philippines cannot remain forever locked from world needs and world demands. To-day the material progress of the archipelago is practically at a standstill, paralysed at its source through adverse legislation, constant agitation for independence, and the utter failure or incapacity of Filipinos themselves to undertake any worthwhile economic development. Teodoro M. Kalaw, Chief Executive of the Philippine Independence Propaganda Bureau, has estimated that without outside labour it will require at least ninety-three years for Filipinos to till the now unoccupied and arable lands of the islands.

There is one avenue and one only through which this natural wealth of the Philippines can be realized under conditions which will insure the prosperity, happiness, and well-being of the Filipino race, and that is through assurance of permanent American sovereignty and protection, and a willing and whole-hearted coöperation by Filipinos in a constructive, forward-looking programme. The United States has given them a square deal in the past and can be counted upon to do so in the future, a fact worthy of reflection by those having the interests of the Philippine people at heart. It is idle to believe that either their welfare or material progress would be seriously consulted, much less be a paramount consideration, in the welter of competing and conflicting interests, individual and national, which withdrawal of American authority would invite.

Equally idle is it for Filipino politicians to assert that Japan would not immediately avail herself of the opportunity to exploit the islands in the interests of her govern-

ment and people. There is every reason why she should take advantage of the situation, none why she should not. Here again, as in the case of a threatened influx of Chinese, the actual attitude of Filipinos belies the optimism of their political pretensions. Early in 1920 certain Japanese capitalists purchased a 13,000-acre estate adjacent to Manila, occupied by several thousand Filipinos. The turmoil was terrific, some three thousand of the tenants, headed by the Governor of the province, walking en masse to Manila (fifteen miles) to enter protest with Governor Harrison against the sale. Their protest read in part as follows:

Knowing as we do through the American Press the practices in Korea, Formosa, and other places in the archipelago, together with concrete evidences which we have recently seen and experienced, and the absolute disregard of the law of contract, we simply cannot live peacefully with them [Japanese] side by side, nor would we care to work under them.

This particular difficulty was solved through a repurchase of the property from the Japanese, at a considerable advance in price, by a combination of Filipino capital. The antipathies and antagonisms which Japanese presence aroused, however, with its seed of inevitable strife and discord, were altogether apparent. When multiplied, as would be the case, by like instances throughout the length and breadth of the islands, it is clear that ample excuse would be furnished to justify Japanese intervention, first military, then political, "to protect and safeguard the rights of her nationals."

In a preceding chapter reference was made to the large migration of Japanese to Davao, on the island of Mindanao, in 1917 and 1918, to engage in hemp growing. Commenting on the fact, a local Filipino newspaper,

after reciting that Filipinos took no advantage whatsoever of the investment opportunities offered in Mindanao, said:

In other terms, while we fill our mouths with words, patriotically declaiming against the Japanization of this great island, we do absolutely nothing to overcome it. We need not be surprised, therefore, if, before we realize it, we will see the greater part of Mindanao entirely controlled by Japanese. Then all our protests and all our patriotic fulminations will be completely sterile.

The situation was met, not by organized Filipino competition, but by the simpler method of amending the Public Land Act of the Philippines in such manner that Japanese could no longer purchase or lease public lands in the islands. This law still applies, but its obsequies would be coincident with the ending of American sovereignty.

To-day a fleet of sixty-five sampans, brought from Japan, manned by three hundred Japanese fishermen, make their daily catch of fish in Manila Bay with few if any Filipino boats on the horizon. It is the old story of competent organization versus the *laissez-faire* attitude of most Filipinos in industrial affairs.

Filipino spokesmen argue that Japanese do not thrive in the tropics and would not go to the Philippines. This is belied by the tens of thousands of Japanese in Mexico, Central America, and the various tropical islands under Japanese sovereignty or mandate. The Hawaiian Islands are tropical, and yet 110,000 Japanese reside there, comprising 43 per cent. of the population. If Japanese have not yet invaded the Philippines in numbers, it is not due to climate but rather to the fear that such proceeding would unmask her self-interest in desiring American withdrawal from the islands, and thus delay or prevent the granting of independence. Moreover, the direct returns

to Japan from exploitation of Philippine resources, great though they might be, would be but a small part of the advantages which would accrue to her. Far greater would be the strangle-hold over the trade and politics of Eastern Asia which the possession or control of Philippine commercial and naval bases would give her.

Given the altogether remarkable progress of Japan since 1868, and the enviable place she now holds as a military and industrial power, it is perhaps natural that Filipinos should claim kinship with the Japanese and attribute to themselves like qualities and possibilities. It is a view that Japanese have encouraged either from politeness or for other reasons, the two peoples being, in truth, utterly dissimilar in characteristics. During a meeting of the Far Eastern Bar Association at Manila in 1923, one of the Japanese delegates, addressing an audience largely Filipino, stated that Filipinos and Japanese were of the same stock, the only difference between them being that the Filipinos spoke Spanish or Tagalog while the Japanese spoke Japanese. He referred to the common sentiments and common ideals of the two peoples, and ended by hoping that independence would soon come to the Filipinos.

In neither heredity, religion, environment, social usages, governmental training, climatic influence, or historical background is there any common meeting point between the Japanese, of Mongol origin, and the Malayan-Filipino with his superimposed Latin influence and training. The achievements of 65,000,000 Japanese, homogeneous in language and ideals, frenzied in devotion to their Emperor, laborious, painstaking, deadly earnest and relentless in what they undertake, yet willing to accept instruction from foreign experts, afford little upon which 11,000,000

Filipinos, lacking all such elements, can hope to predicate a like success. Whatever courtesies may be exchanged between upper-class representatives of the two races, therefore, the fact remains that their people as a whole are inherently different and antagonistic, and could never intermix on terms of equality or lasting amity. Unlike the Chinese, the Japanese, when emigrating, bring their women with them and seldom intermarry with outsiders. Prolific and clannish, they would soon rear their own social and religious structure within the islands and devote their every energy to advancing the interests of the Empire.

While Japan disclaims any purpose or desire to exercise either a political or commercial influence over the Philippines should America withdraw (which disclaimers are avidly accepted by Filipinos at their face value), there is, nevertheless, a constantly recurring Japanese "hope" that independence "will soon be granted," various of their newspapers being vitriolic in denouncing "American deception" toward the Filipinos. One of such papers, the *Yorodzu* of Tokio, recently expressed itself thus:

The poor Filipinos have become the slaves of the Americans after being freed from the tyrannical rule of Spain. America has been in possession of the Philippines for the past twenty-five years in spite of her fine professions and her advocacy of peace and justice, and has failed to act up to the promise she gave the Filipinos to grant them independence. America's deceptive policy toward the Filipinos exposes her to the censure of the world's public opinion, and we cannot help feeling a profound sympathy with the Filipinos who express high indignation and great resentment at the American attitude.

Contrasting America's treatment of Filipinos, and the political privileges granted them, with Japanese methods

in Korea, Formosa, and other territory brought under her jurisdiction, this "profound sympathy" would seem to be wasted.

The Batanes or northernmost islands of the Philippines are almost within hailing distance of the Japanese island of Formosa. The commercial penetration of an independent Philippines by Japan would offer no difficulties, while the every need of her government and people would render such exploitation inevitable. The extension of her political influence would be equally desirable, enabling her, as it would, to dominate the entire coast of Asia from the Amur to Singapore, and placing every strategic military and naval base in the Far East within her control or at her mercy. It is entirely natural, therefore, that Japan should be eager to have the United States withdraw across the Pacific. Not only would it open the way for this attempt at commercial and political control over the Philippines, with the consolidation of her preëminence in the Pacific area as the prize of success, but it would materially reduce American competition with Japan in Oriental markets, and remove from the scene a power which, more than any other, has proved a stumbling block to Japanese political ambitions in eastern Asia.

Independence advocates argue that one nation can no longer grab the territory of another with impunity. Possibly so, nor would any such brutal methods be employed. An impecunious Philippines, however, seeking foreign loans, would most certainly turn to Japan as the only possible source of supply, pledging as security her customs and other revenues. The consequences of default are obvious. Again, when her hot-headed people, exasperated by Japanese competition and the probably domineering attitude of Japanese colonists, ran amuck and killed a



few of the latter and destroyed their property, a perfect basis for military intervention would arise.

Mr. Manuel Quezón, speaking before the Senate and House Committees on Insular Affairs in 1919, stated:

The fear that many people have that Japan would grab the Philippine Islands is baseless. In the first place, if you grant the Philippines their independence now, for Japan to go and attack the islands would be a challenge to the United States itself. You don't have to stand sponsor for Philippine independence, the world would know and the Japanese people would know that you would resent their attacking the Philippines after their independence had been granted by the United States.

Unfortunately, mere "resentment" would not stay the course of events, and there is nothing more certain than that the American people would not go to war with Japan to save a Philippine Republic from the fruits of its own folly. Having withdrawn its sovereignty upon the insistent demands of the Philippine people, the United States would be in no position, nor would there be any obligation, to assume further responsibility. Mr. Quezón, however, expresses a prevalent delusion of his countrymen that somehow or in some way the United States would continue to protect them whatever their transgressions or however much "like hell" they ran their government.

Having invited their fate, it might be said that it was up to the Filipinos to make the best of it. This view would have much to excuse it if the demand for independence was, in fact, unanimous and the consequences were limited to the Philippine people. The problem, however, is not so simple. Great Britain, France, Holland, and the peoples of Australia and New Zealand would hardly share the quiescent attitude of Americans as to what happened in the Philippines once we were quit of

them. The territories and possessions of all such countries would be vitally menaced by Japanese dominance of Philippine resources and strategic bases, and they would most assuredly seek to forestall such consummation. The situation was summed up by a somewhat cynical British naval officer in Hong Kong, who remarked that if the United States gave up the Philippines, "the Japanese will be in there by tea-time," to which he added, "The British, however, will be in there at tiffin-time."

So long as American sovereignty continues in the Philippines there is little or no possibility that Japan would risk a war with the United States to secure control of the islands, particularly when any such attempt would also be opposed by the Powers above mentioned. The inevitable disaster to her economic and political structure from such a struggle would be too high a price to pay for any possible benefits which might accrue. With the United States eliminated, however, and the Philippine people thrown upon their own resources, this protection and this security would altogether vanish.

It has been argued that this international development might be avoided through "neutralization" of the Philippines, that is, having the various Powers concerned guarantee their independence. This furnishes no sufficient solution of the difficulty. You cannot neutralize a hornet's nest, and when the personal and property rights of foreigners were molested or attacked intervention by the Powers affected would become imperative and justifiable.

The "Peace of the Pacific," assured in large measure by the Washington Conference, finds its only cloud to-day in the political incompetence of China. Should the United States withdraw its interests and influence from the scene, not only would this China cloud darken and spread,

but through adding an incompetent Philippines to the equation, the responsibility of Americans for the consequent turmoil and conflict would be direct and positive. Ceasing to be an "insular possession" of the United States, and no longer shielded by the protecting wall of the Four Power Treaty, the Philippines would become an apple of discord and set up reactions which would menace not only the peace of the Orient but of the world. The dangers of the situation, and the vital rôle the Philippines play in shaping the commercial and political future of Eastern Asia, were recently stated as follows by William Howard Gardiner, an acknowledged expert on naval and political problems affecting the Far East:

It is perhaps not generally realized that, during the last fifty years, the Japanese have completed their hold over all of the insular barrier to Eastern Asia from Kamchatka to Formosa, and that the full scope of their present "Maritime Plan" contemplates the progressive extension of Japanese control along this insular barrier down to its southern terminal in the Antipodes and around into the Indian Ocean.

A glance at the map should suffice to show that the retention of the Philippines by the United States is the present outstanding obstacle to the Japanese extending progressively their control along the insular barrier. But if Filipino politicians were free merely to grant to the Japanese a certain naval-base site in the southern Philippines—as there is reason to believe some would be glad to do—then the remainder of the task ahead of the Japanese would be easy in comparison with present difficulties. And this for the simple yet all-important reason that the United States, should we so desire, could focus adequate force to stop the Japanese at the Philippines; whereas the British, for politico-naval reasons that are too complex to be outlined here, could not focus adequate force at Singapore to stop the Japanese there if the latter were based on the Philippines and had a secure line of support to such a base.

The conclusion from the situation is that, in deciding on the future of the Philippines, we are likely to be deciding on the future of the Netherlands East Indies, and of Australasia—to say nothing of the future of India, of Malaya, of China, and of all for which our civilization may stand in the Orient.

In short, the American, the British, and the Dutch circles concerned

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with matters of international grand strategy in the Far East recognize explicitly that the guard the United States mounts at the Philippines is essential to the security of Australasia and to whatever measure of peace may be maintained "east of Suez."

On the other hand, it is recognized in such circles as beyond question that, if the Japanese could merely secure an appropriate naval-base site in an "Independent Republic of the Philippines," they would be able to isolate Eastern Asia from commercial or political or military relations with or support from either Europe or America.

Consequently, the Japanese could set aside that vast region as their own economic preserve, without the trouble of having to police it, by securing merely control over the sea lines of communication to it, in accordance with only a partial development of the more extensive Maritime Plan that the naval Satsuma clan is known to be urging; and by so doing they would reap the bulk of the benefits while avoiding all the turmoil and costs necessarily incident to the Territorialist plan of the army Chosu clan for the progressive conquest of Eastern Asia.

From this it should be obvious why, on the one hand, the Japanese are not pushing forward into continental Asia as extensively as they might while, on the other hand, they are doing everything in their power, indirectly, to bring about Philippine independence.

Students of Far Eastern affairs have unanimously recognized and repeatedly heralded this consequence of casting the Philippines adrift, but politicians (both in Manila and Washington), brave in the valour of ignorance, blithely assume that nothing further is involved than the creation and christening of an infant "Philippine Republic."

To-day there are less than six hundred Americans in the Philippine government service, most of whom are in the Bureau of Education and the Police Department. Filipinos now have complete local autonomy, and so far as the rights of "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness" are concerned, are as *independent* as any inhabitant of the United States, citizen or otherwise. A withdrawal of American sovereignty would simply mean a slight increase in political power, to be appropriated and exploited by

an insignificant element of the population. If the price to be paid by the Filipino masses for this doubtful additional privilege remotely approximates that outlined herein, then those who question the wisdom of such a step and urge against it are the real friends and protectors of the Philippine people.

## CHAPTER XII

### INDEPENDENCE PROPAGANDA

OF THE hundred and ten million inhabitants of the United States, only a small fraction have visited the Philippines or have personal knowledge of the islands and their people. Whatever information they have in the matter, or whatever judgment they form, must necessarily be based upon the printed word or upon the testimony of those who speak from actual experience. Upon this evidence, incomplete though it be, and dealing with a situation entirely outside their ken, our people must decide whether the Philippines are to remain territory of the United States, subject to its protection and guidance, or be delivered over to Filipino rule. Not only this, should their decision favour political independence of the islands, the verdict will be final and conclusive, with no opportunity for new trial or appeal.

Something Filipinos seldom if ever face, and few Americans realize, is that there can be no halfway arrangement. Either United States sovereignty must continue in the archipelago, with reserved powers sufficient to insure an orderly and progressive government, or the withdrawal must be complete and absolute. For the United States to assume responsibility without authority, or for Filipinos to expect it of us, is sublimated folly. Situated as are the Philippines, "authority" and "sovereignty" cannot be divorced, and once the United States deliberately destroys the union it will be estopped alike

from turning back or from asserting rights not shared in equal measure by other nations.

The issue involves the welfare and future destiny of eleven millions of people and their descendants, and merits a deliberate judgment upon the best evidence obtainable. Particularly is this true considering that the United States is a voluntary trustee of the rights and interests of the islanders as a whole, and cannot in decency cast them off, either because of their own clamour or from selfish motives, until the trust is discharged.

President Coolidge, in a recent communication addressed to Manuel Roxas, Speaker of the Philippine House, stated:

I should be less than candid with you if I did not say that in my judgment the strongest argument that has been used in the United States in support of immediate independence of the Philippines is not the argument that it would benefit the Filipinos, but that it would be of advantage to the United States.

Feeling as I do, and as I am convinced the great majority of Americans do regarding our obligations to the Filipino people, I have to say that I regard such arguments as unworthy. The American people will not evade or repudiate the responsibility they have assumed in this matter.

The American Government is convinced that it has the overwhelming support of the American nation in its conviction that present independence would be a misfortune and might easily become a disaster to the Filipino people. Upon that conviction the policy of this Government is based.

Flattering as it is to be told that the American people will not evade or repudiate their Philippine obligations, the fact remains that a considerable element among them is prepared now, and has been since the beginning, to do that very thing. When the President's letter was written, four separate bills were pending in Congress to grant the Filipinos immediate and absolute independence, while the "American Civil Liberties Union," and numerous

other entities and celebrities, were "resolving" that Philippine independence be declared "as soon as the civil and military representatives of the United States can be withdrawn."

Bryan's slogan of "Imperialism" in 1900, as also the labours and expenditures of the Anti-Imperialist League of Boston and thereabouts, had as their basis the alleged "welfare of the United States," all such persons pretending to see in this forward movement of our country across the Pacific some sort of menace to the government builded by the fathers. It was and is the same old cry which has gone up since the boundaries of the original Thirteen States were first pushed westward. The purchase of Florida and Louisiana, the annexation of Texas, the gradual extension of our frontier to the Pacific, and then on to Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands, all gave rise to these prophets of gloom, who revelled in pictures of national disaster following each addition to our domain. That all now laugh at the folly of these "little Americans" deters not a whit this new crop of pessimists, who launch as new gospel all the time-worn arguments of their discredited predecessors.

Any claims advanced that the "welfare of the Filipinos" would be served by this scuttle policy were intended largely to salve the conscience of an uneasy and doubtful public. Few or none of those who agitated the loudest against Philippine occupation incurred the trouble or expense of visiting the islands to secure first-hand information. Their ideas were purely theoretical, founded upon premises utterly at variance with actual conditions. The fact that we had destroyed and supplanted Spanish sovereignty, and had become obligated by a treaty, duly ratified, to establish and preserve law and order in the



islands, bothered them not at all. With equal complaisance they ignored the findings of Messrs. Schurman, Denby, Worcester, Dewey, and Otis, who, after an exhaustive personal investigation, had unanimously reported:

Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the Commission believe that the Government of the Philippines would speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, the intervention of other Powers and the eventual division of the islands among them. Only through American occupation, therefore, is the idea of a free self-governing Philippine commonwealth at all conceivable.

None but the fanatical or ignorant now pretend it would have been other than tragical for the United States to have abandoned the Filipinos to their fate in 1898. How then explain the reasoning or motives of those who, in the years between—with but little change in material conditions—have nevertheless persistently continued to champion Philippine independence and to urge withdrawal of American authority? The answers are various.

Supposed “political exigencies” caused the outs in 1900 to pronounce in favour of turning the islands back to the natives. This “plank” was accepted as gospel at the time by the rank and file of the party, many of whom have not yet discovered that our Philippine problem affects us as Americans and not as Democrats or Republicans. A considerable element also harbours the idea that similar action is possible and desirable in the Philippines as was taken respecting Cuba. Recently an American Congressman, addressing a gathering of Filipinos in Manila, stated that should the latter misbehave themselves after independence was granted, then “Mother would have to come out and spank them occasionally as we did Cuba.” The fact never percolated his mind that the

Monroe Doctrine does not extend to Asia, and that once the Philippines are cut loose and our Army and Navy withdrawn, this "spanking privilege" will not be our exclusive function.

Then again, there is a considerable element in Congress, particularly from the Southern States, which frankly avows its desire to get rid of the Philippines "because we have enough coloured people at home." Congressman Jones of Virginia, who wrote into a preamble to the Organic Act of 1916 the purpose of the United States to withdraw its sovereignty over the islands "as soon as a stable government can be established therein," when asked what he regarded as a "stable government," replied: "One that will last until we can get out of Manila Bay." Neither he nor those like-minded were concerned with the effect upon the natives, and yet, as author of the "Jones Law," he became a hero to the Filipinos, who erected a monument to his memory.

United States sugar and tobacco growers, realizing the tremendous potentialities of the Philippines in the production of these articles, and desiring to eliminate the competition which free trade with the islands portends, also regard "Philippine independence" with favour regardless of where the Filipino gets off. Notwithstanding that the islands are domestic territory of the United States, these interests succeeded in holding Philippine products to payment of seventy-five per cent. of regular tariff rates until 1909. In that year free trade was granted as to all articles "the growth and product of the Philippines," *except* that as to sugar such free entry was limited to 300,000 tons, and as to tobacco, to 150,000,000 cigars annually. It was not until October, 1913, that Congress finally surmounted "the arguments" of the sugar

and tobacco people and removed all restrictions. It is hardly a coincidence, therefore, that at this time some of the strongest advocates of Philippine independence in our Senate and House come from beet-sugar states.

There are also many Americans who, while satisfied that our work in the Philippines is unfinished, and that present or early independence would spell disaster to the Filipino people, feel that what we have done and are doing in the islands is not appreciated, and that we would consequently be perfectly justified in taking the Filipinos at their word and clearing out. This view found concrete expression in a recent American newspaper editorial as follows:

It is our belief that the Philippines are a nuisance of which Uncle Sam would do well to divest himself. There is, of course, the doctrine that we ought to keep them for the sake of the Filipinos, but the most articulate of the latter do not hold this doctrine. We can stay and keep the peace at our own expense, killing Moros who want us to stay and protecting Tagalogs who want us to get out. We can hold the islands until the Japanese want them, and then we can fight a long and costly war to retain them.

At present we have no real policy respecting the Philippines. Under Wilson the Tagalogs were taken into the government and their appetite for more jobs was whetted. They have a chance for good government and accelerated progress under gifted colonial administrators. But they don't want them. They want the right to misgovern themselves, and we cannot see that we have any duty or interest to deny them.

There is much in the wordy and ceaseless clamour for "immediate independence" of the islands, and in the constant criticism of our administrators, to excuse such a state of mind. To give it effect, however, would be to visit the sins of the few upon the many. Philippine-Americans have been and are accused of opposing independence from purely mercenary motives. It is doubtful,

however, if there is one of these Americans who would not delight in seeing independence granted forthwith if its inevitable consequences could be limited to the "political element" which is fostering the present agitation. Unfortunately, however, the ninety-five per cent. of the population which is "inarticulate," and has no voice and certainly no intelligent part in the existing chorus, would share the catastrophe and be the chief victims. We cannot escape our responsibility to these latter through pretending we are satisfying "Filipino desires." Mr. Taft, in a report made while Secretary of War, defined the nature and extent of our duty as follows:

We are the trustees and guardians of the whole Filipino people, and peculiarly of the ignorant masses, and our trust is not discharged until these masses are given education sufficient to know their civil rights and maintain them against a more powerful class and safely to exercise the political franchise.

Aside from the persons and interests listed above as independence advocates, most of whom have no illusions as to what would happen to the islands should American protection be removed, there are unquestionably many others who sincerely believe the Filipinos now fitted for self-rule, and that such a step would minister to their welfare and happiness. The causes contributing to this belief, and which largely explain it, furnish an interesting study.

Primary, of course, is the prevalent and frequently unthinking application of the doctrines of "self-determination," "consent of the governed," etc., supplemented by a sentimental rather than practical reading of our Declaration of Independence, all of which create a soil fertile for Philippine independence propaganda. The fact that attempts at self-determination by children meet stern par-

ental repression; that the actual experiment by immature and politically inexperienced peoples has plunged the vast bulk of them into ignorance, poverty, and misrule, and that the numerous "independent states" created in Europe following the war have yielded little but dictators and economic and political chaos, do not dampen the ardour of those who would inject a tiny, poverty-stricken Philippines into the agitated and pirate-infested political waters of the far Pacific. There are some who pretend that a smooth and untroubled course could be assured through a "guarantee" by the various Powers against molestation. This takes no account of internal upheavals, of the stifling consequences of economic penetration by the land-hungry hordes of Asia, or of the obligation of all or any of the Powers to intervene when the rights of their nationals are trespassed.

In December, 1920, acting upon the report of Francis Burton Harrison, then Governor-General of the islands, President Wilson stated to Congress that the Philippine people had succeeded in maintaining a stable government, and recommended that "independence be now granted them." Inasmuch as Mr. Harrison was on the ground and should know the facts, and our people had no reason at the time to believe he would misrepresent them, it was natural that many should accept his statement as true and formulate their views accordingly. Aside from the truism, however, that a "stable government" under United States sovereignty, and what would likely result should the sustaining might of that sovereignty be removed, are two quite different things, the fact remains that even the qualified control conferred by Mr. Harrison upon Filipinos, and existing when his report was written, had resulted in the speculation and dissipation of the funds

of the Philippine National Bank, in the debasement of the island currency, in the rapid decline of public service, and in the virtual bankruptcy of the government. The results of Mr. Harrison's experiment not only failed to justify his conclusions but disproved them in every particular.

One of the by-products of the late war, and not the least insidious, was a development of the art of propaganda. It has been defined as: "The dissemination of information, true, false, and mixed, in a systematic manner, thereby influencing public opinion and swaying the policies of governments." Ordinarily those engaged in the process camouflage their operations, believing, with reason, that a crude display of purposes might frighten their intended quarry. Not so the Filipinos, however, who have unblushingly labelled their wares and then scattered them broadcast with unrivalled prodigality.

Early in 1924 a special Senate committee was appointed,

to investigate and report to the Senate whether there is any organized effort being made to control public opinion and the action of Congress upon legislative matters through propaganda or by the use of money, by advertising or by the control of publicity.

Under this resolution Mr. Edward W. Bok was haled before the committee to explain why he had spent his own money in an effort to promote World Peace, a consummation devoutly desired by men and women everywhere. With this display of Senate zeal before us, let us examine the truly amazing performances of the "Philippine Independence Commission."

This Commission comprises the two Houses of the Philippine Legislature, which controls insular revenues. In 1918, 500,000 pesos were appropriated by it from public funds to defray the cost of independence propaganda. In

1919 a Special Mission of twenty-eight members, headed by Manuel Quezón, with eight "Technical Advisers," was sent to the United States to advocate independence. At the same time a "Philippine Press Bureau" was installed in Washington, whose personnel and "advertising" were also made a charge against this government subsidy. In December, 1920, shortly preceding Harrison's departure, the Philippine Legislature, that is, the "Independence Commission," passed an Act providing as follows (No. 2933):

Sec. 1. A standing appropriation of one million pesos per annum is hereby made out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to defray the expense of the Independence Commission, including publicity and all other expenses in connection with the performance of its duties. This credit shall be considered as included in the annual appropriation for the Senate and House of Representatives at the rate of five hundred thousand pesos for each house, although the appropriation acts hereafter passed may not make specific appropriation for such purpose. Provided, that no part of this sum shall be set up on the books of the Insular Auditor until it shall be necessary to make the payment or payments provided by this act.

The "annually recurring" feature of the appropriation was to preclude possibility of veto by a succeeding Governor-General, while the exemption from "pre-audit," required as to other appropriations, enabled the fund to be spent without knowledge of the public or of the minority members of the Legislature. The signature of the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate, as the case might be, was the sole requisite to authorize payments from the fund. While vouchers for actual disbursements were presumably filed with the Auditor, it was not his province to determine whether particular expenditures were for "propaganda" or other purposes, nor could he give publicity to returns filed.

The presiding officers of the Senate and the House at the time were Manuel Quezón and Sergio Osmeña (the latter succeeded in November, 1922, by Manuel Roxas), who thus became the secret purveyors, without check and without publicity, of approximately one dollar out of every sixty of insular revenues. Such unbridled power over large sums of public money is without parallel or precedent in any modern country. Moreover, the end sought through such unlawful action was to subvert American authority and sovereignty in the islands and to place those responsible for such subversion in control of the government. That such a thing could be perpetrated and continued for years, illustrates the easy-going attitude of Americans and their disposition to tolerate almost any attack on our institutions short of actual violence. It certainly supplies no ground for complaint by Filipinos that their "freedom of expression" has been unduly curtailed.

It was a big sum to dispose of annually, and was spent in devious ways and with lavish hand. As no report of expenditures has ever been made public, details are lacking. Certain "activities," however, are of common knowledge, the following being a few.

Special newspaper and magazine writers were imported from the States, whose articles, uniformly favouring independence, were foisted on a home public as representing "matured conclusions after personal investigation." Two Philippine Supreme Court justices, upon retirement from the islands, received substantial contributions for promised "services," which largess was also shared by at least one retiring Manila editor. Charles Edward Russell, a writer and lecturer, after a brief visit to the islands with travelling expenses paid, wrote a book on the Philippines, which, as may be supposed, is filled with inaccuracies and



pictures the Filipinos as little less than demigods. This book, together with one by Governor-General Harrison, which also fails to "tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," have been distributed gratis in multiplied thousands to Members of Congress, government officials, newspaper editors and newspaper correspondents. The *Philippine Press Bulletin*, Washington, which, according to announcement, has a monthly circulation of 32,000 and is mailed "to Members of Congress, prominent citizens, and to 15,000 editors of weekly and daily newspapers in the United States," regularly carried the following notice:

#### FREE BOOKS FOR AMERICAN EDITORS

The Philippine Press Bureau desires to announce that it will be glad to send, free of charge, to any editor of a newspaper in the United States, either of the following two books:

"The Corner Stone of Philippine Independence," a narrative of seven years' experience as Governor-General of the Philippines by Governor-General Harrison: 343 pages, exquisitely bound and illustrated;

"The Outlook for the Philippines," by Charles Edward Russell, noted writer and lecturer, who has recently returned from a tour of observation and study in the Philippines; 411 pages, beautifully bound and illustrated.

This offer is necessarily confined to editors, although no discrimination is made as to whether the newspaper is a large city daily or a country weekly.

As the publisher's price for such books is \$3 per copy, and the cost to some fifteen thousand editors simply a postal card, the "demand" was presumably large, which, with other free distribution, doubtless netted Messrs. Russell and Harrison handsome royalties.

Luxurious offices, with a numerous and high-salaried personnel, were indulged by the Philippine Press Bureau, Washington—appointments going "by favour." Among

the Americans on the staff was an ex-Congressman who for years drew a salary ranging from \$500 to \$1000 a month, having qualified to write "from experience" through a fleeting trip to the islands. His numerous press articles on the Philippines, usually accompanied by his portrait, invariably recited that he was a "former Congressman," and had "toured the islands from end to end." He did not divulge, however, that he was a paid "propaganda agent," nor that his "touring" had been done at public expense. Moreover, while persistently libelling his fellow Americans in the islands through accusation of opposing independence "because of the size of their dividends," he did not himself hesitate to profit by his sinecure with this Bureau, financed by taxes paid, or made largely possible, through the efforts of these same pioneer Americans whom he maligned. Neither did it concern him that the independence he advocated for hire would, if realized, likely bring misery and hopeless servitude to millions of helpless Filipinos.

For a time a second "ex-Congressman," who did not bother to visit the islands, drew down \$500 a month from the propaganda hope chest, largely through Mr. Quezón's personal favour, who was altogether liberal in rewarding his friends. Doubtless the beneficiary was presumed, by reason of former connections, to have influence over Congressional action, thus explaining the why of the gratuity. Others there were aplenty invited or encouraged to dip in the golden stream, in return gladly voicing their belief in the capacity of the donors to run a government—or whatever else they pleased. When the scroll is unrolled, if ever, it will be difficult for some of these recipients to explain the *quid pro quo*.

In August, 1921, Mr. Manuel Quezón, accompanied by

two secretaries, made another trip to Washington, the fleshpots of the States appealing greatly to him. This was followed in the spring of 1922 by another "mission," headed by Quezón and Osmeña, comprising sixteen members, six "technical advisers," and a complement of secretaries. They travelled about the country for some months, entertaining in lavish fashion and accumulating large expense accounts, the total outlay for the trip being 390,000 pesos. As with the first mission, a majority of the body were Spanish and Chinese Mestizos, in nowise representative of the Philippine *people*. Unfortunately, this "hand-picked" variety of Filipinos, such as the Resident Commissioners in Washington, members of various "missions," and college students, all of whom make a creditable showing, furnish to most Americans their conception of the Philippines and their people. There are in fact, however, according to reliable estimates, less than 10,000 Filipinos in the islands who can be classed as really influential in business or politics.

In the meantime, in addition to the Press Bureau maintained in Washington, an "Executive Office on Independence" was established in Manila, furnishing another prolific source of outlay. This was headed by Teodoro M. Kalaw as "Executive Officer and Chief Adviser to the Independence Commission," with annual salary of \$6,000, who resigned as Secretary of the Interior to take the new job. Four "Assistant Advisers" were provided, to receive \$5 per day "when they held a meeting with the Chief Adviser," while special contributors, clerks, and other "help," furnished additional outlet for rewarding the faithful. The duties of this office were:

1. To direct the work of information and propaganda in favour of the Philippine cause both in the Philippines and abroad;

2. To supervise the work of the Philippine Press Bureau in Washington, and of such other press bureaus as may be established elsewhere;

3. To publish periodicals, pamphlets, or books in the Philippines, in the United States, or foreign countries, *favourable* to the cause of the Philippines;

4. To prepare, collect, and classify data, materials, and other information for missions which may be sent to the United States or other foreign countries;

5. To keep the Philippine press informed of the progress and activities of the independence campaign in the United States, and at the same time to furnish the press with such necessary information as may promote the Philippine cause;

6. To prepare, collect, and classify data, materials, and other information regarding the international aspects of the Philippine problem.

At the beginning of 1924 Mr. Manuel Roxas, Speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives, accompanied by three "Technical Advisers," journeyed to the United States, followed in May by Messrs. Quezón, Osmeña, and others, all liberally supplied with "expense money." To be a ranking politician in the Philippines carries many perquisites. In the meantime, the imperative needs and wants of the Philippine people are sacrificed through lack of adequate revenues, and such few industries as are being developed owe their existence largely to foreigners.

During the whole period of this luxurious propaganda debauch, and for years previously, the Philippines were represented in the United States Congress by two Resident Commissioners, elected and commissioned by the Philippine Legislature, and duly authorized by law to formulate and present any and all petitions on behalf of the Filipino people. They have the privileges of the floor of the House, with right of debate, and draw salaries of \$7,500 per annum, with \$2,000 in lieu of mileage, and the same allowances for stationery and clerk hire as are en-

joyed by Congressmen, all of which sums are paid from the Treasury of the United States. Given this "official" representation of the Philippine people, freely granted and paid for by our Government, the coming of this swarm of "unofficial" propagandists, their pockets lined with money voted by themselves from a depleted treasury, certainly gives ground to doubt both their judgment and patriotism. Particularly is this true considering the recent "investigations" and revelations concerning official Washington, coupled with the avowed purpose of these missions and individuals to use "every art of propaganda" to influence Congress in favour of Philippine independence. One million pesos a year is a large sum to dangle about Washington with the Volstead Act unmodified and living costs steadily mounting.

It is altogether natural, under the circumstances, that charges of graft, bribery, and other like uses of this million-peso slush fund, should have gained currency, an accusation fortified by the persistent refusal of those responsible for the spending to render any accounting. Characteristic of most efforts by Filipinos at team work, these charges of corruption and malfeasance have raged most fiercely within their own ranks.

As heretofore noted, the "Philippine Independence Commission" is composed of the two Houses of the Philippine Legislature; furthermore, the several members of that Legislature have been "patriotically" drawing down regular payments from this independence fund in addition to their salaries. Notwithstanding this fact, however, few of such legislators, and none of the minority or Demócrata party, were informed as to how the moneys were being applied, the active disbursement being the perquisite of the two presiding officers, both members of the Na-

cionalista or dominant party. During a special senatorial election in 1923, the Demócratas accused the opposition of using this "sacred fund" for personal and party ends. Feeling ran high, with the result that on September 23, 1923, some ten thousand adherents of the Demócrata party gathered on the Luneta, Manila, where fiery speeches were indulged charging that such moneys were being used for partisan purposes, and the claim made that as representatives of the people, the Demócrata legislators had just as much right as Quezón and Roxas to know how this "treasure" was being spent. As part of the demonstration a resolution was adopted reading:

Whereas, each year the Legislature appropriates one million pesos to defray the expenses of the propaganda campaign in America for the independence of the Philippines;

Whereas, for sometime now, trustworthy information has been circulating to the effect that independence funds are not devoted exclusively to the end for which they have been appropriated inasmuch as they are used for electoral purposes, these funds being used to pay for banquets given by private individuals, for political reasons; for subsidizing newspapers partial to a certain political party or to its leaders and chiefs; to bribing newspapermen for the same purpose of gaining political adherents and personal followings; to paying salaries, emoluments, and bonus for services partisan in character and rendered by individuals who work and campaign for that party; to defraying expenses for junketing trips made on flimsy pretexts without having anything to do with the purposes for which the independence funds were appropriated, and, in fine, to ends and activities entirely distinct from the propaganda campaign for independence in America;

Whereas, those charged with the duty of making disbursements out of the independence funds and responsible for their legitimate expenditure refuse tenaciously to give a detailed report to the people of the manner this public treasure is spent, to publish or cause to be published a statement of the disbursements made out of these funds, in spite of the moral obligation which they have to make the report and publish an itemized account of such disbursements, in this way denying to the citizenry the right to know how these public funds which have been entrusted to the care and management of these representatives, agents, and employees are handled;

Therefore, the members of the Demócrata party present on the Luneta and convened in a mass meeting, resolve to ask, as for the present they ask, the Governor-General to order the office concerned to let those members of the Legislature who so desire, examine the statement of accounts of independence funds, with the necessary vouchers and receipts, giving them, moreover, every facility needed to this end.

General Wood decided that the question was properly one for the Independence Commission, and referred the Demócrata legislators to Messrs. Quezón and Rosas, the "disbursing agents." These latter, however, despite the serious charges made against them, which, if untrue, could readily be disproved through furnishing the desired information, still "tenaciously refused" to do so.

Failing to secure action administratively, twenty-six Demócrata representatives and four Demócrata senators thereupon filed a joint petition with the Supreme Court of the islands, praying that the Governor-General, the Insular Auditor, and Messrs. Quezón, Roxas, Kalaw, and Guerrero (the last two being Executive Officer and Secretary of the Independence Commission respectively), be ordered by peremptory Writ of Mandate to exhibit to plaintiffs all vouchers and other documents evidencing expenditures from the propaganda fund. They made this demand in the triple capacity of members of the Independence Commission, members of the Philippine Legislature, and citizens and taxpayers. Their petition, besides incorporating most of the matter set out in the resolution above quoted, further charged—

that certain literary traders who, if not paid by the Independence Commission, would be working to frustrate its plans, are now prospering at the cost of many thousands of pesos to such Commission, paid to them for chanting hymns and exaggerated eulogies in the United States in praise of certain chiefs of the Nacionalista-Colectivist party, while various mercenary patriots are receiving fat salaries from the Inde-

pendence fund for their servile adhesion and loyalty to certain lords of the situation.

Reference to the "chanting of hymns and exaggerated eulogies" arose from the fact that the *Philippine Press Bulletin*, Washington, which became largely the personal organ of Quezón (particularly in his fight on General Wood), was utilized to publish the pictures and glorify the deeds and merits of the Nacionalista-Colectivist leaders, whereas members of the Demócrata opposition, equally renowned, were completely ignored. Propaganda within propaganda, and the double cross rampant.

The Writ of Mandate was refused by the Philippine Supreme Court, which held the question involved to be an administrative one and not within its jurisdiction. So the matter stands at this writing, the Demócratas openly charging that the strenuous fight by Quezón, Roxas, *et als.*, to keep their expenditures secret is inspired by a wholesome fear of what a show-down would reveal.

Meanwhile, the American people have been systematically fed with the questionable output of this propaganda mill, which, by sheer weight of volume and persistence, has largely effected its ends, *i. e.*, "to control public opinion and the action of Congress upon legislative matters." Mr. Bok, whose laudable efforts to end War and promote World Peace aroused our Solons to action, is a tyro in comparison, certainly as regards "organized effort," "the use of money," and "control of publicity," cited in the Senate resolution as earmarks of iniquity.

In February, 1924, the Insular Auditor refused to honour further "propaganda vouchers," holding such expenditure from public funds to be illegal. Naturally consternation reigned among the chosen in Manila and Washington, where the cashing of monthly pay checks



from "the fund" had become a habit. They were decidedly peeved, with result that the "Philippine Division" cabled the "Washington Division" as follows:

Owing to the suspension by the Insular Auditor, Ben F. Wright, with the support of Governor-General Wood of the 1,000,000 peso independence fund, an act which is considered by Filipinos as an effort to obstruct the independence campaign in the United States, and as a result of the approval by the American press and American business men of the act of the Governor-General and Auditor, the Filipinos are abstaining from patronizing American goods and American papers and have launched a nation-wide campaign for voluntary contributions to support the campaign.

Apparently the response for "voluntary contributions" did not justify continuing the Washington Press Bureau, which has been closed. Through a systematic campaign, however, in which every artifice known to collection drives was employed, and in which the masses were led to believe it was their "patriotic duty" to contribute, a considerable sum has been raised; enough at least to send Messrs. Quezón, Osmeña, and Roxas to the United States for a protracted stay, each of whom receives an allowance of 1,800 pesos for "clothes," and 90 pesos per day for "expenses"—exclusive of travelling costs. Other regular beneficiaries are being provided for in the islands, though their number will doubtless suffer as the first fervour of the contributors subsides. Present plans call for "circularizing all Congressmen by their constituents, with the financial assistance and initiative of the Independence Commission"; this on the theory that Congressmen are indifferent to any proposition which does not affect their chances of reëlection. How the "constituents" are supposed to inform themselves on the question is not explained.

The Philippine Legislature, while freely appropriating this million pesos annually for "propaganda purposes," refused at its session of 1923 to vote the few thousand pesos required by the Governor-General for the operation of a boat, used by him on necessary government business, or to provide the usual per diems for his aides, whose regular salary is paid by the United States. With some reason, such action has been described as, "the childish petulance of a primitive people."

Governor-General Harrison in his Philippines book says:

If any reactionary policy as to the Philippines is ever determined upon by an administration in Washington, the American public has little chance of knowing the real facts. The Filipino people will be virtually helpless before the campaign of misrepresentation which will be launched against them.

In view of what has actually transpired, including the free distribution of Mr. Harrison's own book, this statement should be labelled "humorous," particularly when weighed over against the fact that there has been no organized effort undertaken by any one to counteract the intensive and misleading propaganda for independence indulged by Filipinos at public expense.

That this propaganda has presented only a partial and one-sided story of Philippine conditions goes without saying. In all the voluminous material emanating from the Philippine Press Bureau, the difficulties and dangers of independence have been left untouched, nor has there been the slightest effort to outline a constructive programme whereunder a Philippine Republic could preserve present gains, much less promote the future welfare and happiness of the Filipino masses. The progress achieved during the past twenty-five years (made possible through American sovereignty) has been enlarged upon,

credit taken largely to themselves for what has been accomplished, and upon these premises a superstructure builded which they profess would prove glorious and enduring. They completely ignore, however, one absolutely essential element to permanence, *i. e.*, a proper foundation, now supplied by the United States.

A preamble to the Jones Law of 1916 stated it as the purpose of the United States to withdraw its sovereignty over the Philippines "as soon as a stable government can be established therein." It is insistently urged by Filipino spokesmen that this stable government now exists and that the United States should redeem its pledge. It is or should be *prima facie*, however, that the inquiry properly involves not what *now* exists but what might exist should the Philippine people be turned loose to shift for themselves. Aside from inevitable deductions of disaster, drawn from internal conditions and from the Far Eastern situation generally, there is the patent demonstration furnished by the partial control conferred by Governor-General Harrison. A "stable government" was defined by Governor-General Wood as—"one under which capital seeks investment at normal rates of interest," while another definition given is: "One that is able to maintain peace and security for individuals and property at home and resist aggression from abroad." With even the mere *possibility* of independence, worth-while capital has not sought and is not now seeking investment in the Philippines at "normal" or any other rates of interest, while no one with knowledge of actual conditions sincerely pretends a Philippine Republic could remotely qualify under the second definition.

Mr. Manuel Roxas, testifying before the Senate Committee on Insular Affairs (February 24, 1924), stated:

To develop our country industrially and economically we need the investment of foreign capital, especially American capital. Now, American capital will not seek investment in the islands until the final status of the islands is determined one way or another. Capital before it seeks to invest in a foreign country must know the environment, the conditions, what it is liable to meet, what the tariff regulations are going to be. For example, no capital will seek investment in the Philippines until it knows that certain foreign trade relations will be maintained, or how the free trade relations with the United States will be maintained.

He argued that this situation would be bettered by independence, notwithstanding that sixty-seven per cent. of Philippine exports now go to the United States, due almost entirely to tariff advantages over foreign competitors, and that the immediate consequence of independence would be elimination of this free trade privilege along with American protection. It is doubtful if American investors can follow Mr. Roxas in his proposed panacea.

Further testifying, Mr. Roxas said: "We want to lead a life where we can develop our national character, national traits, and enter into the life of self-relation." The Filipinos pride themselves on being a Christian people imbued with modern ideals of life and conduct. The United States has conscientiously helped and encouraged them to achieve the best that centuries of struggle have proved of value to organized society. If any desirable end or thing has been stifled or discouraged, it has never been pointed out. Certainly there is nothing in the modicum of political power now exercised by Americans to prevent the Philippine people from developing any "national traits or characteristics," or entering into any "self-relation," which they feel to be for their ultimate good. To substitute the United States by other gods and masters, less considerate and unselfish, might well prove another story.

Propaganda organs and orators claim that the demand for independence by Filipinos is "unanimous." This is not true. There are a million or more Moros and Pagans whose datos and headmen say their people desire American rule, and who would early mix things with their Christian neighbours if left untrammelled. As to the vast bulk of the population, there is no informed public opinion and no intelligent sentiment on the subject. The masses repeat what they are told, and believe as they are instructed. When the Wood-Forbes Mission toured the islands it found "standardized" resolutions everywhere, evidently the product of Manila headquarters. The mere "asking" for independence signifies nothing unless the petitioners appreciate what its granting would involve. The overwhelming majority of Filipinos do not have this knowledge, never having had opportunity to acquire it themselves and never having been told the truth by their superiors. The idea of "independence" appeals to their pride, and they respond readily to the suggestion that they are fitted for it. Children anywhere, when offered a chance "to keep house," eagerly undertake the venture, confident of their ability to do as well or better than their parents. This is the prospect held out by a small, politically minded group of Filipinos to the great body of their countrymen, children in everything that pertains to government and its responsibilities. The expressed desire of the latter to "run the house" may be practically unanimous, but it furnishes no argument that they can do so nor that it would be a kindness to permit it.

It may be asked whether educated Filipinos do not realize the perils in store for them and their people should absolute independence be granted. Undoubtedly most of them do, and it would be an unwarranted reflection

upon their intelligence to believe otherwise. Why, then, do they advocate it? As to the politicians, Speaker Roxas likely gave the answer when he stated to the Senate Committee on Insular Affairs (February, 1924) that, "no man could be elected to office in the Philippine Government who did not advocate independence." It is their stock in trade, and as the desire to be "elected to office" is almost universal, the candidates naturally meet the condition precedent. As stated, however, it nowise follows that the electors know what they are asking, nor that the candidates really believe independence offers what they pretend.

In demanding "absolute independence" there is also something of the Oriental trade habit, where much is asked in the hope of getting a better bargain than if a fixed price is set. It can safely be said that most of the so-called "leaders," now urging independence, do not actually desire to be cut entirely adrift from the United States. When the Clarke Amendment was adopted by the Senate in 1916, providing for absolute independence in not less than two nor more than four years, these same leaders were stupefied at the possibility, nor were there any bonfires or celebrations in Manila over "their victory." Moreover, the old Insurrecto generals and officials, who had been side-tracked by younger and more plausible politicians, proceeded to organize their following with intent again to assert control upon American withdrawal, something they probably would have done. The permanence of present leaders in their positions, with the resulting prestige and emoluments, depends largely if not entirely on American protection, a fact quite generally realized by them. In private conversation they frankly admit the present unpreparedness of the islands for inde-

pendence, but state it would ruin them politically openly to express this view. Governor-General Wood recites this situation in a recent cable to Secretary Weeks, wherein he says:

Those who understand present conditions know that they [Filipinos] are not yet ready for independence. This most of the political leaders—indeed, all the prominent ones—have admitted to me, some of them frequently and very recently. They admit freely that a considerable number of years will be required before the people will be prepared for independence, either from the standpoint of national defence, or resources.

They all labour under the impression that whatever trouble they may get into, troubles which are certain to occur with neighbouring Powers, due to racial immigration and other problems, we will come to their assistance, and they do not realize that, once we leave here, we cannot return. I'm sure that once the actual conditions are known to the American people and to Congress it will not be the policy of either to abandon these people until they are prepared to maintain a stable government and meet the obligations of a national existence.

Agitators and disseminators of false and misleading propaganda have thus far very largely had the floor, and with the exception of statements contained in the letter of the President and those of the Secretary of War and a few others, the American people have been misled and befuddled as to Philippine conditions and sentiments toward the United States.

Filipinos of capital, and particularly those engaged in the growing of sugar, tobacco, and other export products, do not want the United States to withdraw, this not only because of existing trade relations but because they fully appreciate the limitations of their own political class. They fear to make an open stand in the matter, however, as they would immediately be branded as "traitors" by the pro-independence press, and be the first to suffer persecution should independence be granted. In repeated instances these Filipinos of wealth have assured the writer that if the United States decides to leave the

islands, they will realize what they can on their assets before the event and leave for Hong Kong or other safe place. In this they would simply imitate the practice of wealthy Chinese, thousands of whom have banked or invested their money in Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tientsin, and other of the foreign concessions, where it cannot be reached by rapacious officials and war lords.

The anomalies of the Philippine situation, with its hue and cry by Filipinos for immediate independence, and the persistent effort of a considerable element in Congress and among our people to give it to them, are a matter of unceasing wonder to those watching the game from the side lines.

The followers of President Wilson were insistent that the United States take a "mandate for Armenia," where we had incurred no obligations, and yet the bulk of this following would have us surrender our mandate in the Philippines, deliberately assumed, and having to do with a people less able to stand alone than are the Armenians, and the centre of a political area fraught with greater menace to world peace than exists in Asia Minor.

Most Americans, to their credit, are keen on "uplift" work. They spend hundreds of millions of dollars annually to give the denizens of our slums, and the outcast, the needy, and the delinquent, a chance to become decent, self-respecting citizens, while other fabulous sums are contributed to feed and clothe the distressed of earth's peoples wherever found. Few of these Americans apparently appreciate, however, that for the past twenty-five years the United States has been engaged in the greatest piece of "up-lift" work which history records, striving against every obstacle of intrenched ignorance, racial misunderstanding, and political misrepresentation and



antagonism, to bring to millions of childlike people, freedom from disease, better living conditions, opportunity for education and social progress, and relief from age-long oppression and exploitation at the hands of the *cacique* and money-lender. Agitators would now have us abandon this work when yet scarcely begun, the immediate effect of which would be to foist an infinitesimal minority of the population (mostly half-castes) into positions of pelf and power, and plunge the masses back into the morass of hopeless and helpless servitude from which we are seeking to extricate them.

American religious organizations, irrespective of denomination, have been engaged, time out of mind, in a world-wide crusade to "save the heathen," spending thereon millions of treasure and the consecrated energies of tens of thousands of missionaries and Christian workers. Strange to say, however, many of these same religious societies, no less than large numbers of their willing contributors, are now working for Philippine independence, the inevitable effect of which would be to bring upon the only Christian peoples of the Far East a flood-tide of Oriental paganism, under which the Christianity they now profess would, in all likelihood, be largely smothered and obliterated.

The American Indian, whose numbers in the United States have never exceeded possibly half a million, has, from earliest times, been on the conscience of the American people, and sincere efforts have been made by Congress to protect him from exploitation and provide for his needs and happiness. In the Philippine Islands there are more than a million "wild peoples," less capable and less self-sufficient in many ways than the American Indian, for whose welfare and future destiny the United

States became responsible by treaty stipulations. To abandon them now to the tender mercies of an independent and unrestrained Philippine government would be an act of treachery and breach of faith without parallel in American annals, and which it is difficult to conceive our people will deliberately perpetrate.

Americans are reputed to be shrewd in business. Few of them would buy a horse without seeing the animal, or, if that were impossible, getting the judgment of someone with knowledge in whom they had confidence. Equally is it true that few are simple enough to invest in real estate upon the mere statement of the vendor that his tract has merits which experience has shown to be unlikely. In this matter of the Philippines, however, large numbers of our people have not only accepted, at their face value, the statements of Filipino propagandists, interested in "promoting" independence, but they have ignored and still ignore the warnings of those with actual knowledge and experience of the facts. Obsessed by the fetish of a word—"Independence"—they blindly believe it potent to overcome every obstacle which God and Nature have interposed.

When men of the character and calibre of Chief Justice Taft, Bishop Charles H. Brent, ex-Governors-General James F. Smith and W. Cameron Forbes, General Leonard Wood, and a host of others who might be named, all of whom have lived and worked in the Philippines for years, state unhesitatingly that it would be a mistake and a tragedy to withdraw American sovereignty and protection at this time or in the proximate future, their views and opinions should be regarded. It can be said also that practically all Americans who have lived in the islands, with an opportunity to know their people as a whole,

are equally unanimous in decrying an early abandonment of our trust. To charge these men with deliberately attempting to mislead the American public, or of being influenced by selfish or other questionable motives, is puerile, and reflects only upon the intelligence or integrity of those who so argue.

As for the Filipinos themselves, with some twenty thousand of their number already in the United States, and a considerably greater number in Hawaii, they would deliberately exclude themselves from any further such immigration privilege, and trade every blessing and advantage accruing to them from partnership with the United States, for the doubtful and likely ephemeral enjoyment of a very slight increase in "political power." Freedom they already have, and the rights of Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness, in equal degree with American citizens and those other millions who have sought and found asylum within our territory. They cry, however, for the panacea of "Nationalism," blazoned a few years since as a sure specific for every political eruption of mankind. Trial has shown, however, that it is not the all-potent cure-all advertised, most of the peoples dosed with it being now in the throes of bankruptcy and tyranny. The world is slowly realizing that the forces which work for the stability, progress, and well-being of peoples are economic rather than political or racial, and that "self-determination," when not joined with material resources and experience in government, is suicidal.

The Philippines are almost purely agricultural, which, with an insufficient labour supply, and with education and material development to all intents paralysed by the attitude of present-day Filipino leaders, offers little encouragement for any early change in conditions. Given

the slow-moving processes of evolution, both in the development of natural capacity and of ability to control economic forces, there is scant basis for believing that another twenty-five years will work any material transformation in the Filipino race, nor that they will be fitted then, or in a much longer period, to establish and successfully maintain an independent, self-sustaining government.

Americans who bluntly state that we should get out of the Philippines because it is to our interest to do so, and who make no pretense of caring what happens to the Filipinos, have the merit at least of being consistent and understandable. Not so much can be said for those who, while acknowledging our obligations in the premises, profess nevertheless to believe that the withdrawal of United States sovereignty would be for the good of the Philippine people.

## CHAPTER XIII

### ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE PHILIPPINES

AMERICANS have had their attention so persistently distracted by agitation concerning the "political status" of the Philippines that little thought has been given to the economic value, past or future, of the islands to the United States. It is a prevalent belief, in fact, that our colonial venture has cost and is costing us millions of dollars annually for which no returns are received. What are the facts?

Our original occupation of the archipelago, and the restoration of orderly government thereafter, were a logical outcome of the war with Spain, and the money thus spent is not a proper debit against the islands. Thereafter all expenses of the insular government have been paid from local revenues, the only direct outlay incurred by the United States being the slightly increased cost of maintaining a portion of our army in the Philippines to what it would cost at home. To this some would add money spent in enlarging our Navy and in building island defences. Eliminating the Philippines, however, we have the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, Guam, an extended Pacific Coast line, and the Panama Canal, quite sufficient in themselves to justify our naval programme. Money spent in fortifying naval bases and coaling stations can hardly be deemed wasteful, as these would likely be retained in any event. The Secretary of War, in a statement filed with the Senate Committee on Insular Affairs,

March 1, 1924, estimates that the only real saving to the United States through abandonment of the Philippines would be the present upkeep of the Philippine Scouts—approximately \$2,000,000 per annum. What, then, of the credit side of the ledger?

As a heritage from Spain the United States acquired ownership of all public buildings and improvements in the islands, including title to the public domain or "Crown Lands." These latter comprise more than 60,000,000 acres, of which some 40,000,000 are available for agriculture. Filipinos own approximately 10,000,000 acres, of which only 8,000,000 are under cultivation. There are 64,800 square miles of forest, of which 99 per cent. belongs to the Government. These forests include immense quantities of valuable hardwoods, the supply of "Philippine Mahogany" alone being estimated at 192,000,000,000 board feet. The mineral resources of the islands are abundant and varied, the available supply of iron ore being figured at more than 500,000,000 tons, with large deposits of coal and copper. While "administration" of these public lands, forests, and mines has been vested by Congress in the Philippine Legislature, subject to approval by the President of all Acts relating thereto, such holdings still remain property of the United States and represent an asset of tremendous potential value. This "public domain" was held and administered by Spain for more than three hundred years, and was never owned, occupied, or claimed by Filipino-Malays—themselves invaders of the islands—either before or after Spanish occupation. Title to and possession of such lands by the United States were acquired through conquest, through cash payment, and through formal cession by Spain, its ownership therein being more clearly vested than applies

to the great bulk of our domestic public domain. America is not an interloper in the Philippines, having dispossessed no rightful claimant except Spain, and that through more formal and humane methods than adopted by Filipinos in dispossessing the aboriginal inhabitants of the islands.

The advantages accruing to American trade through Philippine occupation have already been a big item. In 1895 (being the last year of Spanish occupation for which reliable data is available), the trade of the Philippines with the United States was but \$5,288,341, or 17 per cent. of the total. In 1923 such trade amounted to \$132,387,472, or 65 per cent. of the total. Moreover, since 1909 American merchants and manufacturers have enjoyed free trade with the islands, giving them this considerable leeway over foreign competitors.

The influence exercised by American ownership of the Philippines over our Far Eastern relations, with the consequent awakening and development of interest among our people concerning the Orient and its opportunities, was pointed out in earlier chapters. It was shown that whereas in 1900 but  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the total foreign trade of the United States was with Asiatic countries, this had increased by 1923 to 21 per cent., our trade with the Far East for that year amounting to \$1,736,824,000. While causes other than possession of the Philippines have played a part in this phenomenal gain, the fact of the United States having become an Asiatic Power, and its active presence on the scene, had no small part in the happening.

Another by-product of Philippine occupation, possibly more far-reaching in its influence upon the fortunes of the United States than all others combined, was the practical training in military affairs it gave our army officers, and

the important and decisive part it enabled them to take thereafter in the World War. Most persons are familiar with the deplorable condition of our army upon outbreak of the Spanish-American War and for months thereafter; of the inefficiency of our Commissary and Quartermaster departments, and of the tremendous death toll among our soldiers from preventable diseases. Without our occupation of the Philippines, and the resulting lessons gained through constant transportation of American troops to the islands and return, through the proper supplying, quartering, and care of such troops in the islands, and the familiarity with army needs acquired by our officers through this semi-foreign service, there is every reason to believe our military arm would, in the untroubled years between, have lapsed into much of its old-time, easy-going ways. The "unpreparedness" of the United States in 1917 was bad enough, but without this Philippine schooling of those called upon to organize and lead our armies, it would have been infinitely worse. Most American officers who achieved outstanding distinction during the war had back of them years of active service in the Philippines, where they largely qualified for the bigger tasks ahead. The following are a few of the many who might be named:

General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F. who was on duty in the Philippines from 1899 to 1903, and again from 1906 to 1913. During most of this latter period he was Commander of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, and Governor of the Moro Province, winning his star as Brigadier-General because of successful Moro campaigns.

Major-General Leonard Wood—whose work in organizing the Plattsburg Training Camp, and in preparing two



army divisions for service in France, were of inestimable value—commanded the Department of Mindanao and Sulu during the early years of American occupation, was the first Governor of the Moro Province, and thereafter commanded the Division of the Philippines.

Major-General James G. Harbord, General Pershing's Chief of Staff from May, 1917, to May, 1918; Commander of the famous Marine Brigade at Château-Thierry, and then the efficient Chief of the A. E. F. Supply Service, was Assistant Chief and Supply Officer of the Philippines Constabulary, with rank of Colonel, from August, 1903, to January, 1913.

Major-General Henry T. Allen, in command of the Eighth Army Corps, A. E. F., and thereafter head of the American forces in Germany, organized the Philippines Constabulary—a native Insular Police Force of 5,000 men—and served as Chief of such body, with rank of Brigadier-General, from 1901 to 1907.

Major-General Hunter Liggett, Commander of the First Army Corps, A. E. F., was Commander of the Division of the Philippines from April, 1916, to April, 1917, with many years previous service in the islands.

Major-General H. H. Bandholtz, Provost Marshal General of the A. E. F., served as Colonel and Assistant Chief of Philippine Constabulary from 1903 to 1907, and was Chief of such body, with rank of Brigadier-General, from 1907 to 1913.

Major-General Mark L. Hersey, in command of the Fourth Division, A. E. F., served for some ten years as Assistant Chief and Colonel of Constabulary in various districts of the Philippines.

Major-General R. E. Bullard, in command of the Second Army in France, was in the Philippines from 1899 to 1904,

having built the famous Iligan-Lanao Military road in Mindanao, and being Governor of the Lanao District during 1902-1904.

Major-General J. L. Hines, in command of the Third Army Corps, A. E. F., served in the Philippines from 1901 to 1905, and again during 1911 and 1912.

The war expenses of the United States during the six months preceding the Armistice averaged some fifty million dollars a day, the monthly total for three of such months being well over \$1,500,000,000. If, through the lessons of their Philippine service and the greater efficiency it gave them, these officers—and many similar others—were better qualified to safeguard the health and morale of our men and to bring the struggle to an end a month or even a week earlier than otherwise, the saving in human life and war costs to the United States would make of our Philippine occupation an unmixed blessing.

What, then, of the future? Are the islands destined to play a still greater rôle in our economic life through the years to come, or is the game over except the shouting? The question is interesting but hazardous, inasmuch as a mere suggestion that the United States should remain in the islands because it would be to its advantage to do so, brands one immediately (by propagandists) as opposing independence "from purely selfish motives." It might be said in defence (without mitigating the attack) that the Philippine problem is but part of a much larger Far Eastern problem, and that the United States must take into account not only the interests of its people as a whole, but also the consequences of its action upon international relations. It can be said also, with truth, that whatever good might result to the United States from retaining the

islands would accrue in even greater measure to the Philippine people. Our country can be relied upon to serve Filipino interests as faithfully in the future as it has in the past, and to share liberally with them any advantages which might follow a permanent relationship. Moreover, there is ever a possibility that the politicians who now agitate for "complete independence" without actually desiring it, may change their song, or that the intelligent, non-political element, which fully recognizes and admits the desirability of association with the United States, may gain courage to say so openly and impress their views upon the emotional, unthinking masses of the population. At all events, there would seem excuse to point out what continued possession of the Philippines *might* mean, economically, to the American people, and through them to the Filipinos. The final outcome remains in the lap of the gods—which means a more or less partisan United States Congress and a minority element of the Philippine people.

In 1852, when our great West was yet a wilderness, and China and Japan still wrapped in age-long isolation, Wm. H. Seward said:

Henceforth European commerce, European thought, European politics, and European activity, although actually gaining force, and European connections, although actually becoming more intimate, will nevertheless relatively sink in importance; while the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast region beyond will become the chief theatre of events in the world's great hereafter.

Theodore Roosevelt, with his hold on realities, stated shortly before his death:

The Mediterranean era died with the discovery of America; the Atlantic era is now at the height of its development. The Pacific era, destined to be the greatest of all, is just at the dawn.

Hubert Howe Bancroft, the historian, in his work, "The New Pacific," wrote as follows:

It is not merely China, Russian Siberia, Japan, Korea, Siam, Formosa, the Philippines, Java, Borneo, great and small, that constitute a vast field which has been termed the Pacific opportunity. All eastern Asia to-day is trembling with the oncoming tread of progress, and when once these uncounted hosts realize that old conditions of sloth and inaction must yield to the invasion of new ideas, then the movement all along the line will astonish the world.

Nowhere is history so rapidly being made as in and around the Pacific Ocean; nowhere is the evolution of events which stand for progress of more increasing interest and importance. It is now one of the world's great highways of commerce, not a hazy dream or half mythical tale, with its ancient mariner, and Amazonian queen, and Crusoe island, and terrestrial paradise.

Floyd R. Parsons, an authority on world trade and commerce, wrote under date of March 23, 1923:

About all the East lacks is education and unity of thought. Let no one doubt that interest is shifting to the East and that Asia will be the seat, not only of the most vital of world problems, but of to-morrow's greatest opportunities.

What Seward visioned, and men of experience in commerce and world affairs now everywhere confirm, is being translated into facts and figures at a pace incredible in former times. The telegraph, the radio, the airplane, the movie, the automobile, cheaper newspapers and books, wider educational facilities, extension of communication by rail and highway, new applications of steam and electricity, and other innumerable inventions and appliances, are speeding the forces of change and transforming almost overnight the needs and wants and methods of life of great masses of Asiatic peoples.

While most persons appreciate vaguely that "the East is waking up," few realize how rapidly it is happening, or

how the importance of our Atlantic seaboard—great though it be—is steadily diminishing through this trans-pacific movement and the consequent flow of business to the Pacific Coast. Trade statistics show an increase in imports through Pacific ports from 1914 to 1922 of 102 per cent., and an increase in exports of 132 per cent., as against an increase of 28 per cent. in imports and 45 per cent. in exports through Atlantic ports. During the same period the percentage of total imports and exports through Atlantic ports suffered a material loss, while those through Pacific ports registered a substantial gain.

United States trade with Japan in 1893 amounted to but \$30,000,000; in 1923 it totalled \$585,483,000, being but slightly less than that done with the whole of South America, *i.e.*, \$736,135,000. In 1923 our total trade with Asia and Oceania was \$1,736,824,000, being over half that done with Europe, and approximately one fifth of our total foreign commerce. In a recent pamphlet entitled "Trading with the Far East," issued by the National City Bank, it is said:

Asia as a whole has one third of the world's land area and over one half of the population. Nine tenths of its 875,000,000 people are massed on that narrow frontage of fertile land running along the ocean from India to Japan, most of them living within 1,000 miles of the ocean and less than 2,000 feet above its level. They originate and conduct practically all of the commerce of the Asiatic continent, and their international trade has grown from \$4,000,000,000 in 1913 to \$8,000,000,000 in 1922.

Referring to what is happening in China, David Fraser, a trade expert, writing in the *London Times* early in 1922, says:

The China trade is straining at the leash, eager to bound ahead. It needs only a turn in the political wheel, and a little improvement in the

general situation, to open out a new and magnificent vista of trade opportunity. These are big words. Let us examine the sober fact as detailed in the Customs report of China's foreign trade for 1921. The total foreign trade in 1901, exclusive of treasure, was £69,000,000; in 1911, £113,000,000, and in 1921, £391,000,000. Roughly speaking, the foreign trade of China doubles itself every ten years. It depends upon the intelligence and enterprise of British traders to make good in this El Dorado of the Far East.

Thos. W. Lamont, America's representative on the International Consortium, recently stated:

The pressure upon modern nations to discover and develop outlets for their trade is increasing, and China presents to-day by far the largest undeveloped field for commercial expansion.

To the same effect Capt. Robert Dollar, the farsighted pioneer of Oriental trade expansion, said:

The greatest field in the whole world for commercial development is China, with its population of a third of the earth's total inhabitants.

The present annual consumption of American products by the three hundred million inhabitants of British India is but \$0.15 per capita; of the 400 millions who inhabit China but \$0.23, and by the 50 millions of Netherlands India \$0.90. What their future trade promises is indicated by the fact that American goods sold in Japan now average \$4, and in the Philippines \$5 per capita, annually. As graphically stated by Lord Leverhulme, the soap magnate of Great Britain: "If we could educate the Chinese to use soap, the whole output of the world would not suffice them for more than a month."

Whether "World Peace" remains a dream or becomes a reality, the war for trade supremacy will go on, and will grow steadily more intensive and relentless with increasing population. As never before the "Seven Seas" are being

searched for essential products and raw materials, and their control safeguarded against the present and future needs of those concerned.

Something frequently forgotten by idealists is that governments, after all, are simply business concerns operated on behalf and in the interest of their own subjects, and that their policies and conduct are almost invariably directed to that end. Given this fact, abundantly evidenced in practice, what does the accelerated trend of world politics and world commerce to the Far East signify to the United States, and what are its obligations? There would seem but one answer, which is, that the future prosperity and well-being of the American people imperatively require that every trade advantage now held in the Orient be conserved and utilized, that every legitimate means be employed to extend our commercial influence and prestige in Asiatic countries, and that every facility be afforded American business men in competition with the nationals of other Powers.

Time was when we boasted of our "splendid isolation," and, rich in apparently inexhaustible natural resources and home markets, scoffed at the need to develop foreign trade. That epoch, however, with its narrow provincialism, has passed for ever. To-day our producing classes, whether farmers or manufacturers, realize fully that the margin between profit and penury hinges upon an export demand for surplus products.

During the past decade the population of the United States has increased approximately 14,000,000, whereas food production has remained almost stationary. Measured in dollars, we are to-day a food-importing nation, our imports of sugars, tea, coffee, spices, nuts, and tropical fruits exceeding in value our exports of grain, flour, and

meats. Statisticians estimate that in from fifteen to thirty years we will consume more than we produce of staple food products. The steady trek from the country to the cities, and the creation of great urban populations, are rapidly making of us a "manufacturing" rather than an agricultural people. In 1923 the importation of "crude materials for use in manufacturing" totalled over a billion and a half dollars. A source of supply for this necessary raw material, therefore, and a steady export demand for finished products, have become absolutely essential to our economic life.

Given the factors, therefore, of an imperative need to develop and extend our foreign commerce, and that the countries of Asia, with their unnumbered millions, offer a field and an opportunity for trade expansion second to none on earth, where and how do the Philippine Islands enter the equation?

A fact recognized by every competent business man is that trade depends largely upon location, upon cheapness and convenience in replacing stock, and upon the facilities for reaching and supplying customers. As "business concerns" alive to these same principles, every great trading nation except the United States has consequently exerted itself unceasingly to acquire strategic commercial bases throughout the world, from which and through which it can foster its overseas trade and minister to the welfare of its people.

In the Far East, Great Britain has, and will retain, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Kowloon, while its Asiatic holdings include India, Burmah, the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States, and parts of Borneo. France, through its hold on Indo-China, controls the ports of Saigon and Haiphong, as also a rail line of 500 miles from



the latter point into the Chinese province of Yunnan. Holland has the Dutch East Indies, with the important ports of Batavia, Soerabaya, and Macassar. Japan has developed Kobe into a great distributing centre, and dominates the trade of Korea and Manchuria through the ports of Fusan and Dalny. Russia retains Vladivostok and the great hinterland of Siberia, linked with China and Europe by the Trans-Siberian Railway. Remains then the United States, and its offering in the way of an Oriental outpost from which to meet and successfully resist this organized advance of its trade adversaries.

Without its seeking, and in the performance of a national duty, Fate thrust upon the United States the Philippine archipelago, rich in every natural resource and situated at the very doors of this Asiatic treasure house for whose present and potential markets its rivals had fought and intrigued and sacrificed through almost a century. Coupled with the Panama Canal, our great Western ports, and the Hawaiian Islands and Guam, the Philippines furnish an incomparable vantage point from which the United States can play a leading rôle in the stirring drama now staging in the far Pacific. Within a radius of thirty-five hundred miles lives half the population of the globe, while a lesser radius of seventeen hundred miles includes the ports of Hong Kong, Amoy, Shanghai, Kobe, Yokohama, Saigon, Bangkok, Singapore, Batavia, Soerabaya, and other large centres of Oriental trade. With reason the Philippines have been described as "lying at the cross roads of the greatest trade routes of the future."

Manila has a deep-water, protected harbour, where ships of any draught can load and unload at substantial piers, and where American bottoms are now assured a

“home port,” with equal, if not preferential, rights as to fueling, port facilities, bonding of cargo, etc. As the terminus of fast steamers plying to and from the United States, and with feeder ships for concentrating and distributing cargo therefrom, there is every reason to prophesy that under our flag Manila will become, in due course, one of the great trading centres of the Far East. Lord Northcliffe, characterized “as probably the best observer living,” remarked after visiting Manila shortly before his death:

The interest of most Americans in the Philippines is sentimental, but the British and the Australians know Manila as probably the finest distributing centre in the East, not excepting Hong Kong.

In line with this frank statement of an outsider we have the studied conclusions of one of our ranking naval officers, interested solely in serving the best interests of the United States. Rear Admiral Hilary P. Jones, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the General Board, United States Navy, appearing before the Senate Committee on Insular Affairs, March 3, 1924, testified in part as follows:

It seems to naval officers as if our country were going to depend more and more in the future upon its seaborne commerce, and that for us to sacrifice our only outlying position of commercial importance in the world would be a very grave step that would cost us dearly in the future. The greatest commercial countries have been those that built up colonies and bases all over the world to support their commerce. America has not done this, nor has it any chance of doing it at present. The most we can do apparently is to retain those advantages which we have gained legally and not to retire from them in order that some other more enterprising Power may avail itself of the privileges we surrender.

The yearly expenditure of ten or twelve millions of dollars in maintaining a stable government where we have special responsibilities is a very economical way of warding off troubles which might otherwise

develop into situations requiring the expenditure in war of many hundreds of millions.

The money spent in maintaining the Philippines is not money wasted, but money used to guarantee stability where there will be instability if we surrender our guardianship, and with that instability are likely to come expenses now undreamed of by us.

The Navy considers that we must possess bases in the Philippines. They are vital to our operations in the western Pacific—so vital that I consider their abandonment tantamount to abandonment of our ability to protect our interests in the Far East.

It will naturally occur to any one considering the question of naval bases to suggest that Manila Bay and Corregidor be retained for naval use in the Philippines. As a peace-time arrangement this would be very desirable. As a war-time arrangement, it would be rather futile, unless it carried with it complete power to defend the position, not when the attack came, but before the attack came, by having always present strong military forces capable of delaying any aggression until such time as reinforcements might arrive from the United States. The defence of Corregidor will stop ships from entering the harbour, but they will not stop troops from coming over from any direction and investing Manila Bay. Nothing will stop troops on land, except other troops on land, once hostile troops gain a foothold.

Important and valuable, however, as are the Philippines to the United States as a naval base and as an outpost for Oriental trade expansion, this tells but half the story of the part they are fitted to take in the economic welfare of the American people.

Of the tropical domains of the earth, 40.38 per cent., with area of 8,258,970 square miles, are independent; 59.00 per cent., with area of 12,167,970 square miles, are owned or administered by European Powers, while but 0.62 per cent., with area of 125,992 square miles, are owned by the United States. Without the Philippines, the only tropical territory remaining to our country would be the Hawaiian Islands and Porto Rico, with area of 10,055 square miles, or 0.05 per cent. of the whole. On the other hand, the United States consumes more tropical

products than any other nation, its imports of food and raw materials from the tropics and semi-tropics now aggregating over \$2,000,000,000 annually, for practically all of which we are dependent upon the goodwill and tariff regulations of trade competitors. As population increases the need and value of these importations will steadily grow, creating a situation whose possible disastrous consequences to our industries and people are as yet barely realized. Prosperous and happy, we go our way believing we are the favoured of earth and that the future will provide.

Early in 1923 Great Britain levied an export tax on rubber grown in her tropical possessions, with result that Americans learned—most of them for the first time—that while the United States consumes 75 per cent. of the world supply of rubber, Great Britain controls 85 per cent. of world production. This fact—in conjunction with the export tax—is now costing American consumers approximately \$150,000,000 annually. In addition, Secretary Hoover recently referred to like foreign monopolies and combinations increasing the prices of sisal, nitrates and iodine, quinine, coffee, and other articles, while a proposal by Canada to embargo further exportations of pulpwood created consternation among our paper manufacturers.

The handwriting is plain and requires no seer to decipher it. As in the matter of foreign-trade bases, countries with longer vision than the United States have systematically acquired and developed possessions abroad, from which they are assured a constant supply of raw materials for their industries and of food products for their people. Inevitably, as home demands tend to consume the output, or as trade exigencies require, exports of such raw materials and food products to other countries will

be curtailed or prohibited. Equally certain is it that the United States, without its own controlled sources of supply, will become a victim, with increased frequency, of the needs or cupidity of competitor countries more fortunately situated.

A partial list of tropical products now imported by the United States, and which enter into the social and industrial life of our people, includes the following: Sugar and molasses, rubber and gutta percha, vegetable oils, desiccated and shredded coconut, copra, fibres of all kinds, tobacco and its products, cabinet woods, coffee, tea, cocoa, dyewoods and extracts, fruits and nuts, gums and resins, wood pulp, rattan, spices, quinine, indigo, kapok, pearl shells, sago, rice, sponges, tanbark, etc.

The Philippine Islands now produce, or can produce, practically every tropical product known to commerce, and afford to the United States, if properly utilized, a latent source of domestic supply as to all such articles sufficient largely to satisfy the needs of our people and liberate them from dependence upon foreign countries.

With its great area of productive, untilled lands, the Philippine archipelago could be made the future sugar storehouse of the world. It now excels in the growing of coconuts and in the production of copra and vegetable oils. It holds a natural monopoly of Manila hemp, and is capable of producing almost unlimited quantities of maguey and other fibres. Its forest wealth offers a source of supply for the world's fast-diminishing store of hardwoods, while the great Island of Mindanao could produce all and more of the rubber required by the United States through a long future.

Such, then, is the possible economic value of the Philippines to the American people, both as a naval and trade

base in the Far East and as a controlled source of domestic supply for tropical products. To surrender the islands is to eliminate ourselves from a preferred position to share if not to dominate the greatest potential markets of the world, and to place ourselves at the mercy of competing nations in the matter of essential food products and raw materials, to which they hold the key. To do this with the welfare of our own nationals a paramount consideration, and in the almost certain knowledge that it will result to the everlasting prejudice and hurt of the Philippine people, would be to enthrone Don Quixote as a paragon of wisdom and farsightedness. As well might the owner of a manufacturing plant, having at his command everything necessary to successful production, deliberately give away certain essential parts, and then go into the market and buy them, if possible, from his business competitors at their own price.

That a realization of these facts may come too late is altogether probable. Our Congress, with its partisan squabbles, its regional "blocs," and the disposition of individual members to play local politics, has thus far shown little ability or disposition to protect our foreign traders or to act in the interests of our country as a whole. With billions of dollars invested in a merchant marine, laws are perpetuated which render it impossible for our ships to compete on even terms with those of other countries. With millions of dollars spent annually on our Department of Commerce and its agencies, the recommendations of that Department, and of our various commercial and foreign trade bodies, are consistently ignored. The difficulties American merchants encounter abroad are not only minimized, but their efforts are deliberately handicapped and obstructed. The nature of these

difficulties, and the general needs of the situation, were stated as follows by Secretary Hoover as far back as April, 1921:

We are at a disadvantage against European manufacturers and exporters in our foreign marketing machinery and our lack of foothold in industry abroad. Except in a few industries, we do not have an adequate representation of native Americans in wholesale business, and in general business enterprises in foreign countries.

Every merchant will agree with me that the sale of goods abroad is a matter of salesmanship and national sentiment as well as of quality and prices. None except our own citizens can properly represent these factors. We can liken our present foreign marketing system to a supply train and a general staff, with no fighting men on the front. Our competitors hold the front line and naturally we lose the market when competition arises.

In addition to distribution, one of the strongest foundations of foreign trade is our own citizens engaged in foreign industry. Their enterprises constitute a constant pull of machinery and supplies. It is useless for our Government to say to Americans: "Exile yourselves; get into business, distribution, and industry; protect our foreign trade." Other nations, even under the pressure of necessity, have required generations to build up their marketing systems and their foreign industries.

Since 1916, however—and the situation remains unchanged—the United States applies to Americans living abroad, and to income derived by them from purely foreign sources, exactly the same tax rates as apply to persons and income within the States. It does this despite the fact that competing nations, old at the game, levy no such taxes upon their foreign traders for home uses. The handicap such a policy works upon our merchants in China (and it applies to other foreign countries) was described as follows by Miss A. Viola Smith, for three years Assistant Trade Commissioner, Shanghai, in testimony given before the House Judiciary Committee in January, 1924:

American manufacturers who are represented through American concerns in China are at a disadvantage in that, on account of their home taxation, they have to ask more for their products than if represented through a British outfit. I have seen calculations made which show that the American had to sell for one and one half per cent. more on the price of their products than their British competitors can sell for.

You will be interested in knowing that there are twenty British firms in Shanghai who hold three hundred and four American agencies. What is the cause of that? There are several causes. The British themselves seek the American agencies, those where the article involved is better in quality than manufactured by the British, such as typewriters, calculating machines, etc. The reason is that they know that, on account of their taxation advantage, they can undersell the Americans. There are a lot of American manufacturers who go into the field and are not ready to open up their own offices there. They look about for trade representation and when they get to thinking about real business, if they find that the British can sell their product at a lower price and get more business for them than the American who has to ask more for the same product, they place the agency with the British. That is not fair to the American trade.

The needs and prestige of the United States imperatively require that Americans engage in foreign service and undertake foreign ventures, and yet our Congress starts them in the race with this tax burden on their backs. By what sleight-of-hand they are expected to win in such case against competitors trained to the minute, and carrying no weight, is a State secret. Either they\* must lose the business or meet the prices of their competitors, who pay no such tax and are free to market their wares accordingly. An even break, with a fighting chance for success, is the least these pioneer Americans have a right to expect in their struggle to create and develop new markets for American products. The odds against them are already sufficiently great without stacking the cards in favour of their more experienced opponents.

From 1918 to 1921, Americans residing and doing busi-



ness in the Philippines were required to pay United States income taxes upon their purely local earnings, while Filipinos and foreigners, "engaged in a like business or calling," were exempt therefrom. In other words, our own nationals, residing in our own territory, were penalized in favour of foreign competitors and trade rivals who shared equally with them every benefit and protection of our sovereignty. This bizarre state of affairs was corrected by Congress in 1921, without, however, making any provision then or since to relieve our citizens from the injustice perpetrated during preceding years.

A situation equally anomalous to this tax matter, and inconceivable under any government other than the United States, now exists in the Philippines in relation to rubber. Given the present dependence of American consumers upon British sources of supply, and a possibility that the jump of \$150,000,000 in rubber costs for 1923 might later be doubled or trebled, our manufacturers took steps to grow their own product and thus provide a measure of protection against the future. It has been demonstrated that the Island of Mindanao, southern Philippines, combines every essential for rubber production, and American interests were prepared to enter the field and spend millions of dollars on development. The land laws of the Philippines, however, limit the lease or purchase of public lands by corporations to 2,500 acres, this despite the scant population of the islands and their over 60,000,000 acres of unoccupied public domain. As 2,500 acres are palpably insufficient to justify the overhead and other expenses incident to development of a worth-while rubber plantation, Governor-General Wood recommended to the Philippine Legislature that provision be made for lease to American rubber companies, on terms favourable to the

Government, of fifty-thousand-acre tracts. The Philippine Legislature, however, dominated by two or three Filipinos, refused to adopt such measure, and this hope of rubber development in the Philippines, with its promise of relief to American consumers, went glimmering.

The Island of Mindanao, with area of 37,000 square miles, has an estimated population of less than 650,000. It is inhabited largely by Moros, favourable to American sovereignty. Its public lands are property of the United States, the "administration" thereof only having been conferred by Congress upon the Philippine Legislature. Moreover, if a reversionary right to the Island of Mindanao exists in any one, the Moros have a preferred claim. We have the spectacle, therefore, of a small coterie of Filipino politicians in Manila blocking the disposition and utilization of public lands of the United States, required for its uses, to which lands such Filipinos, and the element they represent, never had, and have not now, any claim or title whatsoever. The only authority competent to relieve this situation is the Congress of the United States. Given its past performances, however, in the matter of protecting American interests abroad, there is little prospect of any constructive legislation by it in this particular case.

The question will doubtless be raised as to how the United States can square its economic need to retain some form of permanent control over the Philippines and their potential resources, with the promise by Congress, contained in the preamble of the Jones Bill, to grant the islands independence "as soon as a stable government can be established therein."

It might be argued that the dangers fronting a small Philippine nation are so permanent, and that the present stage of political and material development of the great

masses of the Philippine people is so embryonic, that any possibility of qualifying for independence under this Jones Bill preamble is so remote as to become negligible.

A further argument, and it is vital to the question, involves *the power* of Congress to alienate American sovereignty over the Philippines, or over any territory belonging to the United States. Construing the force and effect of the Paris Treaty, our Supreme Court ruled in the Diamond Rings Case (183 U. S. 176) that:

They [the Philippines] came under the complete and absolute sovereignty and dominion of the United States, and so became territory of the United States over which civil government could be established.

This treaty was executed by the President and ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Senate, thus becoming "the supreme law of the land." It would certainly be anomalous to have Congress, through a bare majority of its members, supersede or destroy the rights acquired and obligations assumed by the treaty-making powers of the Government. Sovereignty in the United States—together with every privilege appertaining thereto or flowing therefrom—is vested in the people as a whole and in the several States. The Constitution confers no authority upon Congress to "cede" or "sell" these basic rights of "the people of the United States" to a foreign power or State. It has never been done in the history of the Republic, and recognized experts on Constitutional Law hold that such alienation can only occur through a plebiscite of the American people (for which no provision now exists), or through a Constitutional amendment.

Par. 2, Sec. 3, Art. 4 of the Constitution provides:

The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belong-

ing to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States or of any particular state.

It is argued by some that the words "to dispose of" in this Article authorize Congress to "alienate sovereignty" over territory under the dominion of the United States. Read in the light of conditions existing when the Constitution was adopted, however, and applying the meaning then given such words, no such interpretation is possible. As used at that time the words "to dispose of" signify simply—"To have the control, ordering or disposition of; the act of arranging, ordering, bestowing or distributing; a disposing, placing or arranging." They were not synonymous, in any sense, with "sell," "transfer," or "alienate." Acting under its legitimate powers, Congress, through the Organic Acts of 1902 and 1916, set up a civil government for the Philippine Islands, and they are now, to all intents, an organized territory of the United States. Moreover, any alienation or surrender of the Philippines by Congress would clearly "prejudice the claims of the United States and of the several States," in whom are vested not only every right, tangible and intangible, appurtenant to sovereignty, but also a paramount interest in the public domain of the archipelago, and all other property acquired from Spain or thereafter established in the islands at the expense of the American people.

Alpheus H. Snow, in his standard work, "The Administration of Dependencies," after an exhaustive research bearing upon this specific point, states (p. 470):

It has been supposed that the power "to dispose of" the dependencies includes the power to sell the rights of the American Union over them to a foreign State. There is, however, contemporaneous evidence of

the highest character against this construction. In the Convention of the State of Virginia which met on June 2, 1788, to consider the question of the ratification of the Federal Constitution, an amendment was proposed which provided as follows:

"No treaty ceding, contracting, restraining or suspending the territorial rights or claims of the United States, or any of them . . . shall be made, but in cases of the most urgent and extreme necessity, nor shall any such treaty be ratified without the concurrence of three-fourths of the whole number of members of both Houses respectively."

Governor Edmund Randolph, who, as already noticed, had headed the Virginia delegation in the Convention and presented the Virginia resolutions, opposed this proposed amendment, saying:

"Of all the amendments, this is the most destructive, which requires the consent of three-fourths of both Houses to treaties ceding or restraining territorial rights. . . . *There is no power in the Constitution to cede any part of the United States.* But this amendment admits, in the fullest latitude, that Congress have a right to dismember the Empire."

The amendment proposed by Virginia was not adopted, and the Constitution of the United States as then ratified, and as now effective, does not empower Congress—by a three-fourths vote or otherwise—to make any promises as to the future status of the Philippines binding upon the American people, or "to dismember the Empire" through a sale or surrender of American sovereignty over such islands to other interests.

That the Philippines to-day form an integral part of the United States, and do not occupy some nebulous relation to the Union which permits Congress to alienate them at will, was clearly laid down in principle by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of *Loughborough v. Blake* (5 Wheaton 317), decided in 1820. The point at issue involved construction of the first paragraph of Art. 8 of the Constitution, which provides that—"all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform *throughout the United States.*" The Court said:

The power then to lay and collect duties, imposts and excises, may be exercised and must be exercised throughout the United States. Does this term designate the whole or any particular portion of the American empire? Certainly this question can admit of but one answer. It is the name given to our great republic, which is composed of States *and territories*. The District of Columbia, or the territory west of the Missouri, is not less within the United States than Maryland or Pennsylvania.

This "territory west of the Missouri," held by Chief Justice Marshall to be no less a part of the American empire than Maryland or Pennsylvania, was acquired through no different treaty procedure than the Philippine archipelago, nor was such territory held in 1820 under any firmer title or completer sovereignty than applies to-day to the territory of the Philippines, organized and operating by virtue of laws enacted by the Government of the United States.

If the foregoing argument as to the political experience and stability of the Philippine people be waived, however, as also the matter of constitutional power in Congress to alienate sovereignty, it is increasingly apparent, as time passes, that responsible Filipino sentiment is steadily veering from absolute independence in favour of some tie or connection whereby the continued protection and guidance of the United States will be guaranteed. Whatever their belief as to "political capacity," many of the clearer-sighted and more patriotic Filipino leaders now see looming back of their independence ideal the specter of economic unpreparedness, with its grisly train of tariff walls, a fiat and debased currency, trade depression, depleted revenues, army and navy expenditures, civil strife, foreign intervention, and those other multiplied ills which ever wait upon a feeble, impoverished, and bankrupt people. Certainly the existence and recognition of some

bond between the islands and the United States which would lay this damning vision, and insure to Filipinos the same liberties, and the same rights, privileges and opportunities, at home and abroad, that are to-day enjoyed by any American, would be the part of wisdom and could well be advocated and encouraged by every Filipino interested in the welfare of his country and people.

The efforts and energies of the two peoples, therefore, American and Filipino, should be directed to devising some arrangement whereby they could join forces and work together in union and harmony to the mutual profit and satisfaction of both. Whether such arrangement should be modelled after the present British Commonwealths, or take other form, is a matter of detail offering no difficulties if approached in the proper spirit. Whatever the form, however, the Filipinos would be assured, and increasingly receive, every measure of local autonomy consistent with the welfare of their people and the interests of all.

The United States has many big problems engaging its attention, and this matter of the Philippines and their disposition may seem unimportant in comparison. If we vision the long future, however, and the steadily increasing part which the securing and conserving of natural resources are taking in the economy of nations, it is doubtful if any problem more vitally affects the destiny of the American people than does this question of our relations to the Philippines and the Far East. Involved in whatever action we take, and of equal bearing upon the conscience of all Americans, is the fate of a promising but largely helpless people, for whose future welfare and happiness we stand responsible before the world.





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
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